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The aim of this research is to demonstrate the feasibility of remotely sensing nuclear and 
radiological threat materials by leveraging recent advances in radiation detectors, unmanned 
systems, and contextual sensors.  The broad intent is to get detectors out of the hands of 
humans and onto semi-autonomous systems for a wide range of use cases.  The search for 
special nuclear material is one specific mission area where radiation detectors employed on 
small unmanned aerial systems could provide significant operational value by exploiting the 
advantages that remote access enables: improved collection time, decreased source-to-
detector distance, and reduced unintentional shielding.  The goals of this study are fivefold: 
(1) assess current capabilities for directed search and substantiate the improvement that an 
unmanned approach would provide, (2) expand the understanding of the background radiation 
environment to include building rooftops, (3) establish system requirements and map out the 
parameter space of trade-offs (i.e., trade space) based on an analysis of current sensor and 
platform capabilities, (4) investigate and optimize search methods, and (5) identify and 
characterize additional mission areas for further investigation.   
To achieve these five goals, we started by identifying boundary conditions for signal 
collection time, source-to-detector distance (i.e., standoff), and intervening material 
attenuation for three different search modes: vehicle-mounted standoff detection, rotary-wing 
aerial detection, and small unmanned aerial system-based remote detection.  The objective of 
this analysis was to calculate the theoretical reduction in detector area required to achieve the 
same minimum detectable activity of a 137Cs source for a given detector material.   We found 
that measuring from the rooftop with just 50 cm2 of detector area should detect smaller activity 
sources than 10,000 cm2 in a vehicle-borne approach or 5,000 cm2 in an aerial helicopter-
borne approach. 
Our next objective was to characterize the background radiation environment sensed from 
the rooftops of light industrial buildings.  We conducted a measurement campaign across 
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fifteen buildings varying in geographic location, size, shape, height, wall construction, and 
roofing material.  We discovered the variation in the background radiation ranged up to ±50% 
when analyzing contributions from seven prominent background peaks.  Across a single 
building, this variation ranged 25–40% for contributions from potassium, uranium, and 
thorium.  We also examined the attenuation of radiation by roofing materials both in 
simulation and experiment.  We found that typical roof construction attenuates 1461 keV 
gamma-rays by approximately 50% when passing normal to the roof and continues to increase 
as the incident angle between the source and the detector increases.  This observation directly 
influenced our approach to developing an optimal search scheme.   
With knowledge of the background and consideration of threat signatures, we then 
initiated an effort to develop a system architecture and design a sensor suite capable of 
detecting relevant threats in the anticipated environment.  We employed established 
requirements analysis techniques to frame the development of a system that will provide 
tangible operational value to the user.  We examined the trade space for platforms and sensors 
in terms of size, weight, power, cost, and visibility profile.  Although our survey of capabilities 
is a snapshot in time, it lays the foundation for future analysis of alternatives.  We recommend 
a platform that can move both through the air and on the ground and suggest further 
exploration of tube-launched systems for several military mission areas employing radiation 
sensors.  For detectors, we recommend room temperature semi-conductors: cadmium zinc 
telluride for gamma-ray spectroscopy and lithium-backfilled etched-silicon diodes for neutron 
detection.  Technologies such as real-time kinematic positioning, solid-state light depth and 
ranging, and thermal infrared cameras warrant further study as auxiliary contextual sensors in 
the system.         
Assuming an overmatched system is attainable, we then constructed a method to select 
advantageous measurement locations and developed techniques to optimize a search pattern.  
We devised a nonlinear programming routine and applied threshold cuts to reduce the time to 
converge to a near-optimal solution.  We also explored several parameters that might be used 
as the objective quantity depending on the mission requirements and intelligence assessment.   
Finally, with the intent of removing humans from the task of operating detectors in 
elevated radiation areas, we sought to expand our inquiry to seven additional military mission 
areas.  We briefly examined a historical vignette where unmanned radiation detection assets 
would have provided considerable value, summarized the general operational conditions, 
assessed the impact that remote detection might have on the speed, accuracy, fidelity, safety, 
or feasibility of a given mission, and identified unique challenges that might arise in 
developing a materiel solution.  These additional areas are ripe for exploration and 
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he means to remotely and autonomously sense the location and distribution of 
radiological and nuclear sources across a range of operational environments is a 
capability that could benefit nearly every field application of radiation detection. The 
applications for remote radiation detection are not new.  For many years, instrumentation has 
often been accomplished remotely for activities in the nuclear field such as reactor control, 
weapons testing, spent fuel monitoring, and dosimetry.  The aspect of remote radiation sensing 
that is novel and exciting is the vast improvement in the technology to access dangerous, 
harsh, denied, extensive, and otherwise complex environments.  Unmanned systems, 
colloquially known as drones and robots, have rapidly matured in both capability and ubiquity 
over the past 20 years. 
Most ionizing radiation detection methods, particularly for gamma and neutron sources, 
meet the basic definition for remote sensing, in that physical contact with the source is not 
required.  However, the term remote sensing generally refers to the use of satellite- or aircraft-
based sensor technologies at standoff distances.  While large standoff distances are certainly 
desired, most operationally relevant scenarios involving radiation sources require source-to-
detector distances of no greater than several to perhaps tens of meters.  In this study, we use 
the term remote radiation detection to indicate one or more of the following conditions 
concerning a radiation source or distribution of sources with regards to the location of a 
sensor: (1) an operationally significant standoff distance between the source and sensor, (2) 
the presence of structures or other barriers between the source and sensor, or (3) a significant 
dissimilarity in the source environment and the environment at the location of the human 
operator or controller.  Remote radiation detection generally assumes far-field application, 
with possible intervening material such as buildings, walls, or vehicles, and does not require 
an operator to be co-located with the system.   
Unmanned systems are being developed at a rapid pace for military, commercial, 
industrial, and recreational uses.  Improved radiation detection systems and associated 
imaging and mapping modalities are being mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and even unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to 
produce novel and innovative radiation detection capabilities.  These unmanned systems are 
often equipped with auxiliary sensors that capture contextual information from a scene and 
measure the position, velocity, orientation, heading, and altitude to a high degree of precision 
many times per second.  The advancement in these two fields presents a unique opportunity 
to provide significant improvement in source detection, localization, identification, and 
mapping, thereby delivering real operational value to the radiation detection community of 
users.  While traditional incremental improvements to detector performance characteristics—
better energy resolution, improved efficiency, faster timing—play a role in enhancing 
capability, it is access to the full range of contextual information and the ability to maneuver 







One does not achieve operational capability by simply mounting a radiation detector to a 
commercially-available UAV, though that avenue has indeed been pursued.  While that 
approach may provide some limited capability and undoubtedly helps identify the 
shortcomings of a given system, a detailed analysis of requirements and development of key 
performance parameters often shortens the spiral development cycle and leads to a better 
capability.  Hence, the objectives of the research presented here are (1) explore the sensor 
trade space and make recommendations for a real-world operational radiation detection 
mission, (2) develop methods to optimize collection schemes for unmanned systems, and (3) 
make recommendations for future inquiries and identify areas for further investment of 
resources. 
Remote access, coupled with radiation detection, is desirable for several reasons.  First, a 
human being does not have to enter or remain in a potentially dangerous, harsh, or otherwise 
difficult to reach environment.  Remotely accessing a radiation area precludes unnecessary 
exposure and possible contamination of personnel.  Beyond avoiding potential radiological 
hazards, remote access also protects personnel from exposure to the elements (e.g., heat, cold, 
sun, and rain), as well as potential threats in a hostile or otherwise uncertain situation. 
Second, remote access often denotes access to locations that are inaccessible or 
inhospitable to a human operator.  For radiation detection, this can result 
in significant increases in the signal collection by (1) positioning the 
sensors closer to locations of interest to increase the detector solid angle, 
(2) approaching a location of interest from a different vantage point, 
including from above, to reduce the attenuation by intervening material, 
and (3) dwelling in a location for much longer than a human operator 
could remain safely or comfortably to improve statistical confidence.  
While there are certain locations and situations where a human operator 
will have better access or operational insight, many radiation detection 
operations could be performed just as well or better by remote means.   
Third, unmanned platforms can reduce the variation in radiation 
measurements caused by changes in a human operator’s speed and path, 
position and orientation of the detector, and attenuation and scattering 
generated by the operator’s body and equipment.  Integrated sensors on 
UAVs enable finer control of speed, path, height, and orientation.  
Additional sensors may also be employed to capture 3-D scene data.  
Finally, the cost of remote access has dropped considerably, and 
access has skyrocketed.  Just two decades ago, remote access was 
primarily limited to specialized robotic platforms designed for scientific 
investigation, explosive ordnance disposal, or avid hobbyists.  Now,  
children are using smartphones to fly sophisticated UAVs in parks and neighborhoods around 
the world, as in Figure 1.1, which speaks directly to the cost, ease of control, and ubiquity.  
Figure 1.1: 11-
year-old Ryan 
McManus pilots a 







The capability to detect, locate, identify, and characterize radiological and nuclear 
materials using remote sensing platforms is a shared requirement across the many 
stakeholders in the radiation detection community.  This technology has relevance to 
applications in homeland security and law enforcement, customs and border protection, 
nuclear power plant activities, nuclear waste monitoring, environmental remediation, and 
military operations.  The primary focus for this investigation is radiation detection in support 
of military operations. 
The choice to focus on potential military applications is threefold.  The principal reason is 
that the author is an active duty nuclear counterproliferation officer in the U.S. Army, with 
specific knowledge and expertise in radiation detection requirements for the Department of 
Defense (DoD).  His training and prior assignments have given him a robust understanding of 
the operational tasks, conditions, constraints, limitations, assumptions, capabilities, and risks 
for the employment of radiological and nuclear search assets. 
Next, the overlap between military applications and the functions other entities might have 
for this technology are considerable.  Most often, military applications will have more 
stringent operational requirements, whereas other governmental or private applications may 
have more stringent regulatory restrictions.  Therefore, as a generalized assumption, 
operational capabilities that meet the requirements for a given military mission area will also 
likely meet or exceed the operational requirements of a related civil or commercial 
application.  However, modifications to the system design or concept of operation and 
employment may be required.  For example, law enforcement operations may have additional 
requirements regarding the chain of custody or privacy restrictions that might not apply to a 
similar military application.  The bottom line is that a detection system that meets the general 
operational requirements for military applications will tend to meet the operational 
requirements of most other users as well. 
Finally, military applications present the most diverse, challenging, and likely use-cases 
for this technology.  Of interest to this author and related research projects are the following 
military mission areas: directed search, battle damage assessment, consequence 
management, accident response, nuclear contamination avoidance, nuclear forensics, 
nuclear disablement, and active interrogation.   
1.2 Mission Areas 
The following section introduces each military mission area, and the appendix provides 
further details to include: (1) a historical vignette where unmanned radiation detection assets 
would have provided considerable value, (2) a summary of the general operational conditions, 
(3) an assessment of the impact that remote detection might have on the speed, accuracy, 
fidelity, safety, or feasibility of a given mission, and (4) a brief consideration of the unique 






Directed search describes operations conducted to detect, locate, identify, characterize, 
and recover lost or stolen nuclear or radiological material.  It is a prominent focus area in 
radiation detection research and development efforts for the DoD, and arguably across other 
government agencies as well.  This mission area is the primary focus for this research 
endeavor, and we describe it in further detail in Section 1.3 and in the appendix.   
Battle Damage Assessment 
Battle damage assessment (BDA) encompasses the estimate of the damage resulting from 
the application of lethal or nonlethal military force.  Traditionally, it is associated with 
assessing the damage inflicted on a target from a stand-off weapon, such as a bomb or guided 
missile. Assessments of the physical damage, functional damage, and effect on the targeted 
systems are made to inform further actions [1].  As an example, the commander’s desired 
effect for a given strike might be physical damage to an underground hangar complex or 
airfield that prevents an enemy from launching fighter jets for some number of hours.  In this 
case, verification of the depth and placement of craters provides evidence of a functional kill. 
While the strike has not destroyed any of the fighter jets, the ability to launch them has been 
delayed long enough to make their threat moot.  Alternatively, if the physical damage was not 
achieved on-target, it may drive the commander to authorize another sortie or to adjust the 
plan to account for the possible employment of enemy fighter jets. 
This principle can also be applied to targets with a nuclear or radiological component.  An 
unmanned capability to detect, locate, identify, and map radioactive or nuclear material would 
prove useful in scenarios where facilities associated with such materials are targeted.  While 
BDA to some extent is unique to military operations, the radiation detection requirements are 
likely to be quite similar to that of a civil response to an incident where radiological or nuclear 
material is explosively spread over an urban or industrial area, such as a dirty-bomb scenario 
or a nuclear device that fails to achieve a significant nuclear yield, known as a fizzle.  For this 
reason, there is an additional incentive to develop a capability.   
Consequence Management 
Consequence management comprises those measures taken to protect public health and 
safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, 
businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, 
or high-yield explosive incident [1]. From a DoD perspective, there are several reasons to 
maintain the capability to conduct nuclear consequence management operations.  First, the 
DoD possesses, operates, and maintains nuclear reactors and weapons that could be the source 
of the situation.  Second, DoD forces could be part of those affected by the consequences of 
a nuclear incident.  Third, the DoD could be called to assist civil authorities with executing 






The priorities for the DoD response to U.S. nuclear weapon accidents are the location, 
security, and recovery of the weapon; the protection of lives and property; and remediation of 
the site [2]. Even though accidents involving nuclear weapons are particularly low occurrence 
events—just thirty-two documented U.S. “broken arrow” events since 1950—they remain a 
low-probability high-consequence event, even when taking modern safety design features into 
account [3].  While the high-alert nature of Cold War–era strategies, particularly Operation 
Chrome Dome, increased the probability of such events, the estimated 1,750 U.S. weapons 
that remain operationally deployed is a sober fact that must be taken into consideration when 
planning a response to mishaps involving special nuclear materials [4].  Some of the tasks 
where an unmanned capability could prove useful are assessing the extent of the accident site, 
confirming or denying the release of radioactive material, mapping the radioactive 
contamination, locating aircraft or missile parts, locating nuclear material or weapons 
components, and verifying site remediation.  
Nuclear Contamination Avoidance 
Limited nuclear warfare requires forces, on both sides of the conflict, to be prepared to 
operate in and cross through a nuclear-contaminated area. A required supporting task is to 
conduct a terrain-oriented zone or route reconnaissance to plan a route that minimizes the 
radiation exposure to forces, subject to the constraints of other competing military factors [5]. 
Current doctrine employs either Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Radiological (CBRN) 
reconnaissance platoons or rotary-wing aircraft outfitted with dosimeters and survey meters.  
Current generation M1135 Stryker Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Reconnaissance Vehicles 
(NBCRV) are medium armored vehicles which use readings from a vehicle-mounted beta and 
gamma probe—the Army-Navy Vehicle or Dismounted Radiac-meter (AN/VDR-2)—that 
measures dose rate and records accumulated dose [6].   
Although the threat of limited nuclear warfare may not be at the top of the list of the most 
likely conflict scenarios, it remains possible and is a driver of validated materiel requirements 
within the DoD.  The potential benefits of developing an unmanned reconnaissance system 
for contamination avoidance are numerous: (1) reduce dose to personnel, (2) increase 
coverage area, (3) avoid terrain limitations, (4) allow CBRN personnel to conduct other 
missions, (5) lower cost, and others.  A UAV could even be launched from an M1135 Stryker 







Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear and other radioactive materials, either pre- 
or post-detonation, using various collection methods and analytical techniques to determine 
the composition, origin, age, and history of a material [7, 8]. Arguably the most advanced 
capabilities in remote sensing of radiation reside within the field of nuclear forensics.  
Endeavors sponsored by government agencies to develop pre-detonation capabilities focus 
primarily on nonproliferation and monitoring efforts.  Though a nation could decide that it is 
necessary and prudent to conduct atmospheric testing of their nuclear weapons—which makes 
forensic collection much easier—the source term for monitoring nuclear testing is generally 
located deep underground.  Very little of the fission products make it out into the atmosphere 
unless there is a malfunction during the test.  Rapidly deployable air collection and measuring 
systems are required to verify such tests.  Such a capability has been demonstrated as a bolt-
on pod integrated on a UAV [9]. 
With regards to post-detonation nuclear forensics, however, we do not possess an 
advanced capability to collect samples.  Should a rogue nation-state or violent extremist 
organization detonate a nuclear device in the U.S. or within one of our partner-nations, our 
response policies dictate the collection and measurement of forensic materials from the nearby 
fallout area to attribute the device or fissile material to a source, especially when it is not 
readily evident or needs to be confirmed.  An unmanned system would have many benefits to 
this mission area but would also likely have the most stringent constraints.  Not only would it 
need to operate in a complex and high radiation setting, like that of a contamination avoidance 
mission, it would also need to be capable of excellent specificity and localization in a highly 
inhomogeneous environment.  Current efforts are focused on using swarms of UAVs to 
characterize a debris field to direct follow-on forces to auspicious collection areas with lower 
dose rates [10]. 
Nuclear Disablement  
Nuclear disablement includes those operations associated with the assessment and 
handling of supporting nuclear infrastructure that might be encountered or targeted as part of 
military actions in a given area of operations.  Most likely, this involves the safe shutdown of 
enrichment or reactor facilities, securing materials not yet assembled as a weapon, and any 
other tasks that fall into the category of nuclear-related, excluding weaponized or deployed 
systems [11].  Current capabilities reside in Nuclear Disablement Teams (NDTs)—small 
military teams (~15 personnel) with specialized training in the operation of such facilities, 
and a limited amount of hand-operated or vehicle-mounted detection equipment.  Due to the 
uncertain nature of the mission, location, and conditions, most tasks are completed by hand.  
However, teams usually conduct an initial survey of a facility using either a small, all-terrain 
vehicle, a vehicle-towed trailer system, or a helicopter, outfitted with a set of large directional 





A small number of autonomous radiation sensors could prove invaluable for deliberately 
conducting exterior and interior reconnaissance of the facility.  These would relieve a good 
portion of the NDT members from swinging a meter and free them to use their human 
sensors—primarily their eyes and ears—coupled with their intellect and training.   
Active Interrogation 
Active interrogation involves directing neutrons or high-energy photons toward a target 
and measuring the secondary radiation to gather information about the target.   Government 
agencies have expended tens of millions of dollars or more on active interrogation projects 
since 2001.  Whether the method includes a sizeable bremsstrahlung source, a pulsed neutron 
source, or some other novel source, such as cosmic muons or a photon beam driven by laser-
wake field electron acceleration, they all suffer from one common limitation: the signal they 
induce, while unique and identifiable, obeys the same inverse square law as the passive signal 
and is therefore difficult to detect at any operationally significant range [7].  Detectors must 
be placed close to the target being interrogated to overcome this.  One way to accomplish this 
is by integrating detection elements onboard small UAVs and flying them near the target [12]. 
1.3 Directed Search Vignette  
As noted previously, radiological and nuclear search describes operations conducted to 
detect, locate, identify, characterize, and recover lost or stolen nuclear or radiological material.  
Exactly what the term “search” means and implies to different user groups is exceedingly 
diverse.  Therefore, we use the term “directed search” and further define it here.   
Directed search is a mission area triggered by a credible threat with potential high 
consequence.  In addition to radiation sensors, search forces possess training and capability 
to conduct special reconnaissance and direct action.  Directed search assumes that law 
enforcement, security forces, or intelligence functions have confirmed the loss, theft, or 
possession of radiological or nuclear material of concern by a rogue state or adversarial non-
state actor (e.g., individuals, extremist organizations, and non-governmental entities).  The 
type, quantity, total mass, chemical form, and geometric configuration of the material are 
potentially known or can be approximated.  The suspected location of the material has been 
narrowed to a reasonable-sized search area through intelligence collection and assessment. 
For directed search, we define a reasonable-sized search area as less than ten square kilometers 
(e.g., a small town, a large neighborhood or section of a city, or several small villages).  
Furthermore, light industrial or commercial structures within the search area may be identified 
as possible sites for material storage, device fabrication, or weapons staging. 
Efforts to neutralize attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons or radioactive materials into the 
country have been ongoing since the advent of the Atomic Age.  Fortunately, there have not 
been any publicly confirmed attempts to locate an improvised nuclear device (IND) or 





or stolen material.  One example occurred in 2003 when DoD radiological search assets set 
out to locate two radioactive capsules stolen by looters from a nuclear testing site located at 
Saddam Hussein’s main battlefield testing center in the desert west of Baghdad [13, 14, 15]. 
The site, built in the early-1980s, was used to test equipment, and possibly human subjects, 
in a simulated battlefield radiation environment. Technicians raised radioactive sources on 
towers arranged in an arc around a test pad.  Small metal capsules, each initially containing 
approximately 370 giga-becquerels (GBq)—10 curies (Ci)—of the isotope 60Co, were stored 
in concrete containers at the bases of each of the eight 23 m (75 ft.) testing poles [13].  By 
2003, the sources had decayed to approximately 10% of their original activity but remained a 
significant health hazard and possible RDD threat at ~37 GBq (1 Ci) each.   
According to those with specific knowledge of the mission, finding sources of that strength 
is “the slow pitch softball” variant of search operations [14, 15].  It was quickly accomplished 
by mounting a large detector system containing thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI[Tl]) 
scintillation gamma-ray detectors and 3He-filled proportional tube neutron detectors into a 
military helicopter and scanning the nearby area at low altitude and airspeed [13, 14].  The 
two sources were found along with remnants of the tower poles— the target of the looting—
in two adjacent villages approximately 16 kilometers (10 mi.) north of the testing site [13]. 
Though this search and recovery operation was swift and successful, changes in the 
conditions could have made the mission far more difficult.  For example, the source strength 
and primary gamma-ray energies associated with the decay of the 60Co isotope allowed the 
material to be found from an altitude of more than 100 meters.  Suppose instead it was special 
nuclear material (SNM), secretly hidden from inspectors, that went missing from the Baghdad 
Nuclear Research Facility.  Depending on the material properties, including fissile isotope(s), 
enrichment levels, impurities, and other factors, the gamma and neutron flux produced by the 
material could range several orders of magnitude and be much more difficult or nearly 
impossible to detect from the air.    
For this exemplification, assume that the material consisted of weapons-grade (WG) 
highly enriched uranium (HEU).  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
categorizes 25 kg of HEU as a significant quantity (SQ), which denotes the approximate 
amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive 
device cannot be excluded [16].  Prior to its removal by the IAEA after the 1991 Gulf War, 
Iraq possessed more than 12 kg of slightly irradiated 93%-enriched uranium fuel purchased 
from France as part of the Tammuz-2 reactor.  They also had more than 13 kg each of both 
fresh and irradiated 80%-enriched uranium fuel for the Russian-supplied IRT-5000 research 
reactor [17]. 
Unlike the 60Co sources, which were found lying in the yard of a house and partially buried 
in a field near another [13], assume that the value and hazards associated with the stolen SNM 
were known to the thieves and they kept it in a secure location, such as a non-descript building 
in Fallujah.  The concept of operations calling for a helicopter to fly low and slow to locate 
the material fall apart quickly.  First, the expected radioactive signature from the material 





a helicopter, except for perhaps hovering directly above or landing on the roof.  Second, the 
geographic area that the cobalt sources were recovered from was semi-permissive during the 
operation; i.e., the villagers, while not completely forthcoming with details regarding the 
missing material, were not actively hostile towards U.S. forces at the time.  Had operations 
taken place later in the conflict, those villages at the southern end of the so-called Sunni 
triangle may have been much more hostile, thereby precluding the low and slow flight of a 
manned helicopter and compelling a much larger security presence.  Third, the presence of a 
helicopter flying a search pattern over buildings would certainly trigger apprehension in the 
minds of those possessing the material, prompting them to flee the area or to shield the 
material if they were working with it at the time. 
1.4 Summary 
The identification of capability gaps and the prospect of filling one or more of them is the 
primary motivation for this research project.  It appears that the technology is available and 
the tools to engineer a solution exist.  There are several mission areas that could benefit from 
an unmanned approach to radiation detection. The intent is to get detectors out of the hands 
and off of the backs of warfighters and move them closer to the sources of interest.  For one 
specific directed search scenario, it is a matter of systematically analyzing the threat-space 
and developing a solution to overmatch it.  Hence, the goals of the research presented here are 
(1) assess current capabilities for directed search and substantiate the improvement that an 
unmanned approach would provide, (2) expand the understanding of the background radiation 
environment to include building rooftops, (3) establish system requirements and map out the 
trade space based on an analysis of current sensor and platform capabilities, (4) investigate 
and optimize search methods, and (5) identify and characterize additional mission areas for 
further investigation.   
Given the realities discussed in this chapter, the conditions for high-consequence directed 
search operations involving SNM require pushing detectors as close to the source location as 
possible while not tipping off the adversary to one’s actions.  To that end, a remote sensing 
platform that can be flown, dropped, or launched to a location is an attractive solution to 
reduce the risk to personnel and equipment.  As such, a modest collection of small unmanned 
aerial systems (sUAS) outfitted with radiation detectors coupled to contextual sensors could 
meet those requirements for an estimated $2 million (see Section 5.2.4 for analysis). 
UAVs can fly much closer to buildings and could perhaps land on them undetected.  
Reducing the distance between potential sources and sensors allows one to use smaller and 
more sophisticated detectors to achieve equal or better sensitivity, but with higher specificity.  
Moreover, the reduction in risk across-the-board is unparalleled.  Not only are several 
warfighters and millions of dollars of equipment removed from a potentially high-risk 
situation, but the risk to mission compromise via adversary tip-off is conceivably reduced. 
Of course, there are engineering challenges that must be overcome and trade-offs that need 





for this mission area are the primary focus of the research conducted and presented in this 
work.  The two chief concerns are the optimization of the sensor package and the development 
of the search method.  The choice of detector materials, the quantity and arrangement of 
detector elements, and the selection of auxiliary sensors are paramount in developing a system 
that can detect relevant threats under a given set of conditions.  Beyond that, the effective 
employment of a group of systems requires detailed analysis of individual search patterns, 
collective coverage schemes, and cooperative detection algorithms.   
The other mission areas introduced in this chapter and described further in the appendix 
illustrate various conditions that might dictate a different approach than that of directed 
search.  However, there are likely to be overlaps and synergies that exist between several 
missions that would permit adaptable or modular multipurpose design approaches that employ 





2 Motivating Exemplar 
he customary health physics principles for radiation protection—time, distance, and 
shielding—are applied inversely for most radiation detection applications.  That is, 
one should aim to maximize the collection time, reduce the source-to-detector 
distance, and minimize the material between the source and the detector.  With those 
principles in mind, this chapter compares three different detection schemes for a directed 
search scenario [18]. 
As described in Section1.3, a directed search scenario involves tracking down radiological 
or nuclear material that is known to be lost, stolen, or otherwise possessed by some entity.  
One knows the material characteristics or can reduce it to a limited range of possibilities.  
Intelligence assets have narrowed the search area to a tractable-size and identified target 
locations within the search area.  For this illustration, one can assume that analysts have 
identified several light industrial buildings as targets, each with a footprint of approximately 
10,000 ft2 or less.  
2.1 Detection Schemes 
The three search modes presented for this example are vehicle-mounted standoff 
detection, rotary-wing aerial detection, and sUAS-based remote detection.  The principal goal 
of this comparison is to highlight the theoretical reduction in detector size possible to achieve 
the same signal-to-noise ratio for a given detector material.  Aspects such as cost, size, 
availability, and complexity, which factor into the overall efficacy of a given technique, are 
evaluated as well. 
 
Figure 2.1: Representative detector platforms for comparison. (left) Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory’s (LBNL) Radiological Multisensor Analysis Platform (RadMAP). Source: [19] used 
with permission from J. Curtis and V. Negut.  (center) The National Nuclear Security 
Administration’s (NNSA) rotary-wing Aerial Measurement System (AMS).  Source: [20] used 
with permission from P. Wasiolek.  (right) LBNL’s prototype Localization and Mapping Platform 







Representing mobile standoff detection is Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s 
(LBNL) specialized box truck that is known as the Radiological Multisensor Analysis 
Platform (RadMAP).  It employs 100 square (102×102×51 mm) NaI(Tl) detectors in an 
imaging array, and 14 large-area (85⌀×30 mm) mechanically cooled high-purity germanium 
(HPGe) detectors [22].  The Naval Research Laboratory developed the original system, 
previously called the Mobile Imaging and Spectroscopic Threat Identification system [23].  
LBNL personnel upgraded some of the detectors and contextual sensors used to reconstruct 
the scene as the system travels.  They have collected terabytes of mobile data from the Bay 
Area and elsewhere [24].  
The helicopter depicted in Figure 2.1 exemplifies aerial detection.  It is part of the National 
Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) rotary-wing Aerial Measurement System (AMS).  
AMS generally employs 12 large (51×102×408 mm) NaI(Tl) detectors in the belly of the 
aircraft.  AMS also employs fixed-wing aircraft and has experimented with advanced 
detectors and externally mounted pods.  
The UAV depicted in Figure 2.1 is a commercially-sourced DJI Matrice 600 Pro.  LBNL 
personnel outfitted it with a prototype payload known as the Localization and Mapping 
Platform (LAMP), which is a state-of-the-art system for remote detection.  LAMP has a 
scanning laser light depth and ranging (LiDAR) sensor, several inertial measurement units 
(IMUs), a binocular camera, and onboard scene data fusion processing.  The base platform is 
detector agnostic; in this case, operators mated four small (25.4×25.4×51 mm) thallium-doped 
cesium iodide (CsI[Tl]) detectors in a self-occluding array.  In other incarnations, researchers 
configured LAMP with better energy resolution detectors such as cerium-doped lanthanum 
bromide (LaBr3[Ce]), cerium-doped cesium lanthanum lithium bromo-chloride 
(CLLBC[Ce]), cadmium zinc telluride (CZT), and even an HPGe imager.   
The key aspects that drive the signal-to-noise ratio are collection time, source-to-detector 
distance, and attenuation due to intervening materials. Therefore, assumptions are made to 
establish operational boundary conditions for this analysis.  The following sections explore 
each technique sequentially and provide a consolidated list of attributes in Table 2.1. 
2.1.1 Vehicle-mounted Standoff Detection 
The vehicle-mounted standoff detection technique consists of mounting large detectors in 
a vehicle ranging in size from a large sport utility vehicle (SUV) up to a semi-trailer truck.  
Often, search teams use thermal neutron proportional tubes in conjunction with NaI(Tl) 
crystals coupled to photomultiplier tubes.  Teams have also evaluated developmental systems 
consisting of several mechanically cooled HPGe semiconductor crystals.  For the SUV end of 
the size spectrum, operators can fit several (2–8) NaI(Tl) logs (51×102×408 mm) and thermal 
neutron detectors; for a large box truck, on the order of 1 m2 of NaI(Tl) detector area is 
reasonable.  With the HPGe approach, a much smaller total detector area is achievable, though 
the improved energy resolution may provide an overall improved detection capability.  Four 





and researchers deployed 48 detectors in a semi-trailer truck [23].   
The operators of the search vehicle must investigate the building from a position as close 
to the building as possible without arousing suspicion.  Therefore, we assume that the vehicle 
must drive by or around the building, or perhaps due to some ruse stop for a period near the 
building.  From this information, we can deduce a range of distances, collection times, and 
intervening materials. 
Regarding distance, we assume the source to be somewhere inside of the building, and the 
building is some minimum distance from the road.   In the best-case scenario, searchers can 
examine the building from each side, and the source is located near an external wall.   Given 
such a fortunate layout, the closest approach would be on the order of 5–7 m, considering the 
likely size of the easement between the road and the building.  However, this highly favorable 
set of conditions is incredibly unlikely.  It is more likely that the search team can only 
approach the building from one or two sides, and the source could be located anywhere inside.  
A more representative distance would be the midpoint of the building, with the worst case 
occurring when a source is located opposite the approachable wall of the building.  Therefore, 
we assume the distance of closest approach ranges 5–35 m, with an expected value of 20 m. 
As to the dwell time, the value depends on the speed of the vehicle and the integration 
time chosen.  In general, an appropriate integration time is chosen to maximize the signal to 
background ratio.  The integration time which maximizes such a ratio (see in Figure 6.4) is  
  𝑡𝑡 = 2𝑑𝑑|𝑣𝑣| ,     (2.1) 
where d is the distance of closest approach, and v is the speed of the vehicle.  There are 
some factors which call for deviations from this, such as the shape of the detector (cylindrical 
versus parallelepiped) and arrangement scheme with regards to the source.  One can assume 
that the vehicle will travel as slow as possible in the target area and make multiple passes or 
stop in locations near the building, if possible.  Nominally, a slow pass by at 40 kph (25 mph) 
would call for a 5-second integration window.  Assuming the best-case scenario, such as when 
the team can park near the building or one in which they employ a flat tire or similar ruse, the 
integration time could be considerably longer–on the order of many minutes or even hours.  
However, if we presume a more typical scenario, where remaining undetected by the 
adversary is essential, we expect the upper limit for collection time to be 60 s. Therefore, we 
assume the dwell time ranges 5–3600 s, with an expected value of 60 s. 
Finally, we must consider the material between the source and the detector that attenuates 
the signal.  While building construction varies considerably [25], the critical assumption we 
make is that target locations are most likely to be light industrial or commercial.  More than 
70% of buildings worldwide have exterior walls constructed from masonry [26].  Many low-
rise commercial or industrial buildings are erected using concrete masonry units, also known 
as cinder blocks.  Tilt-up concrete construction is a competing method of construction which 
uses poured concrete walls which are then raised to the vertical position and braced into 





construction and is most common in North America, Australia, and New Zealand [27].  
Regardless of the method assembly, the primary attenuating material is concrete. 
While cinderblock construction generally involves reinforcement with rebar and poured 
concrete in the gaps, some gaps will inevitably remain, reducing the amount of attenuating 
material between the source and detector.  Depending on the construction technique, the 
amount of concrete could be as little as 5 centimeters, if unfilled, all the way up to 20 cm if 
filled with concrete, and perhaps even more if for a custom application.  Tilt-up construction 
tends to be slightly thinner than cinderblock construction [28]. 
There also may be additional attenuation by interior walls and other materials, as well as 
the air.  However, compared to the attenuation by the concrete, the air attenuation is negligible, 
and the attenuation from other building materials (e.g., sheetrock, wood, metal studs) is a 
small fraction of the total.  Note that the attenuation is a function of the energy of gamma-
ray(s) emitted by the source.  Because the attenuating materials have different densities and 
thicknesses, it is convenient to convert the attenuating factor to an effective atomic number 
and areal density.  The effective atomic number is dependent on photon energy [29] but has a 
value between 9 and 10 from 100 to 3000 keV. Therefore, we assume the attenuation factor 
has an effective atomic number of 9.5 and a range of areal density 10–50 g cm-2, with an 
expected value of 30 g cm-2. 
2.1.2 Rotary-wing Aerial Detection 
The rotary-wing aerial detection technique is similar to the vehicle-mounted standoff 
approach in that it also consists of mounting large detectors, either inside the helicopter or 
attached to external pylons.  The primary differences between the two methods are the source-
to-detector geometry and vehicle speed.  The aerial approach generally has a larger standoff 
and shorter collection time.  However, we can expect less attenuation due to the differences 
between roofing and wall materials.  The helicopter also presents a much larger signature to 
a potential adversary; i.e., helicopters flying low and slow certainly draw the attention of 
nearly everyone within earshot and are generally a rare event in most environments.  It is also 
challenging to stage a ruse that would allow the helicopter to hover or repeatedly pass near a 
target area.  That said, it remains a capability, and we will present it for the sake of comparison 
and completeness.   
Concerning the distance of closest approach, one must assume a height above ground level 
(AGL) which allows the helicopter to avoid obstacles such as power lines, communication 
towers, and tall buildings.  In aviation regulations, 150 m (500 ft.) AGL is considered a safe 
distance in populated areas, with that same distance measured linearly from any person, 
vessel, vehicle, or structure in sparsely populated areas.  However, one can assume that a 
search situation presents exigent circumstances that would reduce this height to something 
much lower.  For example, a target operating AGL of 90 m was published for flights in 
Berkeley, CA in 2012 by the NNSA’s AMS team [30], and an AGL as low as 70 m was 





Radiological Enhanced-sensor System program sponsored by the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security [31, 32].  One can imagine that in actual 
search operations, this height could decrease to as low as possible, for the surrounding 
conditions near the target building.  Therefore, we assume the distance of closest approach 
ranges 10–150 m, with an expected value of 45 m. 
 
Figure 2.2: Height-Velocity diagram for Bell 412 multi-engine helicopter.  Pilots must maintain 
a minimum velocity at a given height in order to retain the ability to land via an autorotation 
maneuver in the case of engine failure.  Source: [33] used with permission from S. Myers and J. 
Sams at Bell Textron Inc.  
As to collection time, the minimum safe speed of the aircraft is a function of its height.  
Rotorcraft have a safe height-velocity relationship known as a Deadman’s curve.  As shown 
in Figure 2.2, pilots must avoid the shaded portion so that they can overcome a loss of power 
due to the failure of the engine or transmission by conducting an autorotation maneuver.  
Based on the expected aircraft height, the slowest airspeed safely permitted is ~30 knots, 
according to Figure 2.2.  This airspeed gives an ideal integration time window of ~8.5 s.  The 
ARES test consisted of flying at approximately 35 m s-1(68 kts) which gives an ideal 
integration time window of 2–12 s, depending on the altitude.  A reasonable low-end speed 
for a helicopter is on the order of 10 m s-1(20 kts), which would expand the integration time 
window to more than 40 seconds.  This low-speed does not include the possibility of a hover 
maneuver, which could push the collection time up to several minutes or longer, though at 
that point any semblance of maintaining a low profile has undoubtedly been forfeited.  
Therefore, we assume the collection time ranges 2–300 s with an expected value of 7 s. 
Regarding attenuating material, this approach is much different from the vehicle-mounted 
approach since most roofs are not made of concrete.  Most light industrial and commercial 





climate, a layer of wood or particleboard, and a waterproofing material.  At low energies (150–
200 keV) the attenuation factor ranges approximately 10–50%, primarily due to the gauge of 
steel used and thickness of insulation.  Because of the variation in roof construction, it is 
useful to reduce this to an effective atomic number and areal density. One must also account 
for the attenuation effects of air because of the considerable distance.  Consequently, we 
assumed the attenuation factor has an effective atomic number of 6.33 and areal density range 
2–15 g cm-2, with an expected value of 10 g cm-2. 
2.1.3 sUAS-based Remote Detection  
The sUAS-based approach is quite different from the other two approaches because of the 
limited detector size and weight that can be employed.  Large format NaI(Tl) crystals, as well 
as most mechanically-cooled HPGe detectors, are too massive to be carried by a typical multi-
rotor unmanned aerial vehicle.   While there are oversized UAVs that can carry additional 
weight and specialized systems that make use of small HPGE detectors, we assume that much 
smaller detectors are necessary for this approach.  However, we can overcome some of the 
shortcomings in detector size by using arrays of high-resolution, room-temperature 
semiconductor detectors, such as coplanar grid CZT.  Moreover, we expect the overall gain 
in the source signal—due to increased collection time, reduced source-to-distance, and 
reduced shielding—to outweigh the losses in efficiency due to smaller detectors.   
In terms of distance, an sUAS-based detector can inspect a suspected source location from 
the shortest distance of all three methods.  It can take measurements from just outside the 
walls of the building as well as at locations on the rooftop.  Since the rooftop presents a much 
lower observable signature, it is the preferred inspection location, and we will use its height 
to determine source-to-detector distances.   
In general, most light industrial and commercial buildings are single-story and ~5 m tall.  
Less than 20% of the buildings worldwide are more than four-stories tall.  Therefore, 
assuming the source is located inside the building, the minimum source-to-detector distance 
from the roof is no more than the roof height.  The distance between measurement locations 
drives the maximum source-to-detector distance.  A general rule of thumb for this spacing is 
twice the height of the building.  This grid distance would give a maximum source-to-detector 
distance equal to the building height scaled by the square root of two.  Therefore, we assume 
the source-to-detector distance ranges 3–17 meters, with an expected value of 5 meters. 
The collection time is also very advantageous for this scheme.  While there are indeed 
power constraints both for the detectors and sUAS platform, a system could surely collect for 
minutes to hours on the roof during a period of darkness.  The limiting factor is the number 
of measurement locations for a given building, which we could partially overcome by using 
multiple systems or even a suite of emplaced detectors.  Therefore, for reasonable coverage 
of a representative-sized building, 30-minute measurements are possible.  Moving to multiple 
platforms (e.g., six systems) runs the collection time up to 180 minutes per location.  





perhaps recovered by the sUAS, then that collection time could be expanded to multiple days.  
Assuming one period of darkness to collect and make a decision, we assume the collection 
time be 15–180 minutes, with an expected value of 30 minutes. 
Like the rotary-wing aerial detection technique, this concept takes advantage of the path 
with least unintentional shielding between the detector and the potential source.  Like the 
previous method, the roof construction will vary and consists of the same heterogeneous 
layers. Therefore, the assumed attenuation factor has an effective atomic number of 6.33 and 
areal density range 2–15 g cm-2, with an expected value of 8 g cm-2.  The primary differences 
from the rotary-wing aerial detection technique are the improved source-to-detector distance, 
coupled with the reduction in air attenuation. 
Although not treated in this example, the addition of external shielding to a source is 
certainly a possibility and is expected for most threat sources, either because of their high 
value and requirement to shield from detection, or because of the hazard to health that they 
pose.  Though not a rule, shielding is often thickest in the horizontal direction and least 
effective in the vertical direction.  That is, shielding is applied to reduce the flux to occupants 
in a room or would-be searchers in the same two-dimensional plane.  However, shielding in 
the vertical direction is often a secondary consideration, which could benefit measurements 
taken from above. 
Summary Boundary Conditions for Detection Schemes 
Table 2.1: Estimated attributes for three possible detection schemes employed to interrogate a 



























µ/ρ=10–50 g cm-2 
Concrete 
(5–20 cm) 
Z=6.33 µ/ρ=2–15 g cm-2 
Steel (1– 2 mm) 
Wood (~1 cm)  
Insulation (5–10 cm) 
Z=6.33 µ/ρ=2–15 g cm-2 
Steel (1– 2 mm) 
Wood (~1 cm)  
Insulation (5–10 cm) 
Cost Millions ($1–3.5M) 
Millions 
(>$7.5M) 
Tens of thousands 
(~$50k) 
Size 10 m length 17 m length < 1 m diameter 





Detector Area > 1 m2 ∼1
2





2.2 Theoretical Performance for Notional Conditions 
Minimum detectable activity (MDA) is a useful figure of merit to compare these three 
methods.  Using the MDA attainable with the biggest and best detectors in vehicle-mounted 
standoff detection technique, one can extrapolate to an approximate size detector to achieve 
the same MDA associated with the conditions expected in the other two methods.  Static 
collection scenarios with 137Cs as the source (i.e., a stationary vehicle, hovering helicopter, 
and rooftop sUAS) and standard NaI(Tl) detectors are used to simplify the calculation and 
facilitate a comparison using simulation. 
We used a form of the often-quoted “Currie Equation” [34] to calculate the MDA 
𝛼𝛼 = 4.653√𝐵𝐵 𝑡𝑡+2.706
𝑓𝑓 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴4𝜋𝜋𝑑𝑑2 𝑡𝑡  ,     (2.2) 
where α is the minimum detectible activity in becquerels, B is the background count rate, t is 
the collection time, f is the radiation yield per disintegration,  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the intrinsic detection 
efficiency at a given gamma-ray energy, A is the detector plane frontal area visible to the 
source, and d is the source-to-detector distance. 
Table 2.2: Calculated minimum detectable activity (MDA) of 137Cs based on thallium-doped 
sodium iodide NaI(Tl) scintillation gamma-ray detectors and assumed parameters for three 


























borne 20 60 0.25 10,000 0.10 300   67 
Rotary-
wing 45 60 0.90 5,000 0.10 150 133 
sUAS-
based 5 1800 0.90 50 0.10        1.5     3 
 
While it should not come as a surprise, it is strikingly evident just how much improvement 
comes with pushing detection capability as close to the likely source location as possible.  
Moreover, the approach that achieves the closest source-to-detector distance also permits the 
longest signal collection time through the least amount of attenuating material.   
In general, energy resolution provides significant improvement in detection sensitivity by 
reducing the width of the full-energy peak.  Sharper peaks stand out above the average 
background count rate, which reduces the MDA further.  Though advanced approaches take 
the full-spectrum into account, an improved energy resolution will also improve performance 





Solid-state material such as CZT and HPGe provide excellent energy resolution for a cost.  
Switching to HPGe detectors from NaI(Tl) in the vehicle-borne system would cost a factor of 
25 times more for the same detector area.   However, if we assume that we are willing to spend 
twice the cost of the NaI(Tl) detectors, approximately 14 HPGe detectors could be employed, 
improving the MDA by ~40%.  However, as seen in Figure 2.3, diminishing returns are 
quickly realized for this specific scenario; 5 detectors are required to achieve the same MDA, 
and 14 almost buys only a twofold improvement at twice the cost.  Since the MDA is 
proportional to the inverse square root of the number of detectors, another twofold reduction 
in MDA will require four times the number detectors.  
 
Figure 2.3: Effect of additional high-purity germanium detectors on the minimum detectable 
activity (MDA) of 137Cs source in a vehicle-borne scenario. 
As seen in Table 2.3, achieving the same MDA as fourteen large, HPGe detectors in the 
vehicle-mounted standoff detection method—which costs on the order of $1M—is 
accomplished in just 400 seconds with only one cubic centimeter of CZT—costing about 
$10k—in the sUAS-based remote detection concept.  Furthermore, one could array several 






Table 2.3: Calculated minimum detectable activity (MDA) for 137Cs based on fourteen high-purity 
germanium (HPGe) detectors in vehicle-borne scheme versus one cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) 
































  5 400 0.90     1   0.08   0.25 42 
2.3 Summary 
This chapter explored the effects of time, distance, and shielding on radiation detection 
using the best-in-breed NaI(Tl) systems for three different approaches to directed search.  We 
developed boundary conditions for each of the factors affecting signal collection pertaining 
to each method and suggested expected values based on our analysis of the environment and 
system attributes.  We compared theoretical performance for these notional conditions by 
calculating an MDA for 137Cs.  Then we expanded the analysis to semiconductor detectors to 
estimate the realm of the possible.  Though moving to HPGe required just 1 20𝑡𝑡ℎ⁄  of the 
number of NaI(Tl) detectors for the same MDA, we found that improving the MDA  to levels 
commensurate with the sUAS-based approach was not achievable even with an exorbitant 
number of detectors.  Furthermore, we demonstrated the relative effectiveness of a small 
amount of high-resolution CZT placed close to the source compared to a much larger amount 
of HPGe at a greater distance.  
 Even so, the goal of the research presented here is not to replicate the capabilities of a 
given detection system and its associated concept of operation.  Rather, it is to explore the 
ways and means to optimize the capabilities of a system of systems, which include a suite of 
radiation detectors, auxiliary sensors, unmanned vehicles, and an associated concept of 
operations, to meet or exceed the requirements of a given radiation detection mission area.  
The assessment presented here merely serves as a proof of concept to demonstrate the 
feasibility and potential utility of the approach within a set of expected boundary conditions.  
The remaining chapters add further detail and stretch those conditions in order to maximize 







3 Radiological and Nuclear Threat Detection  
esigning a tool to aid in the search for lost or stolen radiological or nuclear material 
requires a systematic decomposition of the expected operational environment.  We 
described the mission and general conditions in Section 1.3 and further explored the 
target building in Section 2.1.3.  From that information, one can then predict background 
signals, identify relevant detectable signatures, establish collection modalities, select 
appropriate sensors, and develop an effective employment strategy.  This chapter aims to 
compile and classify the radioactive and alternative signatures associated with radiological 
and nuclear threat materials and outline various methods to detect those signatures.  
3.1 Radioactive Signatures 
Any effort to remotely sense radiological or nuclear material—for detection, localization, 
mapping or otherwise—requires knowledge of the signatures exhibited by the material of 
interest as well as the background and nuisance signatures that are found in the environment.  
This section explores the radioactive signatures emitted by background sources and threat 
materials. 
3.1.1 Background radiation 
Background radiation is found everywhere and varies by location based on factors such as 
geology, altitude, and latitude.  The sources of natural background radiation are often divided 
into two categories: cosmic and terrestrial.  There are also artificial sources of radiation found 
in the environment from human activities that are considered part of the background.  This 
section contains a brief description of the three primary sources of background radiation and 
the effects each has on field-detection. 
Cosmogenic 
Stars—including our sun—supernovae, and other galactic objects produce charged ions 
called cosmic-rays that continuously bombard the Earth’s atmosphere.  Cosmic-rays are the 
primary source of neutrons found in the background environment [35] and also create 
cosmogenic radionuclides, such as 14C, 3H, 7Be and others, in the air and ground [7].  
Proximity to dense, large masses of metal—such as bridges, buildings, and ships—can deliver 
an enhanced production of cosmic-ray-induced spallation neutrons that is 2–4 higher than 
usual, through a phenomenon known as the ship effect [35, 36]. 
Latitude and altitude are the two main factors that influence the intensity of cosmic 
background radiation for a given location [35].  It also varies temporally with diurnal time, 
earth’s sidereal position, and the solar cycle [37].  Cosmic-ray intensity increases from the 






geomagnetic latitude and is nearly constant over 0–15° and 60–90° [38].  As discovered in 
the early 20th century by Erich Regener and Georg Pfotzer, the cosmic-ray flux increases 
exponentially with altitude, up to a maximum at about 15 km above sea level [39].  The 
similarities between the maps in Figure 3.1, depicting cosmic-ray exposure and topography, 
indicate a strong correlation with elevation.  
High-energy primary cosmic-rays—predominantly protons (>85%), some alpha particles 
(5–12%), few electrons and positrons (~2%), and very few heavier nuclei (~0.5%)— collide 
with atoms while traveling through the atmosphere, thereby ejecting high-energy neutrons 
and protons, electrons and photons, and other exotic cascade particles such as pions and 
muons [37, 40, 41].  Primary cosmic-rays and the cascade particles they liberate that reach the 
surface of the earth are known as terrestrial cosmic-rays.  The typical threshold energy to 
produce terrestrial cosmic-rays is above 1 GeV.  Primary particles comprise fewer than 1% of 
the total shower of particles that reach the ground; rather, third- to seventh-generation cascade 
particles dominate the terrestrial cosmic-ray flux.  By sea level, cascading collisions convert 
97% of the primary cosmic-ray flux into cosmogenic neutrons [37].   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Side-by-side comparison of (left) cosmic-ray exposure, (middle) elevation, and (right) 
absorbed dose from terrestrial sources.  Source: [42] U.S Geological Survey in the public domain.  
Terrestrial 
Terrestrial radiation primarily comes from three elements formed in primordial synthesis; 
they are potassium, thorium, and uranium–commonly referred to as KUT [43].  Those three 
elements have four long-lived isotopes that have been decaying since the formation of the 
Earth but are still present in large quantities because of their long half-lives [44]. The 
primordial radionuclides are 40K, 235U, 238U, and 232Th. 
The decay of these radionuclides and their progeny contributes to more than 90% of the 
radiation exposure due to natural sources and comprises roughly half of the equivalent annual 
dose to people in the United States [45, 46].  Most of the dose comes from the daughter 
products radon and thoron, which are gases that can seep from ores into the air or water and 






Artificial background radiation from human activity comes primarily from four sources: 
nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, industrial sources, and medical applications.  The 
information presented in this section is summarized from [48].  Atmospheric nuclear testing 
introduced a significant amount of radioactive contamination into the environment while it 
took place in the mid-20th century.  At its peak in the 1960s, the gamma-ray dose in Richmond, 
CA, as estimated from fission product deposition from the fall-out, was more than 0.14 mSv 
yr-1 [49].  This has since dropped to less than 5% percent of that (~0.006 mSv yr-1) principally 
due to the decay of the shorter-lived isotopes.  The estimated total effective dose commitment 
worldwide from atmospheric nuclear testing is 3.5 mSv [50].  In the U.S., the estimated 
cumulative deposition of global fallout of 137Cs ranges 1000–10,000 Bq m-2 with most 
locations falling somewhere in the middle of that range [51] . 
The operation of nuclear reactors introduces radiation into the environment through four 
main pathways: normal discharges from power plants, spent fuel storage and waste disposal, 
nuclear fuel production, and nuclear accidents.  Discharges from power plants give rise to low 
radiation doses and contribute less than 0.005% to annual public exposure by radiation 
sources.  Spent fuel storage and waste disposal are isolated and contained.  Exposure from 
them should not extend beyond the perimeter of a facility unless there is an accident or 
improper disposal.  The nuclear fuel cycle causes increased background radiation from 
uranium mining and milling operations.  The residual tailings contain elevated levels of 
natural radionuclides at higher concentrations than when they resided in the ground as ore.   
Nuclear reactor accidents, including Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, have 
contributed a collective effective dose of almost 450,000 person-Sv.  Some studies estimate 
Chernobyl fallout to have contaminated more than 162,000 km2 in Europe with 137Cs to a 
level above 37,000 Bq m-2, and an area approximately 19,000 km2 in Belarus, Russia, and 
Ukraine to a level > 185,000 Bq m-2 [50].  The discharge of 137Cs from the Fukushima Nuclear 
Power Plant significantly contaminated the soil around the facility and neighboring 
prefectures to levels greater than 100,000 and 10,000 Bq m-2, respectively [52].  However, the 
relative contribution of global fallout from nuclear testing and nuclear accidents to 
background radiation in most locations is minor.  Long dwell measurements using high-
energy-resolution instruments are required to detect it. 
Industrial sources are employed for a wide array of applications including sterilization, 
radiography, instrument illumination, geological characterization, and measurement gauges.  
These sources are usually contained within significant shielding when not in use.  Some 
consumer goods like smoke detectors and watch dials contain small-activity sources as well. 
Certain industrial processes produce increased concentrations of naturally occurring 
radioactive material in their products, by-products, and waste.  These include several activities 
related to the extraction and processing of ores, coal, oil, gas, metal mining, ceramics, 
phosphates, and other industries.  The fly ash from the burning of coal for electricity is a prime 





in roads, buildings, and landfills [53]. 
Medical applications include radiology, nuclear medicine, and radiation therapy.  Sources 
from medical applications contribute to the background environment via the patients receiving 
treatment or during transportation to and from hospitals and clinics.  Some short-lived isotopes 
are ingested for functional imaging, while others can be used to treat diseases. A few radiation 
therapy treatments involve placing sealed sources in a patient for some time.  In many cases, 
radiation levels near the patient are noticeably above the background for days or weeks. 
Orphaned sources from medical and industrial uses sometimes end up in the scrap metal 
trade and have been detected in construction materials as well as some consumer goods.  On 
a few occasions, large-activity orphaned sources have been the cause of extensive 
contamination and exposure to the public because they were not stored or disposed of properly 
and were later mishandled by untrained and unsuspecting personnel. 
3.1.2 Threat Materials  
The signatures that are of most interest for directed search operations are the gamma-ray 
and neutron radiation associated with threat materials.  Threat materials include fissile 
isotopes that could be fabricated into a nuclear device or large-activity industrial sources 
which could be employed in a radiological dispersal or radiological exposure device (RED) 
[54]. 
Fissile Threats 
Uranium and plutonium are the two primary nuclear materials of interest because they are 
the most common materials found in nuclear devices as well as nuclear reactor fuel.  There 
are also novel threat materials such as americium and neptunium, but their scarcity and cost 
make them far less likely to be encountered as a threat material.  The most measurable 
signatures of each element include gamma-rays associated with the radioactive decay of the 
substance and daughter isotopes, neutrons released in spontaneous fission, gamma-rays 
resulting from the capture of neutrons in surrounding materials, and impurities inherent to the 
material or due to processing.  Each signature will be further explored and defined with the 
associated threat material. 
Uranium 
Uranium is found everywhere throughout the world in the earth’s crust, at an average 
concentration of 2.8 parts per million.  It is mined or chemically leached from areas where the 
formation of uraninite, also known as pitchblende ore, is high or often as a by-product of 
mining other metals, such as copper, gold, silver, and vanadium.  The ore is mined, milled, 
and chemically converted into a compound that is suitable for enrichment, normally uranium 
hexafluoride, and then further converted into a different compound for use as a nuclear fuel 
or weapon component [55]. The radiation signature of uranium depends on the isotopic 





foil, pellet, rod).  Natural uranium is predominantly 238U (99.275%) with a small percentage 
of 235U (0.720%) and a trace amount of 234U (0.005%) [56]. 
Though 238U is a chief component of background radiation, substantial quantities could 
present a detectable signature and possibly indicate the development, fabrication, or assembly 
of an IND.  Depleted uranium, also known as DU or enrichment tails, is the by-product 
material from a 235U-enrichment process and is typically 99.78% or more 238U.  It is a very 
dense material (1.7 times that of lead) and is used in armor plating, armor-piercing munitions, 
ballast in aircraft and ships, radiation shielding, and as a component of nuclear weapons [56]. 
238U (t½=4.468 billion years) has associated gamma-rays with energies 742.81, 766.36, 
786.27, and 1001.03 keV that result from the decay of 234mPa, a meta-stable daughter in the 
uranium decay chain, shown in Figure 3.2 [57].  The key signature is the gamma-ray emission 
at 1001.03 keV resulting with an effective branching ratio of 0.837% and an intensity of 73.4 
photons s-1 g-1 of 238U, assuming 234mPa is in secular equilibrium with 238U [58].   
 
Figure 3.2: Simplified decay chain of naturally occurring uranium isotopes.  The short decay times 
of 234Th, 234mPa, and 234Pa give rise to secular equilibrium conditions with the parent isotope 238U 
Source: [59] open access https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.122.044. 
The distinctive gamma-ray at 1001 keV is useful in that its energy is high enough that a 
significant fraction of photons produced will penetrate typical thicknesses of conventional 
construction materials.  The mean free path, or the average length a photon of this energy will 
travel before interacting with and depositing energy in a substance, is 5–7 cm for various types 
of concrete [60].  As demonstrated below, the intensity of uncollided 1001 keV photons 
passing through a typical concrete wall, on the order of six inches thick, is ~10%.  This signal 
could be enough to indicate the presence of threat material, depending on the detection scheme 
(i.e., collection time, source-to-detector distance, detector size and type).  Likewise, a foot or 





The attenuation law for gamma-rays takes the form    𝐼𝐼 =  𝐼𝐼0𝑒𝑒−(𝜇𝜇 𝜌𝜌⁄ )𝜌𝜌∙𝑥𝑥,     (3.1) 
where 𝐼𝐼 is the intensity of the uncollided photons, 𝐼𝐼0 is the initial intensity of the photon 
source, 𝜇𝜇 𝜌𝜌⁄  is the mass attenuation coefficient measured in cm2 g-1, 𝜌𝜌 is the density of the 
attenuating media, and 𝑥𝑥 is the thickness of the material. Solving for 𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼0⁄  and substituting 
values from the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Standard Reference 
Database 126 [61] yields 
      𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼0⁄ = 𝑒𝑒−�0.06495 cm2 g⁄ �2.3 g cm3⁄ ∙15.25 cm = 0.103 ± 0.002.  (3.2) 
while solving for 𝑥𝑥 and substituting values yields 
         𝑥𝑥 =  − ln� 1100�(0.06495 cm2 g⁄ )∙2.3 g cm3⁄ = (30.83 ±  0.14)cm or (12.2 ± 0.3)in  (3.3) 
The 1001 keV gamma also has relatively low interference from nearby peaks from other 
background or nuisance sources. The only isotopes with significant nearby peaks are 
extremely rare (172Lu and 133Te) or have many other tell-tale peaks that preclude one from 
identifying it as uranium (152Eu).  Though uranium and its progeny are present in the 
background, a concentrated amount of DU, perhaps used in an IND tamper, would stand out 
relatively well in a medium to high-resolution energy spectrum, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.   
 
Figure 3.3: Representative high-purity germanium gamma-ray spectrum of 17 kg depleted 
uranium plates measured at 135 cm (black) compared with nominal background (blue).  The red 
illustrates the significant peak at 1001 keV.  Created using PeakEasy computer software with 





Conversely, the gamma-ray signatures attributed to the decay of 235U (t½=703.8 million 
years), the chief fissile isotope of uranium, are much less illuminating and not nearly as 
distinguishable as the 1001 keV gamma-ray.  Though they are more plentiful on a per-atom 
basis, due to a shorter half-life and larger branching ratios, they are relatively low energy at 
143.76, 163.33, 185.72, 202.11, and 205.31 keV.  The 185.72 keV gamma-ray is the most 
prominent of the group, radiating at 4.3 × 104 photons s-1 g-1 of 235U, and it is the most 
frequently used signature to measure enrichment levels of a sample [58, 63].  Because of their 
low energy, just six inches of concrete—the average thickness of an exterior wall in a 
commercial building—attenuates 99% of these photons. 
Worse yet, the low energy of the gamma-rays implies that a significate portion of the 
photons emitted will be attenuated in the high-density material itself unless the geometric 
form has a high surface-area-to-volume ratio.  Because of self-attenuation, only the outer 
surface of a mass of enriched uranium emits a gamma signature to the surrounding 
environment.  Based on the infinite thickness criterion, the so-called “skin depth” for the 
185.72 keV photon in a uranium metal sample is just 2.6 mm.  The infinite thickness criterion 
is defined as seven mean free paths of a given energy photon in a material [58]  Essentially, a 
half-centimeter plate of enriched uranium presents the same 185.72 keV gamma signature as 
an infinitely thick plate of the same planar dimensions when measured normal to the face of 
the plate. 
Not only is the signal attenuation of the 185.72 keV photon problematical, but the 
background interference from other sources exacerbates the situation.  Even though intrinsic 
detection efficiency at low energies is very good, counts from down-scattered Compton events 
from natural background dominate the low energy region of the energy spectrum.  This 
elevated Compton continuum, coupled with the fact that other naturally occurring radioactive 
materials emit gamma-rays with remarkably similar energy, complicates the energy spectrum.  
Indeed, 226Ra (t½=1,600.2 years), an isotope in the decay chain of 238U, emits a gamma-ray at 
186.21 keV.  The two peaks are only distinguishable in high-resolution detectors or with 
significant count rates in other associated energy regions.  Other interferants include 166mHo 
(t½=1,200 years)—which is synthetically produced and used as a calibration source—67Ga 
(t½=3.26 days)—an injectable radiopharmaceutical used in medical imaging—and radiative 
capture gamma-rays from absorption of neutrons on copper and germanium found in gamma-
ray detectors. 
A significant quantity of highly enriched uranium also poses a slight radiation hazard to 
those working with or around it.  While we expect such material to be well-guarded and highly 
controlled, it will also likely be stored in a shielded container when it is not being manipulated.  
Using a dose calculator based on the ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1991 historical standard found in the 
tools of Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS), the equivalent dose 
rate for an unshielded 25 kg sphere of oralloy (U.S. origin 93%-enriched HEU) at 30 cm is 
estimated at 300 µrem hr-1 with a gross leakage of roughly 10 million photons per second 
[64].  This dose rate is hardly a radiation health concern in that form.  If formed into a thin 





more than an order of magnitude and could perhaps warrant some further control measures. 
Uranium also has two other isotopes of interest that are produced in a nuclear reactor and 
have unique signatures. 233U (t½=1.6 × 105 years) is a fissile isotope that is generated slowly 
from the decay of 237Np, which is produced in a uranium fuel cycle either by successive 
neutron capture (n, γ) on 235U and again by 236U, or via fast neutron knockout (n, 2n) on 238U.  
233U can also be bred quickly from 232Th in a fast or thermal reactor using the thorium fuel 
cycle.  It has potential uses as nuclear fuel or possible weapons material.  The isotope 232U (t½ 
= 68.9 years) is produced in trace quantities as well by (n, 2n) reactions on 233U, 232Pr, and 
232Th, as well as (n, γ) reactions on 230Th—though to a much smaller extent because of its 
small fractional abundance in the thorium fuel.  The decay chain of 232U joins the thorium 
decay chain at 228Th, and, because of its short half-life, quickly yields strong gamma 
emissions, namely the 2614 keV (99.16%) gamma associated with the beta decay of 208Tl.  
The co-presence of 232U makes 233U very difficult and dangerous to work with and very easy 
to detect [65].  
It is somewhat fortunate that nearly all HEU contains some small quantity of 232U because 
often some of the feedstock uranium was used first in a plutonium production reactor.  The 
bulk of HEU stocks found in the U.S. were irradiated in reactors at Hanford and Savannah 
River; similar operations took place in the former Soviet Union as well.  The absence of 232U 
and 236U in a sample of HEU is known as “virgin” HEU and is indicative of a concealed small-
scale or well-funded program [66], especially one employing centrifuge enrichment.  
Plutonium 
Plutonium, the other primary threat material, is produced in nuclear reactors either by 
design or as a by-product depending on the reactor type, fuel, and operating conditions.  It 
also occurs in nature, in trace quantities, due to neutron capture on uranium from cosmic 
sources.  The principal isotope of interest is 239Pu, though many of the distinguishing 
signatures of plutonium come from the presence of the even-numbered isotopes 240Pu, 242Pu, 
and to a small extent 238Pu.  239Pu (t½=24,110 years) decays predominantly by alpha emission 
to 235mU, or by spontaneous fission at a meager ten fissions s-1 kg-1.  Although it belongs to 
the actinium series, the decay of 239Pu produces a more distinct gamma signature than 235U.  
The gamma- rays associated with its decay occur at slightly higher in energies, 375.05 and 
413.71 keV respectively, and the greater specific activity of 239Pu results in higher normalized 
count rate.  Additionally, because of the higher energies and much smaller mass required to 
achieve criticality, the self-attenuation aspect is of less significance since the surface-area-to-
volume goes up as the volume decreases. 
The truly undeniable signatures of plutonium result, however, from the unavoidable 
byproducts that accompany its production—the most revealing being the presence of elevated 
levels of neutrons generated by the spontaneous fission, primarily from 240Pu and 242Pu.  Both 
isotopes result from neutron capture events that occur after the initial cycle of neutron capture 
on 238U and sequential beta decay to 239Pu.  While 239Pu is fissile—with an even higher thermal 





time.  These radiative capture interactions lead to higher mass isotopes of plutonium as well 
as other transuranic isotopes of americium, curium, berkelium, californium, and others.   
The spontaneous fission rate of 240Pu is approximately 415,000 fissions s-1 kg-1, while that 
of 242Pu is more than double that at 840,000 fissions s-1 kg-1.  However, the 242Pu content of 
typical WG Pu is less than 0.05%, compared to a 240Pu content typically ranging 3–7%.  Even 
at the super grade level of 4.5%, the neutron emission from a 4 kg solid sphere would be on 
the order of 4 × 105 n s-1.  Even a small (1.65 cm ∅ × 13.0 cm) 3He-filled  proportional counter 
located 20 meters from the source would register a count rate more than twice the background. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Diagram of detection scheme for 4 kg of super-grade plutonium.  Detection is 
unambiguous at expected operational distances.  Expected response based on neutron background 
in the San Francisco Bay Area, 3He-filled polyethylene-moderated neutron detector in ORTEC 
Detective-EX-100, and plutonium model created in GADRAS Version 18.7.9.0 [64]. 
Another source of neutrons, though usually far less significant, comes about from 
interaction of the alpha particles, produced from the decay plutonium isotopes, and low-Z 
materials that may be present as impurities, coatings, or in nearby weapons components.  The 
(α, n) reaction is commonly associated with engineered mixtures that couple strong alpha 
emitters with low-Z elements that have a high cross-section for alpha absorption, such as 
lithium and beryllium, as in Am-Be or Pu-Be sources.  These reactions can also take place 
with other low-Z elements such as boron, carbon, oxygen, and fluorine as well as light metals 
such as magnesium and aluminum.  This pathway for neutron production becomes more 
significant depending on the method for preparing plutonium metal or when the plutonium is 
in a non-metallic form, such as an oxide or fluoride.  Nearly 45% of the neutrons produced in 
an 8 kg sample of plutonium oxide (~6% 240Pu) are the result of (α, n) reactions on oxygen 
from the decay of 241Pu, whereas in a metal (α, n) reactions only comprise 1.3% of the total.  
We base these calculations on values for reported in [58, 67] for spontaneous fission and       
(α, n) reactions in plutonium metals and oxides. 
Not only are the neutrons a distinct signature, but they also induce additional gamma 
signatures by their capture on low-Z materials such as hydrogen, lithium, beryllium, carbon, 
nitrogen, aluminum, and others.  These materials are likely to be present in other weapon 
components such as high explosives, reflectors, and casings.  The capture reaction often 
generates high-energy gamma-rays, ranging from 500 keV to several MeV.  Many even 
exceed the 3 MeV energy scale employed by most field gamma-ray detectors.  However, a 





by the excited deuterium nucleus formed in the capture of thermal neutrons by hydrogen 
present in the water vapor in the air. 
Radiological Threat Materials 
Nearly any radioisotope of sufficient activity could be considered a threat material for an 
RDD or RED.  However, the specific activity, half-life, decay chain, chemical form, 
availability make certain isotopes much more viable as threat source material.  The IAEA and 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in conjunction with an interagency task force, has 
made recommendations on the radionuclides of interest as well as activity action levels that 
trigger enhanced security measures [68]. 
The activity action level for many radionuclides is 37–370 GBq (1–10 Ci). As an example, 
the specific activity of natural uranium is 25,280 Bq g-1; in order to have enough material to 
approach the low end of this threshold, one would need nearly 1500 kg of natural uranium 
[69]. That amount of material is entirely unsuitable for dispersion as a radiological hazard.  
On the other hand, isotopes such as 137Cs and 60Co have specific activities on the order of TBq 
g-1, thereby requiring just milligrams of material to comprise a threat amount.  One can find 
these materials in significant quantity quite easily in the industrial and medical sectors. 
While the specific activity of an isotope is a function of its half-life, the decay rate of a 
particular isotope is of interest for other reasons as well.  A material that decays away too 
rapidly has less appeal as a source term for an RDD, particularly since the aims of detonating 
such a device often include long-term uninhabitability or costly cleanup.  However, for a RED, 
there might be advantages to sources with high specific activity and short half-lives. 
Therefore, in general half-lives on the order of years to tens of years are most common for 
RDD/RED threats.  Isotopes that fall outside of that time frame should not be excluded, 
especially if other factors make them appealing, such as availability or chemical form.   
The chemical form of a potential RDD radioisotope is useful to understand for possible 
distribution methods, such as dissolution or aerosolization.  With such high-activity sources, 
manipulation of the radioisotope and fabrication of a device becomes difficult and may have 
to be performed remotely or with significant shielding.  Certain isotopes used in medical and 
industrial applications are better suited than others for making a device. 
Cesium-137 
The isotope 137Cs is a beta emitter but has a unique gamma signature that is associated 
with the decay of its metastable daughter product 137mBa (t½=2.552 minutes), an isomer it 
populates 95% of the time.  The short half-life of 137mBa put it in secular equilibrium with its 
parent isotope and is the reason that the gamma-ray emission at 662 keV (85.1%) is often 
mistakenly attributed to the decay of the 137Cs isotope. 
137Cs is commonly used in blood irradiators, radiation therapy devices, and various 
industrial gauges for measuring flow rates, thicknesses, and moisture density.  It is an isotope 
of particular concern as a threat RDD material because it is often packaged in a sintered 






60Co has a unique and high-energy signature consisting of two cascading gamma-rays at 
1173 (99.97%) and 1332 (99.99%) keV following beta minus decay to stable 60Ni.  Its decay 
results in two distinguishable photo-peaks with very little interference from background since 
the Compton edge of the 1460 keV gamma associated with the decay of naturally occurring 
40K falls between the two peaks.  Also, under certain conditions, summation peaks are 
expected to stand out above 2.5 MeV.  Given those signatures, any detector of reasonable size 
and sufficient energy resolution would be able to identify a high-activity quantity of 60Co at 
operational distances. 
60Co has a high specific activity and is found in large quantities in teletherapy cancer 
treatment devices such as GammaKnife [70].  It is also used in industrial radiography, 
equipment sterilization, food and blood irradiation, and industrial gauges.  Over 170 large-
scale gamma irradiation facilities are currently in operation worldwide containing over 11 
exabecquerel (300 million curies) of 60Co [71].   An estimated 2.2 EBq (60 MCi) is produced 
annually to replenish sources used in hospitals, clinics, and industries worldwide [72].  
Companies that produce and fabricate the source material for these devices frequently ship 
source activities in the 7.4–13.3 TBq (200–360 kCi) range.  It is a common belief these 
shipments are self-limiting in that their weight inside their protective shielding prevents theft, 
and removing the material would incapacitate or kill an aspiring thief in minutes.  However, 
a sophisticated actor could intercept a shipment and possibly use the material in an RDD or 
RED.   
Indeed, there have been several incidents whereby 60Co sources have been out of 
regulatory control and have resulted in radiation sickness and even deaths.  In 2013, indeed 
opportunistic thieves in Mexico carjacked a cargo truck containing 60Co sources for a 
teletherapy machine amounting to 111 TBq (3000 Ci) [73].  Mexican authorities found the 
truck with the source outside of its shielding 40 km (25 mi.) from the gas station where thieves 
stole it at gunpoint [74].   
In 2000, thieves stole an out-of-use teletherapy machine stored by a medical device 
distributor in an unused parking lot.  Scrap collectors purchased the material from the 
unknown strangers and attempted to separate the head to recover material for salvage.  They 
were only partially successful and took the treatment head, containing approximately 15.7 
TBq (425 Ci), to a nearby scrapyard outside of Bangkok, Thailand.  Workers there 
inadvertently exposed the source while disassembling the machine with a torch to recover 
useful materials.  Ten people received high doses from the source, three of which died within 
two months from their exposure [75].   
Neutron Sources 
Mixed alpha-neutron sources and spontaneous fission sources are primarily found in 
industrial gauges used to measure density and moisture in soils, well logging instruments, or 
portable neutron activation analysis systems.  These sources generally have an activity on the 





Materials of this nature could be used in a RED but would not be expected to be used 
effectively as an RDD.  Because the neutron background level is considered low, detection of 
these sources above background is relatively easy.  They do, however, often give rise to 
nuisance alarms when encountered in the environment. 
3.2 Radiation Detection 
When radioactive isotopes decay they release of some form of ionizing radiation.  There 
are two categories of ionizing radiation—direct and indirectly ionizing—that give rise to four 
main radiation types: alpha, beta, gamma-ray, and neutron. 
Charged particles ejected from the nucleus, such as alpha and beta particles, are classified 
as directly ionizing.  Both their charge and mass dictate their range in matter.  Alpha particles, 
consisting of two protons and two neutrons (equivalent to a fully ionized helium atom), have 
charge +2 and significant mass when compared to the electrons and positrons associated with 
beta decay.  Consequently, alpha particles have a very short range, only a few centimeters in 
air, and are easily stopped by a material as thin as a sheet of paper. 
Beta particles have charge ±1and are roughly 7,300 times lighter than alpha particles.  
Beta-decay is a three-body problem consisting of a beta particle, an (anti)neutrino, and the 
daughter nucleus.  This allows the kinetic energy of the beta particle to have a continuous 
range up to the entire Q-value of the decay.  Even at the maximum end-point energy, beta 
particles still only have a range on the order of a few meters in air, and most average energy 
beta particles are entirely stopped by tissue as thin as the dead-layer of human skin. 
Detection of directly ionizing radiation is generally not useful for standoff detection 
applications because of its short range and weak penetration.  However, there are requirements 
for detecting directly ionizing radiations in some contamination, assessment, remediation, and 
forensics missions.  Indirectly ionizing radiation, however, has a much larger range and is the 
focus of the detection methods outlined here. 
Neutral particles ejected or otherwise liberated from the nucleus or atom, such as gamma-
rays, x-rays, neutrons, and muons, are classified as indirectly ionizing radiation.  Because they 
are neutral, they interact far less with surrounding matter than alpha or beta particles and have 
ranges on the order of meters to kilometers.  The two types of neutral particles that are of 
primary interest in detecting threat materials are gamma-rays and neutrons.  To detect them, 
they must interact with detector materials and liberate information carriers that are collected 
and converted into a signal that correlates to the original neutral particle’s interaction.   
Gamma-rays are penetrating photons that result from gamma decay.  Gamma decay 
usually occurs after other forms of radioactive decay have taken place but have left the 
daughter nucleus in an excited state.  Gamma-rays are electromagnetic waves, like x-rays, that 
carry away this excess energy.  Gamma-rays are the result of the nucleus transitioning to a 







Neutrons are much less common in the environment than gamma-rays.  Cosmic-ray 
production is the primary source of background neutrons in the environment.   Both fast and 
thermal neutrons have flux on the order of 1–5 × 10-3 cm-2 s-1 at sea level [7, 35], whereas the 
gamma-ray background at 40–3000 keV is on the order of 25–50 cm-2 s-1 [64].  Neutron rates 
are affected by altitude (pressure), latitude (geomagnetic rigidity), and solar activity.  The 
following sections detail how photons and neutrons interact with matter and by what methods 
they are detected. 
3.2.1 Gamma-ray Interactions with Matter  
Gamma-rays and x-rays interact with matter in the same manner.  They are both high-
frequency photons emitted to rid an atom of excess energy.  Gamma-rays are emitted due to 
changes in nuclear structure, whereas x-rays are the result of the rearrangement of electrons.  
In general, gamma-rays tend to be higher in energy than x-rays; however, synchrotron 
radiation sources produce high-energy x-rays above 100 keV.  The information presented in 
this section is derived primarily from [76]. 
The principal energies of interest for standoff gamma-ray and x-ray detection range from 
20 keV to 3 MeV, though some valuable signatures occur in the 3–8 MeV range as well.  
These higher energy signatures are used primarily for characterization rather than detection 
and usually require close proximity and unobstructed access to the material of interest due to 
the low efficiency at these energies and the limited flux of gamma-rays from these reactions. 
While there are several mechanisms for gamma-rays to interaction with matter, there are 
three primary means by which photons deposit energy that are relevant to radiation detection.  
They are photoelectric absorption, Compton scattering, and pair production.  These processes, 
either individually or collectively, lead to the full or partial conversion of a gamma-ray 
photon’s energy into an electronic signal within a detection medium. 
Photoelectric Absorption 
Photoelectric absorption is the process by which a photon is absorbed by an atom, and an 
energetic photoelectron is ejected.  The ejected electron most often comes from the tightly 
bound K-shell but can occur from any bound state where the gamma-ray energy is above the 
binding energy.  The release of a tightly bound electron is followed by either the capture of a 
free electron or a cascade of outer shell electrons to fill the inner shell vacancy.  This 
rearrangement of electron results in one or more low-energy characteristic x-rays or Auger 
electrons being emitted to carry away the resulting atomic excitation energy.  Most often, the 
energy of these x-rays is deposited locally, though escaping from the detector is a possibility.  
These subsequent emissions impact the overall energy response since the combination of the 
energy of the photoelectron, x-rays, and any Auger electrons amount to the total energy of the 






This process is dominant for all materials at lower energies, and the interaction probability 
is a strong function of the atomic number as well as the energy of the incident photon.  There 
is no single analytic function for the probability over all energies, but a rough approximation 
valid over the gamma-ray energy region of interest is  
𝜏𝜏(𝐸𝐸) ≅ constant × 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝛾𝛾
𝑚𝑚 ,     (3.4) 
where τ is the cross-sectional probability per atom, Z is the atomic number, Eγ is the energy 
of the incident gamma-ray, and the exponent n varies between 4 and 5 while the exponent m 
decreases from 3.5 to 1 going from low to high energies respectively [77].  The effect of Z 
can readily be seen in Figure 3.5 where more than a tenfold increase in cross-section occurs 
when going from Al to Fe and a hundredfold when going from Fe to Pb at energies above 100 
keV.   
 
Figure 3.5: Photoelectric cross-section for various materials over a broad energy range.  Adapted 
from [78] with data from NIST XCOM: Photon Cross-sections Database [79]. 
The plot in Figure 3.6 illustrates the energy dependence of the photoelectric absorption 
cross-section.  The two gamma-ray emissions from 60Co have nearly the same branching ratio, 
but the peak at 1173 keV is more pronounced due to the higher cross-section for photoelectric 






Figure 3.6: Measured spectrum for 158 µCi 60Co taken at 100 cm with an ORTEC  Detective-EX-
100 from PeakEasyLib(3.0) taken at an unknown location in 2004 [62]. (inset) The same spectrum 
on a linear scale to highlight the difference in peak heights for 1173 and 1332 keV. 
Compton Scattering 
Compton scattering events are inelastic collisions whereby an incident photon strikes a 
bound or unbound electron.  The incident photon transfers some portion of its energy and 
momentum to the recoiling electron and continues moving in some new direction with respect 
to its original path.  Compton scattering is an incoherent process, as the phase of the incident 
photon is not preserved.  Using relativistic kinematics, the fraction of the incident energy 
transferred to the recoil electron, as well as the portion retained by the scattered photon, can 
be closely approximated by treating the interaction as an elastic collision between a photon 
and an unbound electron at rest.  By simultaneously solving conservation of mass and energy 
equations, under these simplifying assumptions, the following relationship is derived    
ℎ𝜈𝜈′ =  ℎ𝜈𝜈
1+(ℎ𝜈𝜈 𝑚𝑚0𝑐𝑐2)(1−𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝜃𝜃)⁄  ,     (3.5) 
where ℎ𝜈𝜈′ is the energy of the scattered photon, ℎ𝜈𝜈 is the energy of the incident photon,  
𝑚𝑚0 is the rest mass of the electron, and 𝜃𝜃 is the scattering angle of the photon measured with 
respect to the incident path in the lab frame of reference, as depicted in Figure 3.7.  This 
equation implies a transfer of energy ranging from zero to some maximum at 𝜃𝜃=180 degrees.  
A transfer of zero energy corresponds to Thompson scattering for which a phase change 
may still take place because the interaction is with a single electron, which contrasts with 





because the interaction is with all of the electrons in an atom.  The maximum energy transfer 
occurs at 180˚, but due to the requirement to abide by the conservation laws of energy and 
momentum, the scattered photon will still retain some energy.   
 
Figure 3.7: Diagram of Compton scattering with a target electron assumed at rest. Source: [80] in 
the public domain. 
This difference in energy for a complete backscatter (𝜃𝜃=180˚) event corresponds to a 
feature in gamma-ray spectroscopy known as the Compton edge, above which there are much 
fewer counts between it and the full energy peak.  The counts that fall between the Compton 
edge and the full energy peak are caused by multiple scatter events occurring in a detector or 
from some higher energy gamma-ray.  Below the Compton edge is the Compton continuum 
that arises from the range of scattering angles, and therefore a range of energy deposited in a 
detector.  This continuum continues down to roughly 200–250 keV  
The angular distribution of photons scattered from a free electron is given by the Klein-
Nishina equation, which is not included here, but predicts forward peaked scattering for 
energies of interest to this study, as seen in Figure 3.8. 
 
S.M. Blinder, (http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/KleinNishinaFormulaForComptonEffect/), “Klein-Nishina 
Formula for Compton Effect” https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/legalcode 
Figure 3.8: Polar plots of the differential scattering cross-section for a 51, 511, 1022, and 2555 
keV incident photons.  Source: [81] open content licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0.   
Compton scattering is the dominant interaction process above roughly 100–300 keV for 
most detector materials and the majority of radioisotopes found in the field.  Since collisions 
take place with electrons, the cross-section for Compton scattering is proportional to the 





scattering falls off gradually with increasing gamma-ray energy.  The pile-up of Compton 
events at lower energies from various sources contributes to the spectral shape which tails off 
at higher energies, as seen in Figure 4.14.  This phenomenon is compounded by the decrease 
in detector efficiency with increasing energy.   
Pair Production 
The creation of a subatomic particle and its antiparticle from a neutron boson is known as 
pair production.  In most cases, it involves a photon in the vicinity of an atomic nucleus or 
electron creating an electron-positron pair.  It is a threshold reaction whereby the incoming 
photon must have a minimum energy equivalent to the rest mass energy of the particles 
created, but the probability of such an interaction is low except for photons with several MeV 
of energy.  The probability rises with photon energy and increases approximately as the square 
of the Z of the absorber.  A simplified approximation for the cross-section for pair production 
in the vicinity of a nucleus the cross-section is  
 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) ≈ 𝛼𝛼𝑍𝑍2𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒2 ln𝐸𝐸𝛾𝛾,      (3.6) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 is the cross-sectional probability, 𝛼𝛼 is the fine-structure constant, 𝑍𝑍 is the 
atomic number of the absorber, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 is the classical electron radius, and 𝐸𝐸𝛾𝛾 is the energy of the 
incident photon.  
Pair production manifests itself in radiation detection in two primary ways, depending on 
whether the interaction takes place inside or outside of the detector.  Inside a detector volume, the 
electron-positron pair produced begin interacting with other particles.  The kinetic energy of the 
electron is deposited just as it would be from a photoelectric or Compton scattering event.  The 
positron will travel some distance, join with an electron, and then annihilate creating two 511 keV 
photons traveling approximately the opposite direction as one another.  One or both photons may 
escape the detector volume, or they may deposit a portion or all their energy via Compton 
scattering and the photoelectric effect.  The result spectra will show a full energy peak equal to the 
energy of the incident photon, whereby all the kinetic energy from the electron and the pair of 
photons is converted to information carriers (e.g., ion pairs, electron-hole pairs, scintillation 
photons) in the detector.  Alternatively, it may record a single or double escape peak, where the 
electron energy is captured, but one or both annihilation photons escape the detector, respectively. 
An incident photon with energy greater than the threshold may also interact outside of the 
detector and undergo pair production with some other material.  The same sequence of interactions 
detailed above can take place.  However, one of the resultant annihilation photons can then interact 
within the detector volume and deposit its energy via Compton scattering and the photoelectric 
effect. This phenomenon often results in a slightly broadened peak at 511 keV with incident 







The intervening material between a source and a detector is a significant factor inhibiting 
the detection of threat sources.  Not only is the signal from characteristic gamma-rays reduced 
but signatures that found at lower energies can be overwhelmed by down-scattered gamma-
rays from background sources that undergo Compton scattering in the intervening material.   
Intervening materials are not limited to common shielding materials such as lead bricks; even 
air itself attenuates gamma-rays to varying degrees depending on the energy.  The purpose of 
this section is to outline the conditions for expected threat building roofs to ascertain the 
impacts that attenuation will have on detector requirements used in search operations.   
The improved signal expected due to limited attenuation through the roof is a strong 
motivation when compared with methods that require detection through exterior walls.  A 
misconception with regards to rooftop measurements is that it is likely to be just as difficult 
to detect through the roof as it is through the wall.  After all, one can usually walk on a roof 
and often it is primarily composed of metal, which is much more difficult to for gamma-rays 
to penetrate than concrete. Though the half-value layer of steel for a 1 MeV gamma-ray is a 
factor of three smaller than that of concrete, concrete exterior walls have an attenuation factor 
nearly twenty times greater than the roof because of they are much thicker.  
Roofs are designed to have a high strength-to-weight ratio and do not have the same 
requirements for static loading as structural walls.  A typical building practice for light 
industrial buildings worldwide is to build walls with cinder blocks, or tilt-up poured concrete 
that is nominally 6–8 inches thick, whereas the steel decking used in the roof is 18–22 gauge 
(roughly 1–2mm).  One can usually assume that the walls of a building are not likely to be 
any less attenuating than the roof.  Counterexamples would be something like a warehouse 
where conditions such as cold and snow require stronger and thicker roof materials, but the 
exterior walls are thin corrugated steel or wood.  The attenuation of photons through the roof 
is addressed further in Section 4.1.2.   
3.2.2 Gamma-ray Detectors  
While there are classes of detectors that can be used to detect the presence gamma-rays, 
namely gas proportional counters, the focus of this treatment will be on those that are capable 
of spectroscopy.  That is, rather than relying solely on gross counts above a given threshold 
to detected elevated levels of radiation, directed search requires further information about the 
energy of the gamma-rays deposited in the detector to differentiate threats from elevated 
background levels or nuisance sources.  The content of this section is derived largely from 
[34]. 
The two most common classes of spectroscopic detectors are scintillators and 
semiconductors.  Much like the two categorizes of ionizing radiation, indirectly and directly 
ionizing, the processes by which the energy deposited into these two classes of materials is 






Scintillators are materials that exhibit the property of luminescence in which the energy 
deposited by incident gamma-rays is converted to visible or ultraviolet light through the de-
excitation of electrons involved in the slowing down of the primary ions liberated by one of 
the aforementioned interaction mechanisms.   The light is then guided to a sensor which 
converts and amplifies the light into a measurable electronic signal. 
Scintillators are typically grouped into two categories, organic and inorganic, and can be 
found in gaseous, liquid, or solid phase depending on the application.  Organic scintillators 
are usually comprised of aromatic hydrocarbons.  They typically have fast timing and are 
inexpensive to produce.  Some organic liquid scintillators are used as neutron detectors and 
newer plastic scintillators, loaded with conversion materials such as boron or lithium, can 
detect and differentiate both gamma-rays and neutrons.   
Inorganic scintillators are usually crystalline structures grown in high-temperature 
furnaces.  They are often doped with an activator material that creates luminescence centers 
within the crystal lattice.  These recombination sites provide access to intermediate energy 
levels that are otherwise forbidden in a pure crystal.  These states allow for a more efficient 
de-excitation from the conduction band to the valence band and give rise to visible light rather 
than the higher energy photon that would be associated with a transition across the full 
bandgap.  
One can find a list of common inorganic scintillating materials used as gamma-ray 
detectors and their properties in [34].  Many common detectors are found in the alkali halide 
family with a small amount of activator impurity.  Of those, NaI(Tl) is the workhorse material 
for most search applications, primarily due to its size, availability, and cost.  Newer materials 
with better energy resolution are available and are often found in small handheld systems. 
Users often bypass them for applications requiring larger efficiency detectors because of their 
limited size and high cost.   
The critical features that determine the usefulness of a scintillator material are abundant 
light output, linear response across a range of energies, fast rise times and short decay times, 
and self-transparency to the scintillation light generated.   Physical features such as a large 
effective atomic number, high density, and manufacturability in bulk sizes affect the 
efficiency of the detector.  Additional properties such as ruggedness, temperature 
insensitivity, and cost also play into the trade space in choosing a scintillator best fit for a 
given detection application.   
The method of collecting and amplifying the light generated in the scintillator is critical 
to the resolution of the detector system.  The electronic light sensor is often the limiting factor, 
or quantum sink, for the energy resolution of a detector.  The three most commonly used light 
sensors are photomultiplier tubes (PMT), photodiodes, and silicon photomultipliers (SiPM)  
In a PMT, light from the scintillator is coupled to a photocathode where it is converted 
back to electrons via the familiar photoelectric effect.  These photoelectrons are directed by a 





the number of electrons by way of secondary emissions from collisions with each dynode. 
The resulting stream of electrons is measured as a current striking the anode.  The PMT gain 
is a strong function of the operating voltage.  The number of secondary electrons produced in 
collisions with the dynode depends on the kinetic energy of the incident electrons, which is a 
function of the potential difference between dynodes.  For normal detection operations, the 
gain is usually set to cover a wide range of flux environments, from low background up to 
high-activity sources.  Measurements over long time intervals require some form of gain 
stabilization due to temperature changes in the scintillator or electronics, gradual changes in 





Figure 3.9: Schematic showing incident high-energy photon hitting a scintillating crystal, 
triggering the release of low-energy photons, which are then converted into photoelectrons and 
multiplied in the photomultiplier.  Source: [82] open content licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. 
Photodiodes are semiconductor devices that convert light to electric current and are used 
with some scintillating detectors.  Compared to PMTs, they have small areas,  low sensitivity, 
slow response time, and lack internal gain.  However, they are often used in search detection 
systems for non-spectroscopic gross counting because they are low cost, lightweight, 
compact, rugged, low noise, low voltage, and have excellent linearity, spectral sensitivity, and 
high quantum efficiency [83]. 
Avalanche photodiodes (APD) are a highly sensitive form of a photodiode because they 
operate at a large reverse bias voltage near the breakdown voltage and result in a built-in 
single-stage gain on the order of 102–103 due to avalanche multiplication.  APDs have 
detection applications primarily in positron emission tomography and particle physics, as well 
as commercial applications in laser rangefinders and fiber-optic telecommunications [83]. 
Advances in photodiode technology over the past two decades are the basis for electronic 





devices consist of arrays of APDs, as many as 1,000 in a mm2, that are operated in single-
photon Geiger-mode.  Each pixel is kept a few volts above the breakdown voltage, and a gain 
of up to 106 can be achieved for 1–1000 incident photons on the nanosecond time scale.  
Advantages of SiPMs include high gain with low operating voltage, insensitivity to magnetic 
fields, and high photon detection efficiency in a compact, rugged, and low-cost form factor 
[83, 84, 85].  However, current SiPMs also have significant disadvantages, including 
relatively small areas and issues with noise and nonlinearity at high energies. 
Detectors larger than 1 cm2 suffer from degraded energy resolution over implementation 
with PMTs because of the losses that occur in guiding the light from the scintillator to the 
SiPM.  There are also nonlinearities at higher energies because the number of scintillation 
photons striking the pixels in the device exceeds the number of pixels.  There is approximately 
a 10 ns dead-time per pixel once triggered by a photon.  At higher incident gamma energies, 
the current generated from the struck pixels is missing the contribution of those scintillation 
photons which impinged on an already fired APD [86]. 
Semiconductor Detectors 
Detectors made from semiconductor material do not require the same arduous steps as 
scintillators do in converting gamma-ray photons into a measurable signal.  Instead, energy is 
deposited in the depleted layer of a semiconductor where a gamma-ray interaction liberates 
both electrons and holes.  Both information carriers can be collected and translated into a 
signal, depending on the type and arrangement of the detector.  However, the electrons in 
certain semiconductors travel much faster than the holes; in those cases, often only the 
electron component of the signal is captured.   
The most common semiconductor detector materials are silicon, germanium, cadmium 
telluride, and cadmium zinc telluride.  The critical feature that determines the usefulness of a 
semiconductor for gamma spectroscopy is the energy bandgap.  A small bandgap, such as that 
of germanium (0.67 eV at room temperature) is a suitable trait for superior energy resolution 
because more information carriers are created for a given amount of energy deposited.  
However, such a small bandgap is a double-edged sword.  Germaniums’ bandgap is on the 
same order as the thermal energy of its electrons.  This near-parity leads to unsurmountable 
noise issues at room temperature and requires cooling germanium to liquid nitrogen 
temperatures (~77–100 K) using cryogenic or mechanical means.  Even detectors that can 
operate at room temperature tend to have improved energy resolution at colder temperatures. 
Silicon detectors have been used since the early 1960’s and are still prevalent today for 
application such as charged particle and x-ray spectroscopy as well as electronic personnel 
dosimeters.  As discussed previously in the scintillator section, they are finding an increasing 
role as solid-state replacements for PMTs.  Their application to standoff gamma-ray detection 
is limited to dosimetry and is not considered here. 
High-purity germanium detectors are known as the gold standard for gamma-ray 





with energy resolution on the order of 1.6 keV (0.25% FWHM at 662 keV).  In the past two 
decades, HPGe detectors have been pushed into field use more than ever before because of 
mechanical coolers replacing liquid nitrogen cooling.  There are man-portable systems in the 
field that can operate on batteries for up to 8 hours and weigh under 10 pounds.  There are 
also segmented systems which use the position information of interaction to image sources of 
radiation.     
CZT is being used to a greater extent for high-resolution spectroscopy.  Its main advantage 
is that it can be operated at room temperature.  It is also fairly low power and can be segmented 
or arrayed to provide position information for imaging.  Its energy resolution is not as good 
(~1–1.5% FWHM at 662 keV) as that of HPGe, and it has proven difficult to manufacture in 
sizes larger than ~6 cm3.  Yet, systems of comparable performance to HPGe are being 
developed without the need for cryogenic cooling.    
3.2.3 Neutron Interactions with Matter 
Neutrons can undergo a variety of interactions with surrounding materials, and the 
likelihood of any one of those occurring is a strong function of the kinetic energy of the 
incident neutron; hence, neutrons are often classified by their speed. The number of groups 
and associated energy bins varies by application and sub-discipline, but the most common 
categories are thermal, epithermal, slow, fast, and high-energy.  Thermal neutrons are defined 
as having an energy that is in equilibrium with their surroundings—they are equally as likely 
to gain energy in a collision as they are to lose energy.   Thermal neutrons have energies that 
follow the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, where the most probable energy is 0.025 eV.  
Epithermal neutrons have energies above 0.025 eV up to a few hundred eV.  Slow neutrons 
generally range from one keV to several hundreds of keV.  Fast neutrons are generally 
considered to have a kinetic energy of more than 0.5 MeV up to 10–20 MeV.  High-energy 
neutrons have energies above 20 MeV and require relativistic effects to be taken into 
consideration [87].  When more precision is required, the number of bins and energy windows 
are refined to suit the application. 
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, neutrons that are found in the environment are most often 
products of reactions from cosmic-rays in our atmosphere.  The other primary sources of 
neutrons are those produced by spontaneous fission isotopes, mixed alpha-neutron reactions, 
or small accelerator-based fusion devices.  252Ca (SF), 241AmBe (α, n), and D-D or  D-T fusion 
devices are licensed sources that are often found in the operational environment.  Licensed 
users often employ them in road construction, petroleum exploration, and portable neutron 
activation analysis.  For example, prompt gamma neutron activation analysis is used in soil 
density gauges that are driven with a neutron source or neutron generator [88]. 
Neutrons are “born” fast and thermalize through collision with matter.  Collisions, 
especially with light elements such as hydrogen, are the most effective means to thermalize 
neutrons.  Neutrons transfer a significant portion of it in a grazing collision with a nucleus 





Conversely, collisions with high-Z materials contribute very little to the energy loss of a 
neutron because of the mismatch in mass.  A high-speed golf ball striking a bowling ball 
provides an illuminating comparison, where the mass difference is on the same order to that 
of a fast neutron striking tungsten. 
3.2.4 Neutron Detectors 
Neutron detectors are generally classified by the speed of the neutron, fast or thermal, and 
further by the type of interaction, scattering or absorption, that produces the measurable signal 
indicating a detection of the elusive neutral particle.  
Thermal Neutron Detectors 
Table 3.1catalogs the most common reactions used to detect thermal neutrons.  The most 
prolific and straightforward thermal neutron detector is a gas-filled detector, containing either 
3He or BF3, operated in the proportional region.  Such detectors are easy to manufacture, and 
the Q-value of the reaction allows for pulse-height discrimination to be employed for gamma 
rejection.  Boron can also be embedded into a gas detector by coating the inner wall of the gas 
cylinder with a boron layer.  Bundles of boron-coated copper straws have also been employed 
to increase the surface area of boron for neutrons to interact with and create charged ions [89].   



















𝟕𝟕 + 𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏        𝟔𝟔%
𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋𝟑𝟑
𝟕𝟕 ∗ + 𝐩𝐩   𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟗%𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏  3840 2.792 2.310 19.8 Enriched 10B (99%) is readily available 
𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋𝟑𝟑
𝟔𝟔 + 𝐧𝐧𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 → 𝐇𝐇𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑 + 𝛂𝛂𝟐𝟐𝟗𝟗    940 4.780  7.40       Enriched (95%) 6Li is controlled but available 
𝐇𝐇𝐇𝐇 + 𝐧𝐧𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐𝟑𝟑 → 𝐇𝐇𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑 + 𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏  5330 0.764  0.000137  Enriched 3He is a by-product of tritium production 
Fission counters are another type of thermal neutron detector that could be employed.  
They operate similarly to a boron-lined detector but instead are lined with a layer of highly-
enriched 235U. One should swiftly recognize the drawback to using such a detector for directed 
search operations—it will certainly interfere with the gamma detection scheme if the target 
material is 235U as well.  Furthermore, the efficiency of a typical fission counter is orders of 
magnitude less than that of a BF3 or 3He tube [34].    
Scintillator and semiconductors are also employed as neutron detectors.  For the case of 





and extruded as scintillating fibers, loaded into bulk scintillating plastics or organic liquids, 
coated onto scintillating screens, or grown as crystals.  The capture of a thermal neutron by 
one of these materials liberates ions which cause ionizations in the nearby material and leads 
to excited states which fluoresce when they de-excite.  These visible photons are collected, 
either by a traditional PMT or solid-state photomultiplier and generate a signal that is 
characteristic of a neutron interaction.   
Semiconductor neutrons detectors employ a similar strategy as scintillators by etching 6Li 
into silicon wafers [90].  However, the resulting charged particles from neutron capture create 
electron-hole pairs directly in the silicon.  These devices can be operated at extremely low 
power and have achieved modest efficiency.  They can be tiled to achieve sufficient sensitivity 
for an application.    
While each method has unique considerations and characteristics, the underlying principle 
is to capture a thermal neutron, produce ions, generate information carriers (electron-ion pairs, 
electron-hole pairs, photons), transport and collect the information carriers, and generate a 
signal that is indicative of a neutron interaction.  
Fast Neutron Detectors 
There are three primary methods to detect fast neutrons: (1) moderate to thermal energies 
and measure energy from thermal absorption, (2) measure energy from fast absorption, and 
(3) measure recoil energy from collisions with atoms and molecules.  There are several 
reasons and strategies for moderating neutrons down to thermal energies for detection in a 
thermal neutron detector.  The two primary applications are the spherical dosimeter and the 
long counter, neither of which are relevant to this effort. However, we do anticipate making 
use of UAV components as neutron reflectors or moderators to thermalize or otherwise deflect 
neutrons into a thermal detector.    
As for direct absorption, most materials do not readily absorb fast neutrons; some 
exceptions are 3He, 6Li, and fissionable materials like 238U.  The primary reason to absorb the 
fast neutrons directly is to gather information about the energy distribution of the neutrons, 
which would be of some value to this effort.  Because the kinetic energy of the neutron is no 
longer dwarfed by the Q-value of reaction, one can simply subtract the Q-value from the 
energy deposited by the reaction products to estimate the incident neutron energy.  This would 
be useful information to differentiate between (α, n), D-D or D-T, and fission sources. 
Elpasolite detectors, such as CLLBC(Ce), have intrinsic efficiencies for fast neutrons on the 
order of a percent [91, 92].         
Another mechanism to detect fast neutrons relies on collisions with atoms and molecules 
instead of absorptions.  Neutrons deposit energy with each scattering event, and it is the 
momentum transferred to a given material, primarily protons, that is measured.  Common 
target materials are hydrogen, deuterium, and helium.  Many applications use organic 
scintillators, employing some form of pulse-shape discrimination to differentiate between 





While we recognize that several candidate target materials emit a substantial and 
detectable number of fast neutrons, we expect that a significant fraction of those will be 
moderated by the time they reach the rooftop.  Several possible materials such as explosives, 
low-Z shielding, room clutter, air moisture, and roof constituents may contribute to the 
slowing down of neutrons emitted by the source.  Therefore, we do not expect to employ a 
standalone fast neutron detector in an sUAS-based approach for directed search.  However, 
we will consider employing methods to extract fast neutron information from detectors 
selected for gamma-ray or thermal neutron detection, if applicable.  That is, if CLLBC(Ce), 
or  some other elpasolite material sensitive to fast neutrons, is chosen, and the means to extract 
fast neutron information is worth that additional size, weight, power, and complexity, we 
would consider implementing such a detector.     
3.3 Alternative Signatures, Indicators, and Other Sensors 
The term alternative signatures, when applied to radiological and nuclear threats, generally 
indicates signatures that are not associated with gamma or neutron emissions.  Alternative 
signatures for this mission area include indications of explosives, firing devices, dense 
materials, specialized machining equipment, and unusual human activity.  Sensors deployed 
either alongside the radiation detectors or as separate systems could also gather ancillary 
information that could improve both the collection and analysis of the radiation data. These 
requirements include the location and pose of the detector; an estimate of the background 
radiation levels and variation; the density, thickness, and composition of intervening roof 
material and other characteristics of the scattering environment.  
Orthogonal sensors are desirable in that they can reduce the false alarm rate of the overall 
system and increase the sensitivity to specific threats. We do not intend to cover these 
alternative signatures and their associated sensing modalities in great detail or specificity.  
Rather, we present a general overview of them because their inclusion in the larger system 
would impact the size, weight, and power (SWaP), and could possibly force tradeoffs in the 
radiation detection components. 
Explosives Detection 
Explosives are an integral component of INDs and RDDs.  The quantity and type of 
explosives required depend on the design of the device.  Some example components include 
detonators, propellants, and bulk high explosives. The presence of explosives or precursor 
chemicals is a reliable indicator of nefarious activity.  The mere presence of explosives does 
not indicate that activity to produce an IND or RDD is taking place; nor does its absence 
remove that possibility. However, the presence of explosives does render substantial probable 
cause to compel further investigation and may warrant raising the threshold required to 
absolve a target building of suspicion. 





The information presented here is summarized from [93, 94, 95]. Technologies generally 
focus on either bulk and trace explosive detection, and the two areas are quite different in their 
approaches.  Standoff detection of explosives is generally defined as distances of 10 m or 
greater. Standoff detection of bulk explosives is possible through imaging techniques used to 
indirectly identify characteristic shapes of explosives, detonators, or wires; or to directly 
detect chemical composition, dielectric properties, or other physical characteristics. Various 
X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, infrared, terahertz, microwave, radar, and other electro-magnetic 
techniques have been explored and operationalized.  However, these techniques normally 
require line-of-sight to the material or control of the container being interrogated.  Therefore, 
it is unlikely that one could employ any of these methods for bulk detection in a typical 
directed search scenario.  For this treatment, we assume that line-of-sight is not possible, and 
trace detection is the most viable means available for remote detection.  
Trace explosives detection at standoff distances is based on sample collection and analysis 
of residual particles or vapors.  The most common explosives trace detection  methods include 
colorimetric, chemical luminescence, gas chromatography, mass spectrometry, ion mobility 
spectrometry, field ion spectrometry, surface acoustic wave, amplifying fluorescent polymer, 
Fourier transform infrared, electron capture detectors, and  photoionization detectors (PID).  
Some of these techniques are coupled together, as in a gas chromatography-mass 
spectrometry, thereby using orthogonal techniques in series on the same sample.  While each 
technology and particular device varies in the manner in which samples are collected and 
analyzed, the broad approaches are sniffing, swiping, or sorbing residual vapors, liquids, or 
particles.  
It is beyond the scope of this work to describe in detail the specific aspects of each of these 
methods.  Rather, it is sufficient to note that we must consider employing one or more of these 
technologies in conjunction with a radiation detection system. We also recognize that remote 
sample collection and detection of explosives has operational value outside of nuclear and 
radiological search missions and is undoubtedly being pursued in several other mission areas.  
The key factors determining which technologies we should evaluate for this mission area 
include sensitivity, specificity, SWaP, sample collection and preparation, and orthogonality.   
With regards to sensitivity and specificity, a variety of explosive types may be employed 
in a device, spanning a range of vapor pressures and chemical signatures.  The detection of 
machined explosives manufactured off-site and brought to the target building is unlikely at 
any standoff.  However, the case in which the explosives were either manufactured or 
machined on-site increases the viability of trace detection.  A system that is sensitive to a wide 
range of indicator compounds and can distinguish between contaminates, military-grade 
explosives, and improvised or homemade explosives is desirable. 
Like radiation detection, there often is a background level of indicator molecules present 
in the environment, especially in areas around the world that have been involved in recent 
military, de-mining, or blasting activities.  In those cases, samples from nearby locations not 





Dense, High-Z materials 
Dense, high-Z materials are used both in shielding radioactive sources and as potential 
components of INDs. Materials such as lead, tungsten, and depleted uranium are effective 
shields for high-energy photons, or they might be used as a tamper or neutron reflector in an 
IND.  Such dense materials are detectable by imaging systems, such as x-ray backscatter, 
dual-energy megavoltage radiography, muon tomography, and nuclear resonance 
fluorescence [12].  These systems are very large; one would have to employ them from a 
vehicle in a directed search operation.  While these methods are not likely to be deployed from 
a UAV, the detection of characteristic gamma-rays or neutrons could be performed remotely 
as part of an unmanned system.  This concept has overlap with active interrogation 
applications and should be further explored.  However, the methods to detect dense, high-Z 
materials is currently outside of the scope of this study.   
Detector Location and Pose 
Knowledge of the location and pose of the detector allows one to develop proximity 
imaging maps for the areas measured by the system.  Moreover, one could apply a directional 
efficiency calibration when trying to reconstruct counts from a well-characterized system that 
employs either self-occluding detector arrays or more advanced modulation concepts.  
Sensors that would provide location and pose information include standard and differential 
global navigation satellite systems, inertial measurement units, visual and stereo cameras, 
structured light RGB-D devices, light detection and ranging scanners, and perhaps other 
electro-optical instruments.  Often, one or more these systems function together to provide a 
capability that builds a map of the scene and tracks the position of the sensor as it moves 
through it, otherwise known as simultaneous location and mapping.  The ability to track 
radiation detectors as they move through a scene, as well as provide context to what is around 
the sensors in a given area, enables near real-time volumetric (3-D) imaging of gamma-ray 
and neutron sources through an approach known as scene data fusion [96].  
Background Radiation Estimation 
The background radiation intensity is likely to be a strong function of the building 
materials and the surrounding area.  For example, if the building is erected on a poured 
concrete slab, we find strong evidence (see Chapter 4) to suggest that the contributions from 
the concrete will dominate the background radiation levels.  There are efforts to semantically 
segment scenes and make estimates on the contribution of materials found in the scene to 
background.  Some form of an electro-optic sensor (visual, hyperspectral, multispectral, 
thermal) could provide enough non-radiation data input to give a reasonable estimate of the 
background.   However, an actual measurement of the local background from a nearby 
location is likely to provide more accurate information.  This technique could be relevant to 





Intervening Material and Building Contents 
A measurement or estimate of the amount of intervening material, such as the thickness 
and composition of the roof material, would inform the shape of the resulting spectrum as 
well as the reduction in full-energy peak signal due to the scattering and attenuation that take 
place in the material.  Moreover, knowledge of the location of structural supports (e.g., arches, 
beams, trusses, columns, stretchers) can inform the best locations to make measurements for 
a given area.  One could garner this information from architectural blueprints or collect it in 
situ using one or more sensor modalities.  
For example, one can obtain limited but useful information from LiDAR scans through 
the windows of a building.  Other technologies such as capacitive sensors, ultra-wideband 
radar, thermal infrared radiation (IR) cameras, and ultrasonic radar are approaches that could 
provide data on near-field material characteristics and possible occupancy and room clutter 
information as well, depending on the building construction.  
From the perspective of other sensing modalities, the data on the building contents and 
clutter inform several lines of analysis.  First, with regards to radiation detection, it can help 
with modeling efforts to characterize sources of interest by taking scattering in the 
environment into account for gamma and x-rays, as well as the production, scattering, and 
moderation of neutrons.  Second, it can improve imaging efforts by providing information to 
voxelize the interior of the building as well as indicate regions from which gamma emissions 
from a potential source are either very likely or unlikely to reach the detector, as in the case 
of thick interior walls, large equipment, or intentional shielding.  Third, the confirmation of 
industrial equipment (e.g., machine shop tools, chemical mixing tanks, processing cells, glove 
boxes) could inform high-priority measurement locations or might be strong enough of an 
indicator to warrant a full-scale building raid. 
The knowledge of building occupancy is valuable for several reasons. It could inform 
decisions on whether to proceed with further measurements at different locations on or around 
the building or whether to deploy additional remote sensing vehicles to the building.  
Moreover, the detection of human activity, especially at certain times, particular work cycles, 
or within specific locations might be indictors of nefarious activity which may raise the threat 
assessment level of a target location. Finally, combined with other intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) streams, it could point to the presence of a threat person or group 
which may trigger a response without the deployment of remote radiation sensing platforms.  
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we explored the radioactive and alternative signatures associated with lost 
or stolen nuclear or radiological material.  We discussed the sources of background radiation 
present in the environment, and we examined typical threat materials that might trigger the 
deployment of a search force and the unique signatures they emit.  Then we turned to the 





and neutrons interact with material and expanded further into the mechanisms by which we 
can detect them.   Along the way, we looked at the impact of attenuating materials as well as 
the impact that background radiation has on the signal-to-noise ratio in detecting threats.  In 
the next chapter, we delve deeper into the background encountered on buildings and explore 
the limits of detection from the rooftop. 
Regarding alternative signatures, we briefly introduced some modalities that do not 
involve the measurement of radiation but would prove valuable if they could answer questions 
regarding the presence of explosives, high-Z materials, specialized equipment, or human 
activity.  We also looked at the benefits of contextual sensors as they apply to improve the 
radiation detection scheme.  Many of these sensors are worth considering for a system of 
systems approach to the problem.  Some may even be deployable on the same platform as the 
radiation detection sensor package.  
However, with the layering of sensing modalities and reconnaissance objectives, there is 
a risk that the complexity of the system will grow too cumbersome and unruly.  One does not 
want to overburden a search team with dozens of sensors, each of which will have their quirks, 
logistical burdens, and failure modes.  Moreover, assuming everything works, the goal is not 
to overwhelm the commander with technical data that may or may not indicate a threat. 
Instead, it is to provide a scalable toolset to the commander so that they can make the best 
decision possible given the information available. There certainly are operational conditions 
and decision points where a commander might choose to conduct a raid on a building or 
compound or order a cordon and search of the entire area instead of deploying an extensive 
suite of sensor platforms.  After all, a substantial amount of direct information can be obtained 
by kicking down the door and looking inside rather than piecing together a number of indirect 






4 Background Radiation and Source Measurements 
n nuclear and radiological search operations, a reasonable estimate of the distribution of 
background radiation is required for most detection and identification algorithms.  The 
variation in the background across the search area influences the probability of detection 
for a given false-alarm rate.  Different search modes may have unique background features 
and signal collection considerations.  For example, vehicle-borne search operations are 
characterized by rapidly changing background conditions with short signal integration 
windows.  Dismounted search activities feature more gradually changing background 
conditions with longer integration times.  Vehicle portal operations have longer fixed signal 
collection intervals under a relatively constant background, though the background rate 
decreases as the ground near the detector is partially obscured or shielded by the vehicles and 
contents being screened. sUAS-based reconnaissance of buildings resembles dismounted 
search, in that the detector moves in the environment, but also shares similarities with portal 
operations, in that collection times are usually long and can be fixed.   
For this study’s first thrust area, we conducted a measurement campaign on representative 
light industrial buildings to address two primary questions: (1) What does the background 
radiation environment look like from the rooftop of a building? (2) Are radioactive threat 
sources detectable from the roof?  This chapter presents the results of the investigation into 
the composition, range, variation, and attenuation of background radiation measured from the 
rooftop of buildings.  It also addresses the detection of limited-activity radioactive sources 
using a variety of detector types.   
4.1 Background Radiation 
For a search area on the order of 10 km2, one can expect minimal variation from the cosmic 
sources of background radiation unless there is a significant change in altitude or geomagnetic 
rigidity.  Therefore, the contribution to the background from cosmic sources is likely constant 
across a building.  Local geological conditions determine the terrestrial background 
component on a coarse-scale. As discussed previously, the KUT content in the soil and 
surrounding materials is the most prominent factor in the terrestrial background.  In open and 
rural areas, this is relatively constant over sizable distances.  However, in an urban setting, 
variation in the buildings and roads have a significant impact on the background levels. 
Since this approach takes place on buildings, we must consider the alteration to terrestrial 
background caused by construction materials.  Digging a foundation or grading the land may 
expose soil which has different ratios of KUT than the surrounding land.  Modern building 
construction often uses materials obtained from beyond the local area.  Soil or crushed stone 
may be trucked in to level or grade the site.  Materials used in foundations and walls often 
come from distant quarries that have different levels of KUT than the surrounding area.  Some 






is a by-product of burning coal and contains concentrated uranium and thorium that is up to 
ten times the level found in coal [53].  Rebar and other structural steel components may 
contain trace radioactive impurities, either from atmospheric nuclear testing or the inadvertent 
addition of orphaned radioactive sources from scrap recycling during the manufacturing 
process.  It should not be surprising that the background radiation measured on the rooftop of 
a building is considerably different from the surrounding area because of the contribution 
from the materials used in its construction.   
As previously discussed in Section 1.3, the expected location of a target building is in a 
light industrial or commercial district, which points to slab foundations with corrugated metal, 
reinforced cinderblock, or tilt-up concrete walls.  A set of buildings with these characteristics 
were examined at several locations: Richmond, CA; Tracy, CA; and Fort Belvoir, VA.  
Detailed measurements were taken to sample the variation of background levels across a 
building, at different rooftop heights, amongst different nearby buildings, at different 
locations within a region, and from locations on opposite coasts. 
4.1.1 Methods 
Primary background measurements were taken using an ORTEC Detective-DX-100 
mechanically-cooled HPGe detector.  The detector was initially self-calibrated using the 
prevalent background peak at 1460.83 keV from 40K and further calibrated with an 8.031 µCi 
152Eu source.  We placed the detector into a field-expedient stand fabricated from a shipping 
pallet for measurements.  This stand positioned the detector in a vertical orientation, such that 
the axis of the coaxial crystal was perpendicular to the plane of the rooftop, as seen in Figure 
4.1.  Interior building measurements were raised from the floor approximately 30 cm, using a 
five-gallon plastic bucket, to reduce scatter.   
 
Figure 4.1 (left) An inverted ORTEC DX-100 high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector on an 
improvised stand.  (middle) The HPGe detector raised from the floor with a bucket.  (right) The 
contents of the bag include various prototype detectors on loan from the Defense Threat Reduction 





A collection of small prototype detectors, on loan from the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency (DTRA), were also employed to measure the background with different detector 
types.  They included cerium-doped lanthanum bromide (LaBr3[Ce]), cerium-doped cesium 
lithium yttrium chloride (CLYC[Ce]), and strontium iodide (SrI2[Eu]) scintillators, a small 
solid-state cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) crystal, as well as boron line tubes and straws for 
thermal neutron detection. 
We took initial measurements at the approximate midpoint of each building, on both the 
rooftop and above the concrete slab floor within the building.  These measurements were 
taken for 4,000 seconds to ensure suitable statistics for rooftop attenuation analysis.  
Subsequent measurements across the rooftops were taken for 900 seconds at separation 
distances from the primary location generally equivalent to the height of the building, but no 
more than twice that distance.  The rooftop size and layout of each building constrained the 
locations of supplementary measurements. Most often, the configuration resembled a 
quincunx, or the pips representing the number five on a die or domino, as seen in Figure 4.2.  
We were not able to take supplementary measurements on all buildings, as our access to 
certain rooftops was limited, particularly at Livermore Site 300. 
 
Figure 4.2: Illustration of single and repeated quincunx pattern.  Source: [97] in the public domain.  
The buildings chosen for this background measurement campaign were selected based on 
access, size, and diversity of construction materials.  As seen in Figure 4.3, the buildings at 
Richmond Field Station varied in size, shape, height, wall construction, and roofing material.  
The interior construction and contents of the buildings also spanned the gamut of what one 
might find in an industrial setting.  Figure 4.4 illustrates some of the unique elements we 
encountered. 
Photographs of the buildings measured at Livermore Site 300 and Fort Belvoir are not 
included here since they are in secure areas, and the activities taking place in such buildings 
may be sensitive.  However, these buildings exemplified the size and construction style of 








Figure 4.3 Representative light industrial buildings found at Richmond Field Station. (top left) 
Bldg. 486 contained tilt-up concrete exterior walls, internal cinder block masonry, I-beam 
structure, and steel roof decking. (top right) Bldg. 128 was built for manufacturing explosive 
blasting caps; it has areas with concrete walls 2 feet thick as well as corrugated steel walls and an 
asphalt and wood ceiling over steel trusses. (middle left) Bldg. 158 is a high-bay with an I-beam 
support structure and corrugated metal walls. (middle right) Bldg. 472 is a unique wooden 
building used for cutting cross-sections of large trees.  (bottom left) Bldg. 480 contained 
laboratory space for analysis of concrete and asphalt road samples.  (bottom middle) Bldg. 478 is 
a forestry products laboratory and warehouse with climate-controlled spaces.  (bottom right) Bldg. 
153 is used by mechanical engineering students working on small engines and contains various 







Figure 4.4: Noteworthy characteristics of light industrial buildings. (top left) Lab in Bldg. 154 
where a properly licensed and stored 137Cs source was detected.  Its presence was not revealed 
prior to our measurements. (top right) Interior view of Bldg. 158 high-bay with I-beam support 
structure and corrugated metal walls.  (middle left) Interior view of Bldg. 486 roofing depicting 
steel roof decking supported by an I-beam structure.  (middle right) Interior view of Bldg. 486 
with concrete walls and machining equipment.  (bottom left) Interior view of high-bay in Bldg. 
486 with machining equipment and large rock crusher.  (bottom right) Interior view of Bldg. 486 






We anticipate the most significant contributions to background radiation in a light 
industrial building to comes from the poured concrete slab and the walls.  From atop the center 
of the roof, one can model the foundational slab as a semi-infinite half-plane with a reasonably 
constant source distribution.  This model results in a relationship whereby the radiation field 
from the slab, neglecting air attenuation, is independent of distance.  It is akin to applying 
Gauss’ law to a uniform sheet of charge density σ (C m-2), where the resulting electric field 
is uniform and independent of the distance from the sheet [99]. 
As shown in [7], this half-space source calculation can be useful in estimating the detector 
count rate from background sources if one knows or can approximate the elemental 
concentrations of the sources.  Such information is readily available for locations in the U.S. 
and Canada from aerial gamma-ray data processed and maintained by the U.S. Geological 
Survey [42]; Table 4.1 lists data for locations germane to this study. The equation to convert 
the surface concentrations into a detector count rate is 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(min−1) = 60 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖2 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑
2 𝑡𝑡1 2⁄  𝑀𝑀 (𝜇𝜇 𝜌𝜌⁄ )  ,    (4.1) 
where CR is the count rate in the detector per minute, 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 is Avogadro’s constant, 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 is the 
branching ratio for the gamma-ray emission, 𝑓𝑓 is the mass fraction of the emitting isotope, 𝑀𝑀 
is the atomic mass of the isotope, and 𝜇𝜇 𝜌𝜌⁄  is the mass attenuation coefficient for the material. 
Table 4.1: Estimated surface concentrations of potassium, uranium, and thorium, based on USGS 
reported values [61] taken from GADRAS inject tool [64] at locations where data where taken. 





Fort Belvoir, VA 0.38 1.39 4.16 
Los Alamos, NM  1.68 2.49 8.38 
Richmond, CA  0.60 0.83 3.59 
Tracy, CA 1.21 1.64 7.12 
 
The assumption of a semi-infinite half-plane is valid for ordinary building heights because 
the attenuation due to air in the energy range of the primary KUT lines is small when 
compared to the attenuation due to the roof material.  Small thicknesses of roofing materials 
have the same effect on photon attenuation as several meters of air.  The attenuation factor 
through 5 meters of air for primary KUT photons (609, 1461, and 2614 keV) ranges 2–5%.   
Air attenuation only becomes a factor at >50 m for gamma-ray energies above 100 keV, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.5.  The steel, wood, insulation, and waterproofing material in the roof 
amount to 15–35% attenuation for the same energy photons, calculated from similar materials 






Figure 4.5: Attenuation (1/𝑒𝑒) length for gamma-rays in air.  Adapted from [7] with data from 
NIST X-ray Mass Attenuation Coefficients database [61]. 
Though steel contains carbon and other minor elements, we conservatively chose to use 
mass attenuation coefficients for pure iron. Wood has similar properties to tissue in terms of 
attenuating gamma-rays, though the density of plywood is nearly half that of tissue [100].  
Thus, based on a review of the literature, we selected breast tissue as a suitable surrogate for 
plywood [101].  Roofing insulation is most often made of extruded polystyrene, and 
polystyrene is a material for which mass attenuation coefficients are tabulated. Ethylene 
propylene diene monomer (EPDM) is often used as a waterproof membrane to cover roofs.  
Because of its similarity in elemental composition to EPDM, we selected propane-equivalent 
tissue as a surrogate.  The wood, insulation, and membrane material are low Z and have 
approximately the same effect on the gamma-ray energies of interest.  The values for breast 
tissue, polyethylene, and propane-equivalent tissue produced nearly the same results for a 
material of a given thickness and density.   



























1461 keV 4.7 8.6 6.9 20.3 2.9 34 
U-chain 
609 keV 3.1 5.7 4.6 13.8 1.9 24 
Th-chain 





Since the material list available in the NIST database is limited, we built models in 
GADRAS to confirm the transmission of various energy gamma-rays through a typical roof.  
These models use a well-defined detector response function and are based on a combination 
of first-principles calculations and empirical modeling [64]. These models are in better 
agreement with our measured results found in Section 0. 
We developed two models in GADRAS.  The first was a simple 2-D layered slab geometry 
whereby the propagation of characteristic 1461 keV gamma-rays from the decay through 
layers of materials was analyzed to predict the attenuation through roof materials.  First, we 
deposit a representative concentration of potassium in a 60 cm slab of concrete.  The model 
produced a simulated spectrum based on this material, and then we executed an automated 
peak analysis to obtain an estimated count rate from 40K.  Next, we placed a 500 cm layer of 
air on to the slab and repeated the process.  We continued this for all the remaining roof 
materials and present the results of this simulation in Table 4.3.   
The second model we created was a full 3-D rendering of a building, including the concrete 
slab, concrete walls, and roof materials.  The purpose of this model was to predict the 
transmission of characteristic gamma-rays from benchmark threat objects through the roof 
and to test the response of characterized detectors in the GADRAS library.  Figure 4.6 contains 
a visual rendering of this model.  
Table 4.3: Attenuation of the 1461 keV background peak from 40K by roof materials modeled 
using GADRAS [64]. 
Material 
Thickness [cm] 


















Count Rate 0.47±0.01 0.45±0.01 0.41±0.01 0.36±0.01 0.312±0.009 0.256±0.008 
Layer 
Attenuation — 4±3% 9±5% 11±5% 10±4% 12±4% 
Total 
Attenuation — 4±3% 13±3% 23±3% 34±2% 46±2% 
 
           
Figure 4.6: (left) 3-D model of building with a concrete slab (blue), tilt-up concrete walls (blue), 
steel roof decking (red), plywood decking (green), extruded polystyrene insulation (pink), and 






Background radiation measurements taken on the roof looked very similar to background 
measured elsewhere.  Still, localized conditions and diverse building materials showed higher 
variation than might be anticipated from surface concentration estimates listed in Table 4.1. 
Although we expected local variations, the magnitude of the variation in counts from 40K 
over short distances was unexpected. 40K counts varied by as much as a factor of two across 
the buildings measured and by nearly that amount on the same building in one case.  While 
unexpected, it is not so extreme when compared to the variations encountered in mobile search 
shown in Figure 4.10.  It is also consistent with local background variations reported in [102]. 
Gamma-ray attenuation through the roof was consistent with predictions generated by the 
models in Section 4.1.2. 
Gamma-ray Background Variations 
 
Figure 4.7: Comparison of measured background with typical long dwell background spectrum. 
The spectrums are not normalized to aid in visual comparison. (black) Measured ~4000 s 
background taken inside Bldg. 486, Richmond, CA. (blue) Measured   150,000 s spectrum from 
PeakEasyLib(3.0) taken in Los Alamos, NM in 2010 [62]. (inset) Residuals from subtracted 
normalized spectra. 
As expected, the data are consistent with natural background radiation.  Figure 4.7 shows 
a gamma-ray energy spectrum we measured in a building in Richmond, CA in comparison to 
a long-dwell background measurement taken with a similar model detector in Los Alamos, 
NM, distributed as part of the spectral library of PeakEasyLib(3.0) [62].  The labeled spectrum 





of naturally occurring terrestrial isotopes.  The disparity in counts per channel between the 
two spectra is due to a massive difference in count time (150,000 vs. 3,978 s)—this is 
intentionally retained to aid in the visual comparison of the peaks.  When normalized and 
subtracted, as seen in the inset of Figure 4.7, there is undoubtedly a much higher concentration 
of KUT, especially potassium, in Los Alamos, NM.  This finding should not be a surprise and 
has been measured in the past.  The USGS reported values for KUT in each area are listed in 
Table 4.1, and Figure 4.8 visually depicts the potassium concentration in two contour maps. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: (left) Regional contour map of the estimated surface concentration of potassium 
zoomed into the Los Alamos region of New Mexico. Source: [103] in the public domain.  (right) 
USGS data overlaid on ©Google Earth map of Richmond Field Station in California (yellow line).  
Sources: Adapted from [42, 104] with data in the public domain. 
We re-calibrated spectra from ten buildings at Richmond Field Station and extracted 
regions of interest data to assess the variation of background across the site. We analyzed 
seven peaks, shown in Table 4.4, to describe the background probability distribution shown 
in Figure 4.9.  We modeled this technique after one used by researchers analyzing background 
variations in mobile data collected with RadMAP, shown in Figure 4.10 [24]. 
Table 4.4: Background radiation peak regions of interest.  Peaks were fit with a single Gaussian 
and a linear background using PeakEasy’s batch processing function [62]. 
Region of Interest Lower Energy Upper Energy 
1 577.683     589.383        
2 604.392     614.264     
3 1113.780    1127.314     
4 1454.190    1466.629        
5 1762.659    1765.840     
6 2202.503    2204.660     






Figure 4.9: (red) Probability distribution for seven naturally occurring background energy lines 
measured at twenty-eight positions on the rooftops of ten light industrial buildings at the 
Richmond Field Station in Richmond, CA (July 2015) x� = 0.95 s−1(57 min−1). (blue) 
Probability distribution of five-thousand Poisson-generated random numbers converted to cps 
with 𝜆𝜆 = 57. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Background probability distributions for four typical environments: bridges (blue), 
rural areas (green), downtown Oakland (black), and the Jack London district (industrial 
warehouses, red). The shaded regions indicate 68% confidence intervals.  Source: [24] figure is 





As exhibited in Figure 4.9, the background gamma radiation levels measured across the 
rooftops of buildings vary beyond Poisson statistical limits.  In comparison to mobile 
background measurements taken through four different environments in the Bay area (bridge, 
rural, downtown, and industrial), the normalized count rates in seven naturally occurring 
background energy lines most closely resemble the data taken near industrial warehouses in 
the Jack London district of Oakland, CA.  The industrial distribution from that dataset had the 
highest average background count rate as well as a sizeable spread in the distribution [see 
Figure 4.10].  Note that the mobile data included summed spectra from twenty-four HPGe 
detectors with roughly 1,200 cm2 of detector area, whereas we collected rooftop data using a 
single HPGe detector with roughly 33 cm2 of detector area.  The average rate of 0.95 peak 
background counts per second in the rooftop data translates to approximately 35 counts per 
second in a RadMAP-sized detector, which is at the high end of the industrial distribution. 
While the rooftop measurements are in good agreement with the RadMAP data, there are 
a few plausible explanations for the elevated peak background rates from the rooftops.  First, 
the ratio of the detector areas could be off by as much as 3%, which would translate to a 
difference of as much as ±1.7 counts per second for a RadMAP-sized detector.   
Second, the average source-distribution-to-detector distance was smaller for the rooftop 
measurements.  The height of rooftops in the background measurement data ranged from 3–
10 m with a mean height of 5.6 m and a median height of 5.4 m.  Though the road was much 
closer to detectors in RadMAP, an inch of lead on the floor of the truck bed shielded the 
detectors from radiation entering from below.  Therefore, the contribution to background 
peaks from KUT was from buildings, curbs, sidewalks, and other structures in the field-of-
view of the detectors.  These materials ranged 5–50 m from the detectors while driving, with 
an average distance of 10 m to the exterior walls of the closest nearby building. 
Third, the peak-fitting methods used were not the same, and we may have included excess 
counts in the regions of interest from the rooftop data.  Our rooftop data peaks were 
automatically analyzed with a peak-fitting routine in PeakEasy [62] using a single Gaussian-
fit with a linear background.  The RadMAP data were analyzed using hand-selected adjacent 
spectral windows to estimate the background under the peak.  An exaggerated estimate of the 
deviation between the two peak-fitting procedures could contribute to the difference.  Based 
on the uncertainty of the net counts in the peak, this could be as high as ±0.04 counts per 
second in the rooftop measurements, which translates to ±1.5 counts per second for a 
RadMAP-sized detector.  This extrapolation assumes that the peak-fitting routine 
overestimated the net peak area for each of the peaks of interest by the uncertainty of the fit. 
Of note, when compiling the region of interest data, the fitting algorithm failed for some 
of the peaks at various measurement locations.  The failure due to low statistics, especially at 
some of the higher energies (>1500 keV), is noteworthy because the measurement device 
used—the ORTEC Detective-DX-100—exemplifies the ceiling of the realm of the possible 
for sUAS-mounted detectors.  It has a relatively large active volume, is among the best for 
energy resolution, and the collection time for these measurements was >900 s, yet some peaks 





detector options for this application will not come close to the same volume or resolution. 
Though longer dwell times are almost always preferred, a 300-second collection is considered 
an unofficial standard for presumptive field spectroscopy [105]. 
As seen in Figure 4.11, potassium content, which is responsible for the 1460.82 keV line, 
has the most significant variance by a considerable amount.  As an individual peak, 40K 
contributes the most counts to the background peak total.  However, the total rate from the 
sum of uranium and thorium-progeny lines is on par or exceeds the average rate due to 40K 
alone. A significant deviation in counts is observed for all seven natural background source 
peaks and provides strong evidence against using gross count algorithms or even energy 
windowing algorithms for this type of search. 
 
Figure 4.11: Average peak count rates for thirty-five measurements of terrestrial background 
measured from the rooftops of thirteen light industrial buildings in the San Francisco Bay Area 
using an ORTEC Detective-DX-100 HPGe detector. 
The range of backgrounds encountered across different buildings at different locations is 
understandable.  However, the variation between nearby buildings, as well as across any 
single building, warranted further analysis.  Based on the data presented in  
Figure 4.12, there is a significant amount of variation in some buildings, whereas others 
are relatively constant.  From these measurements, it appears there is no recurrent or 
identifiable relationship between building height, construction, or location. 
Bldg. 153 demonstrates the most substantial variation and had three different roof levels 
ranging 3–5.3 m.  However, there is no correlation with height since pairs of locations (1&2, 
3&4, and 5&6) were at the same heights, yet the most considerable variation recorded was 
between 3&4. Bldg. 158/158A showed little variation in background levels.  The roof did 
have different heights, which supports the infinite half-plane conclusion that height does not 





A noteworthy feature is seen in the data for Bldg. 486.  Location 2, which is almost twice 
as high (10.7 m) as locations 1 and 3 (5.4 m), has a background rate 28% lower than location 
1, suggesting a decreasing rate at an increased height.  However, location 3, which is at the 
same height as location 1 but in a different section of the building, has an even lower rate 
(32% lower than location 1).  This discrepancy contradicts any perceived correlation between 
height and background level. 
 
Figure 4.12: Count rate charts and waterfall plots for background measurements on Bldgs. 128, 
153, 158/158A, 472, and 486. 
In consideration of the impact that background variation might have on the search of a 
designated target, we chose to make detailed measurements at a finer pitch on Bldg. 128.  We 
measured the background at thirty-five locations across the rooftop on a rectangular pitch.  
This arrangement was chosen to simulate a simple raster search pattern.  We analyzed the 
variation of the background to inform the level of confidence required to confirm or deny the 
presence of threat material. Figure 4.13 illustrates the variation for the thirty-five sample 
locations using a color scheme that is neutral at the mean and ranges up and down three 







Figure 4.13: Variation of terrestrial background measured across a single building (300-second 
measurements at 35 locations).  Counts in (a) 1461 keV peak (b) 609 keV peak (c) 2614 keV peak 
(d) raw sum of 609, 1461, 2614 keV peaks (e) equally weighted sum of KUT peaks (f) total counts 
from the full spectrum, and (g) total counts photo stitched onto an aerial photo of Bldg. 128.  The 












We analyzed the measurements of Bldg. 128 by each of the individual KUT components, 
the weighted and unweighted sum of primary KUT lines, and the total background counts.  
The spread of peak counts from potassium was about half that of the building to building 
comparison seen in Figure 4.11 but still amounted to a range of counts that varied by ±25%.  
The sum of uranium lines was similar at ±28%, and the spread of the sum of the thorium lines 
was higher at ±39%. Table 4.5 lists summary statistics for the individual KUT contributions 
as well as the total background counts. 
Measurements of Bldg. 128 were the most detailed and showed a rather high amount of 
variation for a single building.  However, the nature of the construction of this building was 
unique.  It was previously used for the fabrication of blasting caps and explosives, prior to its 
current use as a storage building. Some interior walls were built over two feet thick to aid in 
the protection of workers.  They were designed to localize the effects of a blast, should an 
accident have occurred with the handling of the extremely sensitive primary explosive, 
mercury fulminate.  These blast walls may have contributed to the elevated and varying 
background levels that were measured. 
Table 4.5: Summary statistics for the variation of terrestrial background on Bldg. 128. 
 









Mean counts  177.8 68.4 35.3 26612 
Standard Error 2.7 1.6 1.2 187 
Median 178.4 66.7 36.0 26338 
Mode 182.7 67.7 29.9 27114 
Standard Deviation 16.9 9.4 7.1 1168 
Sample Variance 287.2 89.0 50.7 1363145 
Range 83.6 37.7 27.7  4887 
Minimum 146.8 51.5 22.4 24235 
Maximum 230.4 89.2 50.1 29122 
Sum 6934.1 2325.5 1165.9 1037870 
 
The background variation will impact the dwell time required to adjudicate each location 
of the building.  The dwell time per measurement location is the free parameter that can be 
adjusted since the source-to-detector distance and incidental shielding are fixed for a given 
building.  The source-to-detector distance has a minimum equal to the height of the building 
minus the height of the source from the ground. The signal attenuation from the roofing 
materials is fixed, aside from the added effect of the angle of incidence (discussed later in 
Section 4.2.2) and possible interference from structural materials such as beams and supports. 
For a background that is twice as large, it could take up to twice as long to detect the same 
source activity level at a 95% confidence level.  For example, using data collected with a 137Cs 
source present with an initial counting time of 1,800 sec, and measured background levels in 





would require at least 3,370 seconds to detect the same source.  Depending on the detector 
resolution and threat source activity, the dwell time scaling can be significant.  Sharp peaks 
associated with sub-0.2% energy resolution detectors have a much better signal-to-noise ratio 
and therefore a much lower MDA. 
Gamma-ray Attenuation 
 
Figure 4.14: Attenuation of the background radiation by roof materials in Bldg. 486. (black) 
Background energy spectrum acquired in the center ±0.5 m of the room at 30±2 cm above the 
floor. (red) Background energy spectrum acquired in the center ±1 m of the roof. (blue) Subtracted 
spectrum denoting attenuated signal, assuming no contribution from roof materials.  
As anticipated, the attenuation of the gamma-ray signal through the roof is roughly 50%, 
exhibited in Figure 4.14.  The three normalized spectra plotted from top to bottom are: the 
background spectrum measured at the approximate midpoint inside Building 486; the 
background spectrum measured on the roof of Building 486 nearly directly above the interior 
measurement; the difference between the first two spectra, which represents the gamma-rays 
that do not make it through the roof to the detector.  The near parity between the bottom and 
middle spectra in the photopeaks, made more noticeable in Figure 4.15, confirms the ~50% 
attenuation of the background by the roof materials. 
 
Figure 4.15: Zoomed in spectra from Figure 4.14 for representative background energies peaks 
(583 and 609, 1461, and 2614 keV) demonstrating roughly 50% attenuation indicated by the 





4.2 Source Detection 
Small radioactive sources were transported to Richmond Field Station and positioned in 
several locations inside Bldg. 128 to test the efficacy of source detection methods from the 
rooftop using various types of detectors. 
4.2.1 Methods 
The sources we chose to conduct this investigation covered a wide range of energies and 
provided a varying number of identifiable peaks.  Table 4.6 lists relevant properties of the 
sources we used.  
Table 4.6: Characteristics of sources used to test the efficacy of detection from the rooftop of 







Activity as of 





57Co 37688     0.745 2.54 122, 136 
60Co 872     5.3 5.59 1173, 1333 
133Ba 872   10.53 7.47 303, 356, 383 
137Cs 778–780   30.1 3 @ 8.67 ea. 662 
152Eu 873   13.537 7.94 122, 344, 779, 964  1086, 1112,1408 
241Am 783 433.2 9.90 59.5 
4.2.2 Expectations 
As the detector moves off-axis from directly above a source, the projected area of the 
detector changes.  Depending on the shape and orientation of the detector, this can have an 
appreciable effect. For a right circular cylinder with an end cap normal to the roof, the 
effective area of the detector can be calculated by 
 
 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 cos𝜃𝜃 + 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 sin𝜃𝜃   (4.2) 




,   (4.3) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 is the projected area of the end cap of the detector cylinder, 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 is the 
projected area of the side of the detector cylinder, 𝜃𝜃 is the incident angle of the gamma-ray, 𝑟𝑟 
is the radius and 𝑟𝑟 is the length of the detector cylinder, 𝐻𝐻 is the vertical source-to-detector 
distance, and 𝐷𝐷 is the lateral source-to-detector distance.  See Figure 4.16 for a depiction of 








Figure 4.16: Schematic of the varying path length for attenuation through roofing materials. 
Figure 4.17 shows the change in the effective area of the detector as the lateral source-to-
detector distance increases.  The maximum effective area occurs at a distance roughly equal 
to the height of the building.  This projection implies that the ideal measurement location is 
not directly above a source for this detector shape, orientation, and building configuration.  
Detector area effects count rate proportionally while the source-to-detector distance has an 
inverse square effect.  Figure 4.18 plots the effective area versus the source-to-detector 
distance squared and confirms a maximum at an offset location.  This finding suggests that 
one should consider the projected area of the detector when selecting lattice spacing, a topic 
which is discussed further in Section 6.1. 
A different detector size, shape, or orientation will influence this consideration.  For 
example, a cylindrical detector, with its axis parallel to the roof, presents the same effective 
area to a source that bisects its side centerline, regardless of its lateral distance.  Yet, the same 
detector rotated 90° to the source develops a similar profile with lateral distance as the one 
shown in Figure 4.18.  Cuboid-shaped detectors display similar directional effects, depending 
on the ratio of the length of their sides.  A detector which presents the largest effective area at 
the distance of closest approach, to a source in any direction, is desirable.  Hence, a cube or 
ideal cylinder is a sound starting point for a detector shape, as long as the stopping power is 
sufficient for higher energy gamma-rays.   
When the detector is off-axis from the source, the apparent cross-sectional thickness that 
gamma-rays penetrating the roof encounter also increases significantly.  The apparent 
thickness of the roof is magnified by more than a factor of 4 times the actual vertical thickness 





probability of the incident gamma-rays confronting structural supports, such as I-beams or 
other dense materials, on their path to the detector at high incident angles. 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Graphical representation of the effect of lateral source-to-detector distance on the 
projected area of a cylindrical detector oriented normal to a horizontal surface above a source. 
 
Figure 4.18: The effect of lateral source-to-detector distance on the detector count rate, illustrated 







The standard counting statistics definition for the signal-to-noise ratio, as it relates to 




 ,      (4.4) 
where 𝑆𝑆 represents the counts due to the source, and 𝐵𝐵 represents the counts from the 
background.  This equation applies to count rates as well, in this application, because the 
source and background are taken together for the same amount of time. 
Doubling the source-to-detector distance has a profound impact on the signal-to-noise 
ratio and the time to detect, as illustrated in Figure 4.19.  In the limit with a strong source, 
where 𝑠𝑠 ≫ 𝑏𝑏, one should expect no more than a fourfold increase in the required counting 
time at the longer distance.  Yet, when 𝑠𝑠 ≈ 𝑏𝑏, a doubling of the distance results in the time to 
detect being ten times greater. As the source strength diminishes with respect to the 
background, such that  𝑠𝑠 ≪ 𝑏𝑏, a doubling of the distance results in a time to detect that 
approaches sixteen times greater. 
 
Figure 4.19: Semi-log plot illustrating the effect the doubling the source-to-detector distance has 
under varying background conditions with respect to source strength.   
4.2.3 Findings 
The time to detect 26 µCi of 137Cs, at a given distance, generally followed the expected 
inverse power law, as shown in Figure 4.20.  We acquired these data with the source in the 
building at a location one meter above the floor, clear of unintentional shielding and away 
from the walls.  We initially placed the detector on the roof directly above the source and then 
moved it laterally along the long axis of the roof for subsequent measurements.  We calculated 






Figure 4.20: Time to detect 26 µCi of 137Cs versus distance on the rooftop of Bldg. 128.  The 
detector was approximately 4 m above three small sources located 1 m above the floor. 
We determine the observed detection time based on the ORTEC Detective-DX-100 alerts 
when taking measurements of the cesium source.  The uncertainty in the time to detect was 
considerable due to the use of the detector algorithm and measurement conditions.  We 
monitored the user interface for the first 30 seconds and then every 30 seconds afterward to 
see if the isotope identification algorithm produced an alert. Thus, we can only narrow the 
time to a 30-second window.  
The first few measurements show fair agreement with theoretical predictions based on 
changes to the source-to-detector distance alone.  For these distances, the detector algorithm 
alarmed sooner than the predicted time.  These early detections could purely be a result of the 
stochastic nature of the measurement, where counts in the peak stacked up above a threshold 
sooner than predicted by a deterministic model.  Alternatively, the proprietary algorithm on 
the detector might have employed full spectrum analysis and observed a template match 
before the photopeak alone.  It also could have been an adjustable sensitivity setting, set such 
that the detector algorithm traded off an increase in the false-positive rate for a decrease in the 
probability of a false negative.  Regardless, the system alarmed as expected at the distances 
examined with one outlier.  At the furthest distance, an alert was not produced in 3,600 s.   
We do not know why the detector algorithm did not alarm at this distance.  A calculation 
based on the source strength and median count rate of the background in the peak, which was 
previously measured, predicted a 3σ detection in under 2,870 seconds.  However, a scaling 
calculation, based on the initial measurement directly above the source and the new source-
to-detector distance, estimated the time for a 3σ detection at 4,060 seconds, which is longer 
than our collection time.  An automated peak analysis of the measured spectrum using 
PeakEasy identified a peak at >4σ.  A manual selection of the peak and background regions 
drove this up to >7σ [62]. Automated post-processing of the spectrum using GADRAS, shown 






Figure 4.21: Zoomed in spectra from rooftop measurement with 26 µCi of 137Cs present at        20.4 
m lateral distance and 4 m relative height.  The native algorithm on the ORTEC Detective-DX-
100 did not trigger an alarm, but post-processing with GADRAS distinctly indicates a peak.   
The deviations from the expectation at longer distances could also be a result of the 
amplified roof attenuation, previously discussed in Section 0, due to the increased cross-
sectional thickness of the roof.  The apparent thickness of the roof is magnified by more than 
a factor of 4 times the actual vertical thickness when the source is 20 meters off-axis, as 
depicted in Figure 4.16.  The increased path length in effect attenuates 80% of the 662 keV 
photons, up from 33%. 
The purpose of this data collection effort was to get a sense of the detection ranges for 
long-dwell rooftop collection using a relatively large detection medium with the best 
resolution available.  We did not intend to map out a detection range versus time plot.  
However, if one were to repeat this type of experiment, we recommend acquiring in list mode 
and analyzing in post-processing to improve the uncertainty in detection time.  Also, one 
should sample more locations at closer intervals to validate or refute the predicted results with 
better precision. 
Three of the four prototype detectors, referred to in Section 4.1.1, were also used to collect 
data concerning source detection.  The fourth detector, SrI2(Eu), was not operable during this 
collection effort.  Performance metrics for each of the detectors are found in Table 4.7.  This 
assessment informed the trade space for gamma-ray detectors discussed later in Section 5.3.2.  
































in 595 sec 
LaBr3(Ce) 25⌀×76 25⌀ PMT 3.9% 5.97% 2350 3.80 6/6 
CLYC(Ce) 25⌀×25 51⌀ PMT 4.9% 3.9% 162 1.54 5/6 
CZT 10×10×10 CPG ASIC 1.4% 1.9% 36 1.08 5/6 
 
Noticeably, there were issues with the LaBr3(Ce) detector as it significantly 
underperformed its resolution potential.  A review of the spectrum in Figure 4.22 suggests 
that the dynamic range was truncated, forcing higher energy counts into lower channels.  It 
also shows a substantial low energy peak, which suggests that the low-level discriminator was 
set improperly, and excess counts were placed into low channels.  As this was a custom 
prototype detector, we did not have access to many of the advanced settings in the controller.  
The CLYC(Ce) detector seems to have under-promised and over-delivered.  While its 
efficiency at higher energy is relatively low, it demonstrated reasonable energy resolution at 
662 keV and performed adequately for the detection trials.  It shows promise in that it is 
capable of both gamma-ray spectroscopy and neutron detection.  The manufacturer did require 
a PMT twice the size of the crystal to ensure the best possible energy resolution.   
For this test, the CZT crystal was small but mighty.  With a detector area six-and-a-half 
times smaller than the CLYC(Ce) detectors and nineteen times smaller than the LaBr3(Ce) 
detector, it was able to detect the 137Cs with just 36 counts in the peak at a 5σ threshold.  
Though it is expensive, its energy resolution per unit total mass, which includes signal-chain-
processing components such as PMTs, SiPMs, and ASIC/FPGAs, makes it a strong candidate 
for sUAS-based detection. 
We also conducted additional trials with other isotopes and smaller activities in Bldg. 128.  
These data show that sources with low activity and low energy gamma-rays are indeed 
challenging to detect. A weak, mixed isotope source consisting of 241Am, 133Ba, and 137Cs was 
used to simulate a distorted plutonium spectrum.  The detection algorithm for not one of the 
three prototype detectors alarmed on this source in ~1800 s measurements.  Post-processing 
of the spectra revealed weak peaks in the regions of interest, but not enough to indicate a clear 








Figure 4.22: Sample spectra from three prototype detectors collected for 595 s from the rooftop 






An additional measurement campaign sponsored by DTRA took place in the summer of 
2015 at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site [106].  User groups surveyed radiation test objects 
containing Category I quantities of SNM, as defined by Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) [107], in different configurations, with an array of passive radiation detectors.  We 
conducted this ad hoc testing under quasi-operational conditions while researchers prepared 
the active-interrogation system for subsequent trials.  Test coordinators positioned various 
construction materials, including wood, steel, and adobe walls, around the source.  
Unfortunately, the background radiation at the test range was elevated by more than a factor 
three of due to activation of the ground and nearby materials from the pulsed bremsstrahlung 
source used for the active interrogation testing.  DTRA retained the data from the 
measurement campaign, but they were not releasable to this study. 
4.3 Summary 
Understanding the background and its variation over time and space is a crucial component 
of any radiation detection scheme.  Background levels and the associated variance have a 
significant impact on the MDA of a source.  In this application, the collection time required 
to distinguish the presence or absence of a source is of most interest.  From the data collected, 
it appears that background on top of light industrial buildings will be at the higher end of the 
distribution when compared to rural and urban areas.  The variation does not seem to be 
correlated with building height or distance from exterior walls, though the dataset examined 
is limited.  The variation across similar building types ranges ~50% when looking at the 
contribution from the top seven background peaks.  Across a single building, this variation 
ranged 25–40%, depending on the particular background peak. 
The extent to which roofing materials attenuate gamma-rays is of concern for this 
detection scheme.  The limitation on detector volume imposed by the weight capacity of an 
individual UAV signifies an already low signal environment.  Significant reduction by 
attenuation makes this detection strategy untenable.  Fortunately, the attenuation by the air 
and roofing materials amounts to roughly ~50% when passing normal to the roof and 
continues to increase as the incident angle between the source and the detector increases.   
Depending on the detector and measurement geometry, some maxima for counting occurs 
when the detector is not directly over the source.  This occurs because the effective area 
projected by the detector grows when one moves off-axis, but the source-to-detector distance 
changes very little.  This phenomenon should be taken into consideration when selecting an 
optimal lattice spacing for measurement locations. 
Detection of small activity source is indeed possible under certain conditions, but it 
requires improved resolution and long dwell times.  The best resolution per unit mass at the 
maximum size for a given UAV’s weight capacity is likely the best choice for this application.  
Signal processing electronics, as well as any other ancillary components, such as a mechanical 
cooler, need to be included in the mass calculation. 
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5 Sensor Suite Design  
central objective of this study is to recommend a sensor suite that overmatches the 
broadest range of expected threats under an established set of operational conditions.  
Size, weight, and power are always a factor when considering a materiel solution to 
provide a capability.  In this case, the requirement to conduct operations remotely will exclude 
some higher fidelity approaches. 
5.1 Requirements Analysis 
Several high-level requirements documents should be referenced or established to design 
a practical and effective sensor suite.  These include a concept of operations (CONOPS); an 
operational mode summary and mission profile (OMS/MP); a set of constraints, limitations, 
and assumptions; and a list of validated performance attributes.  The intent of this study is not 
to develop the elements of a complete acquisition strategy.  However, using elements of these 
documents as a framework will improve the overall system design and will allow one to 
develop a relevant capability more efficiently. 
5.1.1 Concept of Operations  
A concept of operations is a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely 
expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available 
resources.  At a minimum, the CONOPS should identify the problem being addressed, the 
mission, the commander’s intent, an operational overview, functions or effects to be carried 
out or achieved, and the roles and responsibilities of affected organizations [108].  The full 
CONOPS for the directed search for radiological and nuclear material of concern is beyond 
the scope of this study, as it encompasses much more than sUAS-based detection.  Therefore, 
we developed a limited CONOPS just for sUAS-based detection.     
The problem being addressed is the expected possession of radiological or nuclear material 
that could potentially be used in an IND, RDD, or RED by a potential adversary.  Search 
forces must detect, locate, and identify the presence of radiological or nuclear material of 
concern, or substantiate its absence with a high level of confidence, in target buildings within 
12–24 hours of arriving in the vicinity, to allow assault forces to characterize and recover the 
material.  The intent is to confirm or deny the presence of the material in a given target 
building with high confidence.  Finding the material defines success.  However, reducing the 
number of viable target buildings through comprehensive measurement is also valuable in that 
it allows intelligence assets and assault forces to concentrate on high-likelihood targets.  
Figure 5.1 serves as a thumbnail sketch of a potential CONOPS for the slice of the mission 









Figure 5.1: Preliminary graphical depiction of a concept of operations concerning the use of 
unmanned systems for the directed search for radiological and nuclear material.  Source: [109]  
5.1.2 Operational Mode Summary & Mission Profile  
The operational mode summary and mission profile describe the operational tasks, events, 
duration, frequency, and environment in which a system is expected to perform each mission 
and each phase of a mission.  The OMS/MP describes how a system will be used both in 
wartime and peacetime, with a focus on reliability, availability, and maintainability.  It 
projects the mix of ways a system will be used for training and missions as well as the types 
of environmental conditions and terrain to which it will be exposed [108]. An abbreviated 
OMS/MP might include the following:  
Tasks – The primary task the system must accomplish is to confirm or deny the presence of 
radiological and nuclear threats in a target location. Figure 5.2 contains a high-level overview of 
the functions, behaviors, tasks, components, and processes related to accomplishing this task.  
 
Duration –The duration of directed search operations is likely to be more than 24 hours but less 
than a week.  
 
Frequency – The frequency of use for this system is limited.  It is expected that operators will 
conduct functional checks weekly, limited training monthly, operational training quarterly, and 
use it in a full-scale exercise annually.  The likelihood of real-world employment is difficult to 
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Environments – The system must be able to function in all operational environments; this 
includes land and sea, desert and tundra, low-lying areas and mountainous terrain.  The system 
must be capable of operating at night and in moderate precipitation.  It should continue to 
function after exposure to dusty or sandy conditions for the duration of an operation.      
 
Phases – An operation is likely to consist of the following phases: (1) alert, deploy, and stage, (2) 
gather ISR,  plan, and prepare, (3) execute and assess, and (4) recover, refit, and redeploy.  
 
Reliability – the system must always work under the stated conditions.  While subsystems and 
components are expected to fail at times, the design of the system must factor in redundancy at 
all levels and prevent any common-mode failures that render the system ineffective.  With 
regards to risk assessment, the default probability for the worst-case conditions should be equal 
to one.  That is, engineer the solution to accommodate the worst case rather than betting that it 
will not happen.     
 
Availability – A contingency capability must always be deployable for each search force.  The 
basis of issue plan should reflect the requirement for additional systems to accommodate 
training, maintenance, and testing. All equipment should be rotated through the training cycle to 
ensure system functionality under operational conditions.    
 
Maintainability – Maintenance of the system is expected to consist of component-level 
exchange;  a knowledgeable electronics technician with 40 hours of training on the system 
should be capable of all required operational-level maintenance and calibration.   
 
Revision control – Because of the pace at which technology in this area is moving, we expect 
there to be considerable spiral development in all areas of the system: hardware, sensors, 
software, and firmware.  Any component upgrades must pass rigorous beta testing and perform 
as expected in an operational environment during a full mission profile before being fielded.  
Upgrades will take place system-wide by group; teams will not be expected to work with mixed 
generation equipment.    
 
 




Figure 5.2: High-level block diagram illustrating the various functions, behaviors, tasks, 
components, and processes of the envisioned system. 
5.1.3 Constraints, Limitations, and Assumptions  
Whether planning a military operation or developing an analysis of alternatives, it is 
important to generate a set of constraints, limitations, and assumptions, generally developed 
in that order.  The terms constraints, limitations, and assumptions have specific yet slightly 
different meanings in the context of operational military planning as opposed to systems 
analysis.  Even within military planning, there is a difference in the lexicon between joint 
doctrine and service (e.g., Army) doctrine.  Therefore, it is useful to elaborate on these terms 
and identify them as they might apply to a directed search scenario.   
In joint military planning, a limitation is an action required or prohibited by a higher 
authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s 
freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, political and 
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that one must take, and a restraint prohibits an action [110].  Conversely, Army doctrine refers 
to all restrictions placed by the higher command as constraints, whether they dictate and action 
or inaction [111].  In systems analysis, especially for wargaming, a constraint is a restriction 
imposed by the user or sponsor, whereas a limitation is usually the inability of the system to 
fully meet an objective or requirement [112].   
In military planning, an assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or 
future course of events and is presumed to be true in the absence of facts. A valid assumption 
has three characteristics: logical, realistic, and essential for planning to continue. One must 
continually review assumptions to ensure their validity and must challenge them if they are 
unrealistic [110].  In wargaming, assumptions are usually required to accommodate a 
limitation and must meet the similar criteria of necessary, valid, and acceptable [112]. 
This study is a hybrid of military planning and systems analysis.  Therefore, in this study 
a constraint is something that must be accomplished or achieved by the system; a limitation 
is something that cannot be accomplished or achieved; an assumption will meet the criteria of 
necessary, realistic, and acceptable.  Applying these terms to a remote radiological and nuclear 
threat detection concept exposes the following:  
Constraints 
For an anticipated light industrial building, the system must: 
• semi-autonomously deploy to the target from a location up to 1 km away, land on a target 
and collect for up to 12 hours, and extract to a retrieval location 
• detect relevant, most likely threats with at least 68% confidence and confirm the absence 
of threats to at least 95% 
• measure gamma-ray and neutron radiation on a target at a fixed location for 96 hours 
• have enough capability to interrogate up to three targets simultaneously in 24 hours 
• include a gamma-ray detector capable of spectroscopy 
• be deployable by air within 12 hours and require no more than three aircraft pallet 
positions; fit as cargo in one van and three large SUV-style vehicles   
• have a long-term independent means to track the location of platforms 
Limitations 
The system must not: 
• conspicuously alert building occupants or bystanders to its presence  
• require manual piloting  
• require more than eighteen platforms per target building 
 
 




• an anticipated light industrial building is 5 m high and less than 900 m2; there may be 
buildings with higher roofs and larger footprints 
• a delivery vehicle exists or can be developed that can achieve a low enough signature 
(noise, visual, electromagnetic) that a commander would deploy it in a directed search 
scenario 
• an engineering solution to achieve suitable flight characteristics, guidance control, 
landing retardation, and payload stabilization and preservation exists or can be developed 
for munition-style delivery methods 
• the intelligence assessment has high confidence that the threat is credible, is of high-
consequence, and is expected in the designated search area 
• a relevant threat analysis will require a higher level of classification  
5.1.4 Performance Attributes 
Operational attributes from the CONOPS and OMS/MP inform the analysis of alternatives 
and help translate capability gaps into system-specific requirements.  These requirements 
describe performance attributes which are defined by threshold and objective values.  A 
threshold value delineates the minimum performance required to achieve the required 
operational effect.  An objective value describes a higher level of performance that delivers 
significant increased operational effect or decreased operational risk; it is the desired 
operational goal, usually achievable at higher risk in cost, schedule, or technology [108]. 
Performance attributes are critical to the development of an effective capability.  They are 
characterized in one of three ways: (1) as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP)—something 
critical to mission effectiveness,  (2) as a Key System Attribute (KSA)—considered important 
to achieving a balanced solution, but not critical enough to be a KPP, or (3) as an Additional 
Performance Attribute—not important enough to be a KSA or KPP but still appropriate to 
include [108].  Currently, there are four KPPs that must be addressed for all DoD systems: 
system survivability, force protection, energy, and sustainment.  One must either address the 
KPP and provide threshold and objective values for performance, or justify why a particular 
KPP is not appropriate for a system.  Addressing these high-level KPPs is beyond the scope 
of this study.  However, Table 5.1 provides a preliminary attempt at establishing performance 
attributes for one aspect of an sUAS-based directed search system—the SNM threat.  
A KPP for this system is the detection of SNM threats.  While an exploration of the most 
relevant, likely, and dangerous threats requires a higher level of classification, an example 
KPP can be developed using unclassified criteria.  The threshold and objective values for the 
type of SNM can be derived from the previous discussion of signatures in Section 3.1.2.  HEU 
at low weapons-grade enrichment levels and reactor-grade plutonium set the threshold mark, 
whereas virgin HEU and low-burnup-produced plutonium set the objective level.  The IAEA 
definition of an SQ lends itself well to a threshold value for the quantity of material, and the 
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NRC values for Category I Strategic SNM defines the objective value [107].  The source-to-
detector distance is driven by the analysis of building heights, and the shielding is indicative 
of a partial attempt to limit the dose to nearby personnel. Oxides may be easier to detect than 
metals based on their geometry and potential for increased neutron production.  Figure 5.3 
illustrates the signal collected by an HPGe detector located on the rooftop above 1 kg WG 
HEU and Pu threats.        
Table 5.1: Proposed Key Performance Parameters for a small unmanned directed search system. 
Threat Property Threshold Value Objective Value 
Type  HEU (85% 
235U)   
RG Pu (>19% 240Pu) 
virgin HEU (90% 235U)  
WG Pu (<7% 40Pu) 
Mass of Material 25 kg 8 kg  
5 kg 
2 kg 
Source-to-Detector Distance 5 m 15 m 
Shielding Unshielded  
1 cm steel 
5 cm HDPE 




Figure 5.3: Simulated spectra of 1 kg-quantities of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and 
plutonium as measured from a rooftop [64].  
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5.1.5 System-level Requirements 
Building from the OMS/MP, we break down the high-level functional view into a system 
architecture found in Figure 5.4.  The envisioned system currently entails four subordinate 
layers with at least sixteen tasks. The task-level links an exemplary purpose or behavior to a 
broad set of sensor types.  The sensors, such as a radio, could be broken down further to their 
components, e.g., antenna, radio frequency transmitter/receiver, compressor/decompressor, 
but that level of detail and specificity is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Figure 5.4: Sub-system architecture depicting the location and role of sensors within the system.  
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5.2 Trade Space 
The term trade space has long been used in economics and systems engineering.  It is also 
used extensively by project managers within the DoD and other government agencies.  To 
some degree, it is synonymous with cost-benefit analysis, an approach traditionally used to 
provide a comparison of alternative solutions to identify the most cost-effect choice [113], 
whereas 
the term trade space is the set of multidimensional outputs or outcomes of 
interest from a particular process or set of choices that cannot be simultaneously 
optimized.  The trade space maps from a set of defined alternatives, or a bundle 
of choices, to a set of outcomes in the multiple outcome dimension of interest.  
The frontier (or Pareto frontier) of the trade space is the subset of outcomes 
corresponding to alternatives for which one cannot increase the outcome for a 
good or decrease the outcome for a bad by choosing another alternative without 
increasing or decreasing a good or bad value, respectively, in another 
dimension [114] 
  The trade space includes several components including traditional factors such as size, 
weight, power, and cost, as well as other factors such as noise signature, ease of deployment, 
shelf-life, maintenance needs, ruggedness and durability, communication bandwidth 
requirements, and reliability.  While cost is a factor, it is not the principal criteria for making 
technical or operational best-value decisions in this case.  One would still pursue a costly but 
minor improvement if it achieved overmatch in a plausible threat scenario.  Other factors such 
as reliability and redundancy will carry significant weight and may direct technical choices 
that drive up cost well beyond the lowest price technically acceptable choice. 
There are several paradigms for exploring trade space to inform decision-makers [115].  
This section aims to outline the outcomes of interest and map a small subset of options 
available at the time of this study.  It is by no means inclusive of all options, nor does it map 
all the envisioned trade space.  Rather, it serves as a first-order attempt to demonstrate a viable 
option is achievable.   
To begin, Table 5.2 provides a snapshot comparison of multi-rotor, vertical take-off and 
lift (VTOL) fixed-wing, and helicopter UAVs, as well as tube-launched guided vehicle 
systems that one could use as delivery vehicles.  The UAV market moves remarkably fast, 
and the systems described here are merely examples of the range of capabilities achievable at 
a fixed point in time.  Point of fact, the AV Shrike/Cube is no longer available, and production 
of the Pegasus III is not likely to continue.   
The capacity of the vehicle system used to deliver the sensor package to the roof 
determines the size limit of the component sensors.  Weight capacity is the more constrained 
resource, but the size of sensors could be an issue as well, especially if a smaller-class delivery 
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Table 5.2: Specifications for small unmanned aerial vehicles (multi-rotors, vertical take-off and 
lift (VTOL) fixed-winged (FW), and helicopters) and tube-launched guided systems. * indicates 

































DJI Matrice 200   88×88×40 6.1 1.45 24 7.5 [116] 
DJI Matrice 600 167 167×152×73 15.5 5.5 18 5 [116] 
DJI Agras MG-1 200 200×200×42 24.5 10 10 15 [116] 
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AV Shrike 2  
VTOL FW 132 83×132×25 1.2 0.3 * * [121] 
Vertical Tech. 
DeltaQuad VTOL FW 235 90×235×25 6.2 1.2 110 10 [122] 
Robotic Research 












Laser guided munition 6 4⌀×43 0.7 0.3 n/a 1–10 
[125] 
[126] 
DefendTex 40 Tube- or 
hand-launched rotor ~30 ~4⌀×20 0.18 0.11 12 1 [127] 
AV Switchblade 
Tube-launched FW 92 61×92×10 2.5 0.3 10 70 [128] 
DefendTex 81 Tube- or 
hand-launch rotor ~85 ~8.1⌀×65 3.1 1.1 90 * [127] 
Raytheon Coyote 
Tube-launched FW 150 91×150×15 5.9 1.8 60 15  [129] 
5.2.1 Size 
The entire reconnaissance system, including control station, multiple vehicles, auxiliary 
equipment, such as maintenance items and spares, and charging stations should fit into 2-3 
large SUVs.  The only caveat is alternative signature systems that might require a larger 
vehicle or other specialized equipment in order to be employed.  
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The horizontal footprint of each standalone vehicle for directed search should be less than 
2 m in diameter, and the height of the vehicle should be less than 1 m.  Smaller is certainly 
preferred, but a reduction in wingspan and the number of motors will severally limit payload 
capacity.  In general, the entire payload should be no bigger than 5,000 cm3.  Some systems 
can accommodate upwards of 10,000 cm3, but it is more likely that the payload will exceed 
weight limitations before reaching the volume limit.  A munition-style payload may be 
restricted to just 200 cm3. 
5.2.2 Weight 
The capacity of the delivery vehicle(s) limits the weight of the overall sensor suite.  On 
the low end of small multi-rotor UAVs, the payload limit is approximately 500 g, whereas the 
high end is nearly 10 kg.  Guided munitions and vehicles support payloads of 110–1,800 g. 
Increasing the weight of the payload reduces flight time and range, auxiliary power, and may 
increase the visual and acoustic signature of a UAV.  A target payload of 1.5–2 kg is capable 
of being carried by a medium-sized multirotor UAV. 
While the employment of multiple delivery vehicles, each with different sensors, is 
certainly possible, the distribution of various unique sensors across multiple platforms 
increases risk and reduces redundancy.  The desire is to provide the same capability on each 
delivery vehicle to reduce system complexity, promote standardization, and provide the most 
extensive coverage.  Should that not be possible, no critical sensor should be employed in 
quantity less than two, ascribing to the military adage “two is one, one is none.” 
5.2.3 Power 
The power budget is shared amongst the delivery platform, the sensors, and the control 
system.  Each of those parts is essential at various times during an operation.  Therefore, one 
should consider using independent power sources for all three components.  For sensors that 
are emplaced or otherwise not mated to the delivery system, this is already a requirement. 
The primary power sink is the delivery vehicle.  The system must be able to transport 
sensors to the target building from a kilometer or more away, move or place them across the 
rooftop at each of the designated measurement locations, and recover the sensors when the 
collection is complete.  Aerial movement expends roughly 20–50 times the amount of power 
as does ground movement for the same platform.  As an example, the Pegasus III can fly only 
22 minutes without a payload, yet it can drive up to 8 hours [124].  Therefore, there is a 
significant advantage to a system that can traverse a rooftop without having to take to the air.   
A system must be able to operate for 8–96 hours.  During that time, the control system, 
data acquisition, and radiation detection subsystems are likely to be operating.  If present, a 
drive system will occasionally be engaged to maneuver the sensors to new measurement 
locations.  The linear distance traveled is a function of the order in which the system travels 
to each measurement location.  For an anticipated building size, that distance is 100–500 m. 
The power required for traveling to, on, and from the target ranges is approximately 500–
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1600 W for multi-rotor systems and as low as 185 W for VTOL fixed-wing systems. In 
comparison, a radiation sensor package and control system operating might drain a 75 W·h 
battery by the end of a 24-hour operation.  Power is nearly as crucial as weight, and the two 
are entangled; a requirement for more power to operate sensors drives up the weight of the 
payload, which places an additional burden on the platform that requires either more stored 
energy or reduced flight time. 
5.2.4 Cost 
The target cost of a total system should be less than $2M with a goal of under $300k per 
individual platform.  We base these estimates on personal knowledge of the cost of currently 
fielded equipment.  For example, high-fidelity gamma-ray spectroscopy systems, such as the 
ORTEC Detective-DX-100, cost on the order of $80–100k, and mobile systems that employ 
NaI(Tl) logs and 3He tubes can cost upwards of $250k each.  Outfitting a search team with a 
full complement of radiation detection equipment costs well over $500k.  Therefore, the $2M 
system-cost assumes that three teams are available to conduct this part of the operation with 
an additional team in reserve.   
Looking at upper limit values found in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 and using a factor of two 
times the materials cost, a goal of $300k per platform appears to be achievable; using the same 
method to bound the low-end cost results in a platform cost of ~$50k.  We base this estimate 
solely on a rough order of magnitude cost of the components of a system and an assumed 
multiplier of two to assemble the system from a final approved design.  This estimate does 
not include the cost to develop, test, and refine the design. 
Table 5.3: Sensor-level Size, Weight, Power, and Cost estimates 
 







Control 40–100 20–60  1–6 0.1–0.3   
Gamma-ray 50–200 250–500 0.150–0.750 15–40 [130] [131] 
Neutron 25–200 25–150 < 0.5 1–2 [130] [132] [133] [134] 
Visual 500–1500 30–600 0.5–10 1–8 [135] [136] 
LiDAR 160–600 130–590 2–8 0.5–5 [137] [138] 
5.2.5 Visibility Profile 
One must take into consideration the visual, acoustic, electromagnetic, and other 
signatures that the system transmits to the environment.  The size and shape of the delivery 
vehicles, the sensor types and modalities, and the configuration of the entire system could 
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present various indicators to an adversary.  As noted in limitations, a commander must balance 
the risk to mission compromise via adversary tip-off with the probability of success given the 
employment of particular tools or assets.  Remote radiation detection will not be the only tool 
a commander has in his toolkit, even in the case of lost or stolen nuclear or radiological 
material.  Traditional methods of network analysis, pattern-of-life observation, and 
surveillance tracking may have a lower signature and still tip and cue forces to the correct 
location.  Therefore, for the sensor suite to provide maximum operational value, the signatures 
of the entire system should be considered and reduced to the extent possible while still 
maintaining minimum capabilities to detect a range of threats.  There are three primary 
windows to consider for evaluating system observables and signatures: (1) the movement to 
and from the target, (2) descension to and ascension from the target, and (3) movement and 
sensor collection on the target. 
The visual signature of the system is driven primarily by the platform designed to carry 
the payload to the target.  Generally, a smaller and lighter system presents the least signature. 
With regards to delivery to the target, a launched munition might present the smallest 
signature, depending on the launch method, the aerodynamics of the round, and the distance 
from the launch site to the target.  However, a launched munition must be retarded in some 
way before impacting the roof of the target building.  A winged system, or one that transforms 
from a winged to a VTOL configuration, offers an extended range between the launch site 
and target building, and can likely approach from a much higher altitude.  A typical multirotor 
or helicopter presents the largest and most identifiable silhouette of the platforms considered. 
Movement of the delivery platform is the primary source of acoustic emissions for the 
system.   The ability of the sensors to move once on the roof is highly desirable for reasons 
described in more detail in Chapter 6.  Movement between measurement locations can be 
accomplished by flying, driving, hopping, rolling, thrusting, or otherwise propelling the 
sensors to a new position.  
The electromagnetic signature is a factor that will affect the communications architecture 
of the system and may limit the use of some types of active sensors.  The communication 
between platforms as well as back to the command and control hub should either be masked 
in the typical background, limited in frequency and duration so as not to be detected easily, 
or avoided to provide the lowest signature possible.  Active sensors, such as LiDAR, could 
also be a concern.     
5.2.6 Other Considerations 
Some considerations one might take into account are ease of deployment, serviceable life, 
routine maintenance and calibration schedule, durability, communication bandwidth 
requirements, and perhaps others.  For example, a UAV that folds to nearly flat for storage 
and transport and quickly locks into a flight-ready configuration when taken out of the box is 
preferred to one that does not collapse and requires some tool-based assembly before a flight.  
A sensor which is expected to last for the lifetime of the system (5–10 years) is preferred to 
one that requires replacing every year or two.  A radiation detector that self-calibrates and 
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requires little more than a functional check with a source is preferred to one that requires 
frequent recalibration and technician-level service.  A component that still works after a UAV 
crashes during a training exercise is preferred over a delicate component that is guaranteed to 
break if dropped from a few feet.  Finally, a system that can work in a bandwidth-constrained 
environment is preferred to one that is contingent on a large data pipe.   
The point of this discussion is to illuminate additional factors to consider that may impact 
the trade space beyond the established size, weight, and power.  It is imperative that these be 
explored and rank-ordered early in the system development because of the interdependency 
of many of these factors.  Often a low-maintenance system is large; a rugged detector is heavy; 
a communications link is a power burden;  a flight-ready system is expensive.    
5.3 Functional-level Components 
5.3.1 Delivery Vehicles 
We considered five vehicle types for getting the sensors to the target: multi-rotor UAV, 
helicopter UAV, VTOL fixed-wing UAV, transforming UAV/UGV, and guided payloads. 
Multi-rotor UAVs  
Multi-rotors dominate the sUAS landscape for several reasons: first, they are among the 
most inexpensive platforms; second, they are relatively easy to fly; third, they are versatile 
and configurable; and finally, they can access locations that cannot be reached by a fixed-
wing UAV.  Figure 5.5 provides an example of a capable multi-rotor UAV for this application. 
 
Figure 5.5: (left) Photograph of a DJI Matrice 600 Pro in flight with a prototype 3-D radiation 
mapping payload developed at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Source: [139] used 
with permission from R. Pavlovsky.  (right) The same platform with a different radiation detector 
payload on the rooftop of Bldg. 128.  Source: personal photograph. 
 
 




While small remotely piloted helicopters have been around for some time, only recently 
have they become stable enough to be flown by novice pilots using semi-automatic controls.  
Other than small remote-control hobbyist platforms, most helicopter UAVs have been 
immense (>3 m length) gasoline-powered systems, such as the Yamaha RMAX or Schiebel 
Camcopter S-100 [140].  However, smaller gas and battery-powered systems have entered the 
market and boast useful payloads and flight times for their size.  Examples include the Alpha 
800, UAVOS UVH-EL, and Vapor 35/55.     
 
Figure 5.6: AeroVironment’s Vapor 55, an example of a battery-powered unmanned helicopter. 
Source: [119] used with permission from B. Carraway of AeroVironment.  
VTOL fixed-wing UAVs 
VTOL fixed-wing UAVs combined the benefits of multi-rotor platforms for take-off and 
landing with fixed-wing endurance and range, and they can transition between the two modes 
during flight [141].  Current systems tend to be targeted to the agriculture sector for managing 
crops as well as the law enforcement and military sector for hasty ISR.   
Figure 5.7: AeroVironment’s Quantix, an example of a vertical takeoff and lift fixed-wing 
platform.  This system is purpose-built for crop scouting and can cover 400 acres in a 45 m 
flight.  Source: [142] used with permission from B. Carraway of AeroVironment. 
 
 





Figure 5.8: Pegasus III by Robotic Research (top) driving on land, (bottom left) perched on a 
rooftop, and (bottom right) flying up a stairwell. Source: [124] used with permission from J. Frelk 
of Robotic Research LLC. 
Guided Payloads 
One could dispense air-dropped parachute-retarded canisters to emplace sensors on a roof.  
The sensors may be affixed to some small UGV that could also traverse the roof.  The sensors 
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could be employed in groups or separately.  Multiple small canisters would likely be employed 
to provide redundancy and limit the damage or noise that might be incurred from impacting 
the roof with a larger canister. 
One could similarly project a payload onto the roof via some tube mechanism like that of 
a grenade launcher or mortar.  The payload for ground-launched projectiles or missiles is 
constrained by the diameter and range of the tube and propelling charge.  Common diameters 
for launched grenades and mortars range from 37 to 120 mm with payloads of 100–1,800 g. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Examples of tube-launched projectiles and missiles that could deliver a detector 
payload to the target.  (top left and right) The Pike® is a miniaturized, laser-guided weapon.  
Source: [125] used with permission from B. Edwards of Raytheon Company. (top middle) The 
Drone 40 Loitering Platform can be fitted with a small sensor payload. (bottom) The Drone 81 is 
in development with up to 1.1 kg payload, 45 km range, and 1.5-hour flight time.  Source: [127] 
used with permission from T. Reddy of DefendTex.  
5.3.2 Radiation Detectors 
Gamma-ray  
 There are many candidate gamma-ray detectors available.  However, for this application, 
the best possible energy resolution per unit mass is almost certainly the best choice.  Given 
the level of effort required to place a sensor on the rooftop of a target building, this is not an 
area to scrimp on capability.  The trade space for this application leans heavily toward solid-
state detectors ranging from mechanically-cooled HPGe to coplanar grid or pixelated CZT.   
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We see that our threshold value of an unshielded SQ of WG HEU is almost instantly 
detectable by all detector types and is not a discriminating factor.  Whether it takes ten seconds 
or thirty seconds has no real impact on our choice of sensor.   We also see that several of the 
detectors have trouble detecting the threats at a distance, and they all failed to alarm on the 
objective quantity at the objective distance.  These detections are based on a single 
measurement evaluated by a template-fitting algorithm.  Other algorithms trained on SNM 
with a specific detector in a controlled environment are expected to perform better.  Also, a 
trained spectroscopist with unique knowledge of nuclear weapons and shielded SNM should 
be able to discern indicators of HEU in some of these spectra that did not meet the alarm 
threshold for the identification algorithm.      
Table 5.4: Estimated time-to-detect (±30 s) threshold and objective highly enriched uranium 
threats for several detector materials based on assumed parameters for the unmanned detection 
scheme using a 1-D model and the IsotopeID function in GADRAS [64]. * indicates the source 
was not detected using the algorithm in the expected maximum mission time of 27,000 s.                   
† indicates that an alarm was not triggered, but a spectral analysis indicated the presence of 235U. 









5 kg HEU 
93.5% 
5 m 
1 cm steel 
[s] 





5 kg HEU 
93.5% 
15 m 
1 cm steel 
[s] 
1 ea. NaI(Tl) 
25⌀ × 82 mm 21 <30 * * * 
2 ea. CsI(Tl) 25×25×50 mm 26 <10 * * * 
3 ea. CLYC(Ce) 
25⌀ × 25 mm 19 <10 * * * 
2 ea. LaBr3(Ce) 38⌀ × 32 mm 24 <10 * * * 
6 ea. CZT 
20×20×15 mm 24 <10 600 870 * 
1 ea. HPGe 








Figure 5.10: GADRAS simulated spectra for six cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detectors [64]. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: GADRAS simulated spectra for a high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector [64]. 
The alarm was not triggered for the bottom right trial, but the presence of 235U was suggested.   
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Candidate neutron detectors include traditional 3He- and BF3-filled proportional tubes, 
10B-lined tubes and coated straws, 6Li or 10B-coated silver-doped zinc sulfide scintillators 
(ZnS[Ag]), 6Li-scintillating fibers, 10B or 6LiF-etched micro-structured semiconductors, and 
dual-mode gamma-ray and neutron elpasolite scintillators, such as CLYC(Ce) and 
CLLBC(Ce).  The key parameters are size, weight, power, and sensitivity.  The baseline 
constraint is sensitivity, and the most valuable trade space to the overall system is weight.  
Therefore, the sensitivity-to-weight ratio is a reasonable attempt at establishing an initial 
criterion.  Complexity and power are also important factors and should be evaluated for 
approaches that offer similar performance. 
Available neutron detector data was far more limited. Only two small neutron detectors 
were available in the GADRAS library.  A small 3He-tube and  6Li/ZnS scintillator were 
evaluated against relevant neutron-producing threats.  The criteria used was achieving 5σ 
above the background in a one-minute measurement.  As noted in Table 5.5, it appears that 
the threshold and object threat sources would be detected by nearly any neutron detector with 
sufficient sensitivity.   
Table 5.5: Expected neutron detection distance for threshold and objective quantities of reactor-
and weapons-grade plutonium evaluated for 60 seconds [64].  














2 kg RG Pu 
18% 
5 cm HDPE 
 
 [m] 
2 kg WP Pu 
6% 




HRM [143] 10.5 58 33 26 14.5 
6Li/ZnS scintillator 
D3S [144] 12 58 33 21 11.5 
 
Another data source came from a report on performance testing of the DTRA prototype 
detectors conducted by an NNSA laboratory.  A figure of merit applicable to this study is the 
sensitivity divided by the background and mass.  These results showed the 6Li-etched silicon 
performing best followed by 3He; the boron coated straws and boron-line tubes were a bit 
heavier and less sensitive than the 3He-tubes [130].  The low mass and power of the 6Li-etched 
detectors are attractive for this application. 
The placement within the system is a noteworthy attribute for this type of sensor.  We 
expect neutrons that make it to the measurement location to be thermalized by collisions with 
the clutter in the building, the moisture in the air, and the roof materials.  In that case, the best 
arrangement is to have a high-density, low-Z material with a low absorption cross-section 
behind the detector to act as a backstop and reflect neutrons into the detector.  While adding 
heavy moderating materials to the system is not recommended, using materials that are 
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already part of the system to improve neutron detection makes sense.  The carbon fiber UAV 
components are not likely to be thick enough to make a difference but should not degrade 
performance either.  If the UAV were to use liquid fuel, placing the neutron detector between 
the fuel cell and the expected location of the source should be beneficial.  If the power source 
is lithium polymer batteries, the response becomes complicated.  While the batteries are 
mostly comprised of dense, low Z material, they also have some concentration of 6Li, which 
will readily absorb thermal neutrons.  The extent to which the batteries help, or hinder neutron 
detection is left for future investigation.   
 
5.3.3 Location and Mapping Sensors 
Global Navigation Satellite System 
The ability to operate in a GNSS-denied environment is necessary, but the inclusion of 
some level of GNSS-capability is a must.  For an sUAS-based application, GNSS-antennae 
are likely already integrated into the system for navigation.  Often, however, a more advanced 
solution to decrease the positional uncertainty inherent in typical GNSS solutions is desirable.  
The typical accuracy of GNSS is roughly 5 m for single frequency receivers found in most 
commercial products (e.g., smartphones, laptops, cameras, and navigation devices) even with 
several satellites in the field-of-view under an open sky [145].  Military systems generally 
employ dual-frequency receivers at the sacrifice of cost and size.  The use of dual-frequency 
systems can improve positional accuracy to ~50 cm.   
Augmentation systems are also available to improve the accuracy of GNSS.  The most 
common augmentation is known as differential GNSS.  It makes use of fixed ground stations 
or geostationary satellites to provide time corrections to signals transmitted by the GNSS 
constellation.  The signals from the GNSS satellites encounter small delays when traveling 
through the atmosphere, especially the ionosphere and troposphere.   Because of their known 
location and extended dwell, differential GNSS base stations average out the random changes 
from GNSS satellites and can broadcast the current delay caused by solar or terrestrial 
weather. 
Real-time kinematic (RTK) is a technique available that provides centimeter-level 
positioning accuracy.  It uses the number of carrier cycles between the satellite and the rover 
and base stations and resolves ambiguity using the difference in the number of cycles.  It is 
more complicated and requires precise knowledge of the base station location, quality 
observations of the satellites in the field of view, and high-performance antennas.  UAVs that 




For most remote radiation detection applications, the inclusion of cameras, vision sensors, 
or other electro-optical sensors is beneficial.  For a UAS-based approach, cameras are likely 
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already integrated into the flight control system.  Camera systems can also provide enhanced 
situational awareness, improve navigation and mapping, and facilitate multi-system control.  
Binocular camera systems have been employed for computer stereo vision for navigation and 
mapping.  Wide-angle view cameras provide immense situational awareness.   
Even with all the advantages listed, the expected use-case for directed search is during a 
period of darkness, where a typical visible light camera is not useful.  Therefore, the additional 
weight of the stereoscopic system is not advisable.  Instead, one or more low light or thermal 
IR cameras would be better suited for the anticipated light conditions. A thermal IR camera 
could also be very useful for determining the building structure by identifying locations of 
material seams, I-beam locations, and any anomalous thermal activity.    
For many remote radiation detection applications, the inclusion of a LiDAR sensor 
provides a considerable advantage.  As demonstrated by Pavlovsky et al. [21], the benefit is 
threefold: (1) One can generate a 3-D map of the scene from the collected point cloud. (2) The 
position and orientation of the radiation sensors in the scene are well known and can be used 
in conjunction with image reconstruction algorithms to produce a high-fidelity map of the 
radiation field. (3) The sensor provides enhanced-ability to navigate in low-light situations, 
such as at night. The disadvantages are weight, power, and electromagnetic signature.  
Multibeam LiDAR sensors are on the order of 600 g and draw a considerable amount of power 
and data processing capacity.  A smaller single beam LiDAR could be useful for navigation 
and landing, and a small, solid-state system with a limited and segmented field-of-view could 
possibly provide reliable position information with regards to location on the roof.   
5.4 Recommended Sensor Suite 
Vehicle  
Movement across the roof is considered necessary unless the number of systems provides 
adequate and accurate coverage.  Therefore, the recommended vehicle for this application is 
a purpose-built system that takes the best-of-breed attributes of the Pegasus III hybrid 
UAV/UGV.   The ability to traverse the rooftop without having to take to the air is a significant 
advantage from both a low signature standpoint as well as a power requirement perspective.  
While the Pegasus III might not prove to meet all the requirements of a final design, its best 
attributes should be incorporated.  Though a tube-launched parachute-retarded munition-style 
sensor package may offer a low signature, it severely restricts the sensitivity of the radiation 
detector package one can deploy.  It would also prove challenging to incorporate radiation 
sensors, locomotion, parachute-retardation, laser guidance, communications and control, and 
enough power into a deliverable munition-sized package.      
Gamma-ray Sensor 
The recommended gamma-ray detector for this application is at least six 20×20×15 mm 
CZT detectors with an energy resolution of 1.2% at 662 keV or better. The sensitivity and 
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specificity of this size detector are sufficient to detect relevant threats.  CZT offers the best 
resolution per mass when ancillary equipment such as cooling systems for HPGe crystals are 
considered.   It has a relatively high density of ~5.8 g cm-3 and high Zeff.  Further study is 
required to determine the benefit of using pixelated CZT for this application.   
Other options failed to meet threshold values for relevant threats in simulation.  However, 
they should continue to be evaluated for actual performance in trials with physical SNM.  
LaBr3(Ce) showed promise and was on the cusp of detecting relevant threats in simulation 
trials.  Past experience with these detectors in the presence of NRC Category I quantities of 
HEU was favorable.  The intrinsic radioactivity of lanthanum is a detractor for spectroscopy, 
but the fast decay time allows for operation in high-count-rate environments.  The dual 
gamma/neutron detecting capability of elpasolites is attractive.  However, the reliance on large 
traditional photomultipliers to achieve the best resolution (~3.5%) is a detractor. Efforts to 
couple them to silicon photomultipliers have resulted in degraded resolution (~5%).            
Neutron Sensor 
The recommended detector for this application is four or more RDT Domino® detectors.  
The compact size (85×50×10 mm), weight (50–100 g), extremely low power (1.5 mW), 
reasonable efficiency (30%), and adequate sensitivity (~5 cps/nv) make this the best 
alternative for a SWaP-constrained application.  We estimate the cost at $2k for the four 
detector elements.  Any alternative should also perform well at a slightly larger SWaP.  One 
could achieve comparable sensitivity with a 1.9⌀ ×7.6 cm 3He-filled, boron-lined, or boron 
coated straw proportional tube weighing ~100 g.   
Contextual Sensors 
The recommended suite of contextual sensors is still undetermined.  Further investigation 
is suggested for GNSS-RTK, solid-state LiDAR, and thermal IR cameras.  At a minimum, the 
platform will need some means to navigate to and land on the roof, and it must be able to 
operate in a GNSS-denied environment.  A robust system would employ both GNSS-RTK 
and LiDAR.  The utility of thermal IR cameras for this application is yet to be evaluated but 
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6 Search Pattern Optimization 
ssuming a particular sensor can detect threat sources of a specified quantity under a 
set of established conditions, these questions remain: How does the system go about 
searching?  At how many locations should it take measurements?  How should those 
locations be arranged to cover a specific building size and shape?  To which location should 
the system go to first?  How long should a sensor stay at a given location?  What happens 
when it does not detect anything?  Where does it go next?  Is there an ideal path to maximize 
the overall value of each location? The typical, yet ineffective answer is “it depends.” 
One approach is to determine a near-optimal search routine for an expected range of 
conditions.  Such an approach requires developing a framework that allows for the adjustment 
of input parameters within a given set of boundary conditions to evaluate the benefit gained 
from a given measurement.  Exploring this parameter space is the final thrust area of this 
research project. 
Imagine a yard with a severely overgrown lawn that has not been cut in many months.  A 
particularly valuable object is known to be missing, and it may or may not be somewhere in 
the lawn.  The main reason for someone to cut the grass is to find the object or confirm that it 
is not there.  The available mower can either trim off a bit at a time at a reasonable speed or 
cut more at a much slower speed.  What is the best method to go about finding the object, or 
confirm that it is not there, in the shortest amount of time? 
One could choose to mow the entire grass taking a little off a bit each time. They would 
end up having to go over the entire lawn several times to get to a level where the grass is low 
enough to determine whether the object was there or not.  There is no guarantee that any area 
will be low enough to inspect before the operator gets tired of pushing the mower or the time 
available runs out.  Instead, one could move slowly to cut each section down low enough to 
the ground to be sure the object was not there.  This operator might not tire out as quickly 
because they are not pushing the mower over the lawn several times.  However, they may well 
run out of time and not get the entire grass cut.  Since the goal is to find the object, not just 
cut the grass, one could start with areas of the lawn where the object is more likely to be found.  
The allocation of time and energy across the lawn parallels the search plans described further 
in this section. 
6.1 Measurement Location Selection 
The first question we sought to address was, “Where should we take measurements?”  An 
initial prescriptive search method was developed primarily from intuition and experience.  It 
was initially employed for background measurements taken on rooftops before the matter of 
search optimization was categorically explored.  Here it is considered as a baseline for 
comparison with more informed techniques. 
Light industrial buildings are generally rectangular, with an aspect ratio ranging from 1:1 
to 1:1.5. A brilliant place to start appeared to be dead center.  From there, a choice was made 
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to take additional measurements toward the corners at distances roughly equal to the building 
height.  This technique most often resulted in five measurements, resembling the five dots 
signifying the number 5 on a six-sided die, as seen in Figure 4.2.  In the instance of a 
particularly tall or skinny building, fewer measurements were required.  By-passing the corner 
locations is considered a best practice since measuring near a corner of a building will likely 
have elevated background levels from the walls, and squanders sensitivity on areas outside of 
the building, where a source is not expected.  A buffer distance from corners, equal to half the 
building height, was generally followed.   
On the topic of wasting sensitivity in corner measurements, consider an arbitrary spherical 
detector that can be placed anywhere on a plane.  Furthermore, assume a point source that is 
located anywhere on a plane parallel to the detecting plane that is a distance h away.  Ignoring 
the effects of attenuation for the moment, the detector’s sensitivity to a given source activity 
forms a sphere centered on the detector.  The intersection of that sphere with the source plane 
below defines a circle for which any source of activity equal to or larger than some value will 
be detected.  As seen in Figure 6.1, measurements that take place close to the corners of a 
building project a cone of sensitivity outside of the building and therefore collect less 
information than a centerline measurement.  This claim is based on the prevailing assumption 
that threat materials are not located outside of the building. 
Figure 6.1: Extrapolated field-of-view for centerline and corner measurement locations. 
The corners of a building also present a challenge because of the likelihood of elevated 
background in that area, depending on the size of the concrete pad and type of wall material. 
A corner represents the intersection of an infinite half-plane with two semi-infinite quarter 
planes, similar to what was discussed in Section 4.1.2.  Elevated background near corners is 
evident in Figure 4.13 (f) on the right and bottom portion (locations 1,6,11, and 31–35).  Areas 
1 and 11 had two-foot thick concrete blast walls (see Figure 6.2) that protruded into the 
warehouse, and the east wall, near locations 31–35, was constructed with cinderblocks. 
Conversely, the north wall was constructed of corrugated metal over plywood on studs. 
 
 




Figure 6.2: Bldg. 128 characteristics.  Source: personal photographs. 
Basing measurement distances on building height is taken from common search 
techniques for aerial measurements, as well as ground-based mobile detection systems.  For 
aerial measurements, the goal is to determine the ideal line spacing for a raster pattern such 
that an area is covered sufficiently without oversampling.  Most often a line spacing of twice 
the height above the ground is used which results in a maximum distance of closest approach 
that is a factor of √2 greater than the minimum distance of closest approach [20, 146].   
 
Figure 6.3: DOE’s Aerial Measuring System radiation survey method Source: [146].   
Metal over 
plywood wall 
Concrete blast walls 
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Correspondingly, the goal in ground-based mobile search is to establish integration time 
intervals to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio for the system based on the expected distance 
of closest approach to a source as well as anticipated vehicle speeds.  For simple geometries, 
where the source is at the same height as a flat parallelepiped detector, the optimal integration 
time is a factor of two times the expected distance of closest approach.  This maximization 
can be obtained by setting the derivative of the signal-to-noise equal to zero and solving for 
the distance, as seen in Figure 6.4 [147].  The integration time window can then be determined 
from this distance and the average speed.  The optimum integration time is slightly longer 
when the detector is a right circular cylinder because of the uniform projected area it presents.  
The integration window for both shapes gets smaller when air attenuation is considered.  Both 
differences are minor, and often detection system algorithms employ multiple integration 
windows to account for variations in speed or source strengths. 
 
Figure 6.4: Derivation of optimal signal to noise for simple mobile search geometry. Source: [147] 
used with permission from B. Seilhan. 
Adapting the principles of aerial measurement and ground-based mobile search techniques 
to a rooftop measurement scheme seems relatively straightforward.  However, there are vital 
differences in the approach and desired outcomes that result in significant modifications to 
the aforementioned techniques.  The first key difference is the manner in which measurements 
are taken.  The aerial and mobile techniques are both dynamic, i.e., the detectors are moving 
in the environment.  Conversely, the rooftop scheme is expected to consist of a series of static 
measurements in order to take advantage of the extended time available to make 
measurements and to minimize the power required for locomotion. 
The second key difference is the detection geometry.  Regarding the aerial technique, 
measurements are taken along fixed line segments in a plane, assuming the aircraft flies 
ostensibly straight lines across the search area.  The choice of line spacing constrains the 
maximum distance of closest approach to the height of the aircraft added in quadrature with 
one-half of the line spacing distance, as shown in Figure 6.3.  By the same token, ground-
based measurements are even more constrained as they are taken along a single line 
segment—the road.  Therefore, the adjustable parameters are limited to vehicle speed and 
detector integration time.  Moreover, ground-based mobile detectors are often arranged to be 
most sensitive to a source located in the buildings adjacent to the direction of travel.   
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For the rooftop scheme, however, the path constraint relaxes from fixed line segments to 
any point on a plane, i.e., the rooftop.  This additional spatial degree of freedom enables more 
optimal solutions than aerial or vehicular search.  While taking measurements at points along 
a series of line segments spaced across the roof in a rectangular or square lattice remains a 
viable method, it is sub-optimal.  This pattern creates repeating bands that are not sampled as 
well when compared to the measurement path, as seen in Figure 6.5 (left).  Closer spacing is 
required to alleviate these bands.  A smaller pitch creates overlaps, just like mowing the grass.  
 
Figure 6.5: Comparison of (left) square versus (right) triangular lattice with uniform counting 
time at each location. 
Triangular or hexagonal lattices are also commonly used.  This arrangement provides more 
optimal coverage than a square or rectangular pitch because it implicitly overlaps rows and 
columns, as evident in Figure 6.5 (right). The coverage is not only better, but the overall 
performance is improved as well; the color and size of the contours in the right plot clearly 
illustrate this enhancement. Moreover, this is accomplished with less than half as many 
measurement locations (seven vice fifteen), which allows for approximately twice as much 
time to be spent at each location.  A finer pitch could also be chosen, which would result in 
improved coverage and better overlap. 
Since the detector response on a rooftop casts a circle of some minimum detectable activity 
for a source located below it, the spatial optimization routine becomes an exercise of circle 
packing on a plane.  Optimal or near-optimal solutions for aspect ratios ranging from 1:0.1 to 
1:1 for N > 1 up to several hundred, and thousands in some cases, are known to exist [148].  
To first order, the general solution is a hexagonal lattice.  In 1773, J.L. Lagrange ascertained 
the hexagonal lattice to have the highest-density lattice arrangement of circles in two-
dimensional Euclidean space.  This was later proven maximal by C.F. Gauss for lattice 
arrangements in 1831 and optimal for regular and irregular packings by A. Thue in 1890.  The 
first rigorous proof is attributed to L.F. Tóth in 1940 [149]. 
However, exact optimal packing solutions in bounded shapes, for a given aspect ratio and 
chosen number of points, are often non-symmetric, since the goal of the packing algorithm is 
to maximize the diameter of N circles.  For example, the solution for N=32 circles on 1:0.5 
aspect ratio rectangle looks mostly like a hexagonal lattice, as seen in Figure 6.6.  Even so, 
there can be a large amount of unused space if a hexagonal pattern is continued throughout 
without adjustment. Therefore, to maximize the circle diameter, some rows are shifted, which 
throws off the lattice structure (N=19).  Surprisingly, a rectangular lattice gives the optimal 
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solution in some special cases (N=18), while other conditions exploit a mix of rectangular and 
hexagonal-like lattices to achieve an optimal packing arrangement (N=33).   
 
Figure 6.6: Example best-known packings of equal circles in a 1 × 0.5 rectangle. (top left) N=32 
gives a near-perfect hexagonal lattice (top right) N=33 exploits a mix of rectangular and 
hexagonal-like lattices. (bottom left) N=18 is a rare case where a rectangular lattice achieves the 
largest diameter circles. (bottom right) N=19 is largely a hexagonal lattice, but the pattern is 
shifted to accommodate an asymmetric N. Source: [148] used with permission from E. Specht. 
Nevertheless, the goal of traditional circle packing optimization does not directly match 
the required end state of determining optimal rooftop measurement locations.  Circle packing 
often starts with a required number of circles and a designated aspect ratio; the objective is to 
determine the largest diameter possible such that all circles remain on the plane with no 
overlap.  Conversely, in a rooftop detection scheme, the circle diameter is a fixed quantity 
that is akin to a contour line for a given source activity, detector, background rate, and 
collection time.  The aim is to determine the minimum number of measurement locations to 
cover the space adequately.  Furthermore, a uniform packing arrangement is desirable since 
the location of the source, if present, is unknown and often could be anywhere in the building.  
Consequently, a hexagonal lattice becomes an excellent starting point for a rooftop scheme.  
To determine the number of measurement locations, N, one needs to know the length and 
width of the building, L and W respectively, and pitch, r.  The following equation can be 
employed to estimate the ideal number of measurement locations for a given grid pitch.  Some 
adjustment may be necessary, but in general, the ratio of n:k should roughly mirror the aspect 
ratio of the building.    




      (6.1) 
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Assuming one chooses a hexagonal lattice as the blueprint for potential measurement 
locations, the task remains to select a pitch.  Though it was stated previously that the circle 
diameter is “fixed” for a given MDA, it still must be determined. As with anything that is a 
function of more than one parameter, there are tradeoffs.  The first thing to look at is 
uniformity of response.  
Like aerial detection, there are maxima and minima due to overlap from adjacent 
measurements.  In this case, the overlap is more complicated than two line segments found in 
aerial detection.  Regardless, the distance between points should be set such that the difference 
in sensitivity to a source located at the maximum versus one at the minimum meets an 
acceptable threshold.  For example, a potential threshold might be to accept a sensitivity 
difference of no more than a 20–30% to a source located anywhere in the building.  
 
Figure 6.7: Example hexagonal lattice tiling on a rectangle with an aspect ratio of 1:0.6 for 
different pitch values as a function of building height. 
 
Table 6.1: Comparison of measurement lattices for a 15×25 m building (~4000 sq. ft.) as a 
function of pitch.  The figure of merit is the ratio of the worst case when a source is located furthest 
from a set of lattice point versus the ideal case when it is located directly under a point.  Parameters 
are presented for a single independent measurement and aggregated for the seven closest 
measurement locations. 
Pitch Number of locations n k 














2ℎ 1 1 1 1.41 0.50 1.53 0.43 0.11 – 
√3ℎ 2 1 2 1.32 0.57 1.41 0.50 0.19 60 
√2ℎ 3 1 3 1.22 0.67 1.29 0.60 0.23 40 
ℎ 6 2 3 1.12 0.80 1.15 0.75 0.76 30 
ℎ √2⁄  12 3 4 1.06 0.89 1.08 0.86 0.76 5 
ℎ √3⁄  18 3 6 1.04 0.92 1.05 0.90 0.79 2 
ℎ 2⁄  24 4 6 1.03 0.94 1.04 0.92 0.82 1 
ℎ 3⁄  52 6 9 1.01 0.97 1.02 0.96 0.89 1 
ℎ 4⁄  92 8 12 1.01 0.98 1.01 0.98 0.93 0 
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Note that a pitch of ℎ √2⁄  has the same figure of merit, in this instance, the ratio of the 
worst case to best case location, as a pitch of ℎ.  However, this does not reveal the 30% 
improvement in sensitivity achieved by doubling the number of measurement locations and 
thereby reducing the maximum distance to a potential source. 
The use of the building height as a guide for measurement location separation results in a 
maximum source-to-detector distance no more than 1.155 times the building height in a 
hexagonal pitch arrangement.  This limits the maximum reduction in signal to 33.4% when 
comparing a source directly below a detector versus one located at the outer circle of a cone 
of sensitivity.  In a sufficient-sized lattice, the improvement is even more significant because 
the signals from adjacent measurement locations can be aggregated.  The location of least 
sensitivity moves from the outer radius of a single cone to the intersection of three cones. 
The take away from this investigation is that it is wise to choose a lattice pitch equal to or 
smaller than the building height.  The prevailing factor to adjust from there is the required 
MDA to detect the anticipated activity of the target source with a projected background.    Care 
should also be exercised to ensure adequate coverage of the entire building by conical 
projections of the measurement locations. 
The concern with setting the sensitivity threshold too high is that it drives up the number 
of measurement locations, which then drives down the available measurement time at each 
location.  Halving the distance to the source is more than twice as effective in increasing the 
signal-to-noise ratio as compared to doubling the time spent counting.  However, the reality 
is that it takes power to move from location to location.  Thus, a constrained optimization that 
seeks to maximize the probability of detection (or perhaps minimize the chance of a false 
negative) within a fixed time, power budget, and geometry starts to form.   
In developing the optimization, however, the approach is not as straightforward as might 
be assumed.  A naïve approach might be to determine the optimal lattice arrangement and 
then apply a traveling-salesman-problem methodology to determine the best path.  However, 
this assumes that all measurement locations are of equal importance.  While this assumption 
simplifies things considerably, it fails to maximize the objective quantity by squandering 
measurement time at locations that may have already been cleared by the superposition of 
adjacent measurements, and by neglecting the geometric advantages and disadvantages of 
particular locations. 
For a medium-sized building, on the order of 300 m2 (3230 sq. ft.), a conservative pitch of 
ℎ/2 was used to determine the number of measurement locations—18 in this case.  From 
these points, we examined two approaches—the shortest path and the longest path.  For a 
building this size with a realistic number of measurement locations, the extended path was 
~200% longer than the shorter path.  The pathlength becomes almost a factor of six longer 
when the points are chosen on a rectangular lattice for a slightly bigger building, as seen in 
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Table 6.2: Properties of example traveling-salesman-problem path selection for gridded search 
               Path type and    
Grid                    length 














18 points hexagonal  82 273 3.35 95 1.16 






Figure 6.8: Modified Traveling Salesman Problem path optimizations for a 12×25 m building 
with (top) 18 measurement locations on a triangular pitch and (bottom) 35 measurement locations 
on a rectangular pitch. 
It is somewhat intuitive that, for a given building, measurements taken in the center or 
along the centerline of the major axis provide the most coverage for an unknown source 
location.  However, there are often geometries where an absolute center measurement is not 
optimal due to the superposition of adjacent measurement locations.  Regardless, those on the 
edges and corners provide less value because there are locations within the detectors field of 
view where we assume that the probability of the source being there is zero, i.e., outside the 
building.  Therefore, the goal should be to maximize the information potential of each 
measurement instead of maximizing the coverage area.  That is, measurement locations and 
times are prioritized such that they provide the most significant increase in overall information 
supporting or refuting a hypothesized source at all possible locations. 
A simple approach to balance path length while prioritizing a better field-of-view is to 
raster within the middle of the roof and then loop around to catch the outer measurement 
locations, as demonstrated in Figure 6.9.  The length for both lattice arrangements is less than 
20% longer than the shortest path.   
 
 




Figure 6.9: Example search patterns which prioritize locations with the better fields-of-view while 
still attempting to minimize the total path length. (left) Hexagonal lattice with 18 points (right) 
Rectangular lattice with 35 points.  
While this approach heuristically improves the search by prioritizing locations with better 
fields-of-view, this only takes advantage of the spatial aspect of the problem.  The amount of 
time spent at each location is another parameter that can be manipulated to improve the overall 
outcome of a search.  The next section will discuss the temporal component of the 
measurement scheme in terms of information gathering. 
6.2 Collection Time Allocation 
Assuming a grid of possible measurement locations has been chosen for a building, there 
are two types of search plans envisioned for any given scenario.  The first is a prescriptive 
approach, dubbed the playbook method, for which the search pattern must be developed 
before the deployment of the sensor and deviations from the plan are not possible.  The 
approach is to travel to location [A,1], collect for X minutes, go to location [B,2], collect for 
Y minutes, and continue until all locations have been visited, then return to base to download 
data for analysis.  This technique lends itself to scenarios where system size, weight, power, 
and computing resources are narrowly constrained.  It lends itself best to the scenario in which 
clearing a target building is a primary goal, i.e., a source is not expected to be there, but a 
confirmation measurement is required to remove it from the list of possibilities.   
The second is an adaptive control approach [150], nicknamed the Sastry method, where 
the search pattern can be adjusted in near real-time as the measurements are being taken, i.e., 
a measurement of a given length has ruled out the presence of a source of a given strength or 
higher within some distance of the detector.  Example next steps are to move to location [B,3], 
which is the nearest measurement location outside of this detection band, move to location 
[E,4], which is the location that has the potential of provide the next biggest detection band, 
or remain in place for some number of minutes to rule out additional shielding of a given 
thickness for the photons emitted in the germane energy range. 
As one can see, the adaptive approach presents many branches and sequels that will 
complicate an optimization routine.  It is likely beyond what can be solved in polynomial 
time.  However, certain assumptions and heuristics can be used to push towards near-optimal 
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The primary currency for both approaches is information.  That is, when a measurement 
is made, it provides information that supports the hypothesis that a source is present or is not 
present.  Maximizing the information gained from each measurement lends itself well to either 
approach.  In prescriptive mode, it drives a search pattern solution which takes measurements 
at locations which provide the most information to confirm or deny the presence of a threat 
source.  In adaptive mode, a measurement provides an update to a prior hypothesis.  Areas are 
targeted where the most information can be gained, much like in prescriptive mode, but 
decisions to move are based on measured data vice predetermined expectations. 
Information Maximization  
The inputs to maximize information potential are as follows: 
 
Figure 6.10: Cluster diagram of inputs to the information maximization model used to develop an 
ab initio collection scheme.   
• Detector area    .
• Efficiency             .
• Energy resolution





•SNR threshold       .
•False positive rate.
•False negative rate













Figure 6.11: Schematic of variables required for information maximization routine used to 
develop an ab initio collection scheme. 
The routine to maximize information potential is: 
 Create a square grid 𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛 of possible source locations at a reasonable pitch (e.g., 25 cm)  
 Develop a hexagonal lattice 𝐸𝐸, 𝑗𝑗 that oversamples the space (i.e., gives more measurement 
locations than is possible to complete with given time and power) 
 Calculate the source-to-detector distance for all possible locations, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  
 Estimate the fraction of full-energy photons transmitted through the roof, 𝑒𝑒−𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 
 Calculate the expected source signal per second for every possible source location, 𝑚𝑚, 𝑛𝑛  
at each measurement location, 𝐸𝐸, 𝑗𝑗.    
 Calculate the per second signal-to-noise ratio at each location with a background estimate  
 Allow the specified time spent at each measurement location to float in order to optimize 
one of the following: 
o Minimize the mean MDA from any location  
o Minimize the mean MDA times the variance from any location  
o Minimize the ratio of the variance to the mean of the MDA from any location  
The optimization is a smooth, nonlinear, and strictly concave maximization which can be 
solved using standard nonlinear programming solvers such as the generalized reduced 
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Figure 6.12: Sample optimization based on various functions of the minimum detectable activity 
(MDA). (top left) Uniform counting time for reference. (top right) Minimize the overall mean 
MDA. (bottom left) Minimize the product of the variance and mean of the MDA. (bottom right) 
Minimize the ratio of the variance to the mean of the MDA. 
One can see that for a uniform approach, time is wasted in the corners that would be better 
spent in the center portion of the roof.  Three approaches were taken in an attempt to improve 
the overall MDA and reduce the variation across all possible source locations.  These 
approaches attempted to minimize functions using descriptive statistics of the MDA.  
Minimizing the mean performed the best, whereas including the variance in an attempt to 
smooth out the response had little effect at the edges and diluted performance in the middle.   
From these results, we set about developing a different metric to optimize.  We targeted 
the probability of detection and its complement as functions to optimize.  However, to get 
these values in a reasonable amount of time, we had to give the optimization a boost by using 
a threshold value for each matrix value of the SNR.  That is, if a measurement from location 
[A,1] was not going to provide any useful information about a source located at [k,2], then 
we did not bother to calculate its contribution to the overall signal and background.  For each 
source location, a cluster of nearby measurement locations provided the relevant signal and 
background contribution on a per-second basis.  Using these values, we could calculate an 
SNR and then, using the Gauss error function, calculate a probability of detection based on 
the aggregated signal and background.  The optimization can be tailored depending on the 
expectation of the target.  That is, if the source is not expected at a particular target because 
of some other indicator, the objective might be to clear it.  In that case, maximizing the 
minimum confidence that the source is not present is the objective. 
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 Apply a threshold cutoff value based on the confidence of no signal (e.g., 95%) 
 Calculate and sum the expected total signal and background counts for a specified time at 
each measurement location that exceeds the threshold for every possible source location  
 Using the established false-positive tolerance, calculate the probability of the source 
being at location 𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛 and detecting it given the measurements at each location 
 Using the established false-negative tolerance, calculate the probability of a source being 
at location 𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛 and NOT detecting it given the measurements at each location 
 Allow the specified time spent at each measurement location to float in order to optimize 
one of the following: 
o Maximize the average probability of detection of a source at any location 
o Maximize the minimum probability of detection of a source at any location 
o Maximize the minimum confidence that a source is not present at any location 
o Maximize a weighted sum of the true-positive and true-negative values 
 
Figure 6.13: Sample optimization based on maximizing the average probability of detection across 
all possible source locations.  The size of the circle is proportional to the counting time. 
Given an optimal starting grid of measurement locations and collection times, the scheme 
is still not complete.  The optimization is just an initial plan, and no plan survives first contact.  
The starting grid is based on an a priori probability of a source being located anywhere in the 
building.  This could be a uniform probability density where the source is equally probably to 
be at any location in the building.  Alternatively, an informed prior could be developed that is 
based on knowledge of the building interior. Locations that are more or less likely to contain 
a source might be identified by things like room size, proximity to power, privacy, or 
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securability. Regardless, the results of the first measurement will change the probabilities for 
source locations that are near the measurement location, thus updating the prior.  Therefore, 
the optimization should be repeated following each update to the prior and could be updated 
while a current measurement is ongoing.   
Depending on available processing power, this could be accomplished on-board a 
detection platform but might have to be determined before the mission if that is not feasible.  
Furthermore, there are competing requirements that influence the decision to move to another 
measurement location. For example, assuming the first measurement location was centered 
on the building.   
 
 How long does the system wait to move to another location?   
 Should the sensor collect data until the aggregated measurement supports the 
hypothesis at some confidence level (e.g., 68%, 95%, 99%) that a source of 
interest is not directly below the location?   
 Ought the system remain at the location until it can support the same hypothesis 
for a source located some distance off-axis?  
 If so, at what lateral distance does it become more advantageous, even when 
taking power consumption into account, to move closer to that location? 
 
It is evident that the decision tree quickly becomes complicated.  Ideally, an onboard 
processor could handle a near real-time optimization.  If that is not possible, however, it is 
feasible to develop a simple playbook based on likely outcomes from each measurement.  That 
is, create a decision tree with limited options, as seen in Figure 6.14.  The three courses of 
action are: remain at the current location, move to the next measurement location from the 
original optimal grid, and cue the assault force.  When there are no new measurement 
locations, the system can go back and finish uncleared locations if time remains.    
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A pseudocode algorithm is: 
 
Counter = 20      {set counter to max iterations at location} 
Do (measure for 30 seconds)    {collect spectra for 30 seconds} 
 Counter = Counter – 1   {decrement counter} 
If P(D) > 0.68 indicate source detected  {analyze spectra for presence} 
 If P(D’)> 0.95 Counter = Counter*0  {analyze spectra for absence and move} 
 While (Counter>0)    {continue counting for up to 600 s} 
Move to Location [x,#]    {next location in playbook}  
 
The playbook technique improves upon the initial optimal grid shortest path technique by 
spending time in locations where the actual measurement supports further investigation rather 
than the geometry of the building.  It is like simple game theory strategies for a game of 
Battleship in that there are possible measurement locations (i.e., the grid of possible locations 
to attack) and possible source locations (i.e., locations of the opponent’s ships).  An initial 
plan is developed to attack areas with the highest probability of a hit, often the middle of the 
board because of arranging limitations placed on the larger ships.  This strategy is akin to the 
development of a prior based on the building geometry and knowledge of the interior layout.  
Once a ship is hit, analogous to a measurement indicating signal above background, shots are 
fired nearby to determine the orientation of the ship and eventually sink it, thus identifying 
the type of ship.   
The knowledge of the type of ship drives future decisions on where to fire, based on the 
size of the ships remaining; in the case of radiological and nuclear search, this is the MDA of 
the threat source.  Imagine a variant of the game for which a particular ship, suppose the 
submarine, was the only one of value and sinking it ended the game.  Hits on other ships 
would result in further shots fired in the immediate area surrounding until it could be 
determined that it was not a submarine.  In the same manner, measured signal above 
background at a location would drive further collection there and at nearby locations to either 
confirm or rule out a threat source. Just as more shots are fired in the game, and the possible 
locations for a submarine to be hiding dwindle, the systematic approach to measuring at 
optimal positions limits a source of a given strength and configuration to fewer and fewer 
possible locations.  
The constraints of the playbook technique are both limiting and beneficial.  A decision is 
made to do something until a condition is met.  That is, measure at location [A,1] for at least 
30 seconds and but no more than 600 seconds, until either the probability that a source is not 
present exceeds 95% or the probability that a source is present exceeds 68%, or the time limit 
is reached.  These constraints ensure that at least some threshold amount of information is 
gained from a measurement.  The limiting nature of this approach, however, is the incremental 
information gained while making that measurement could drastically change the optimization, 
such that measurements locations not identified in the initial analysis could have considerably 
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Near real-time optimization, taking place even while measurements are ongoing, aims to 
maximize the information potential for the entire collection period.  The collection scheme 
must incorporate the cost to move, both in time and power, with the information potential of 
each location.  That is, there may be a distant measurement location that has the highest 
information potential; however, significant time and power (~120 seconds and 0.5 w-hr) 
would be expended moving there.  The difficult task is to equate the information potential, 
time, and power in terms of a cost function.   
The decision to remain at a location to gather more information can be viewed as an 
opportunity cost.  To increase the certainty of a given hypothesis (e.g., to go from 68% to 95% 
probability that a source is not located within 10 m of the system) requires a trade-off of 
measurement time that could be spent somewhere else.  If power were not an issue, moving 
from location to location and building confidence in the null hypothesis would be a viable 
approach.  Likewise, building confidence in the hypothesis that a source is present is time 
well spent.  As in the lawn mowing analogy, if one sees a tiny bit of something, it is 
undoubtedly worth the time spent to cut the grass down low enough to see if it is indeed the 
object one was searching for or the just a ball from the kid next door. 
6.3 Future Considerations 
Assuming near real-time optimization taking place, how soon into the measurement until 
a measurement taken at some other location offers higher information potential than the 
current location?  Furthermore, should the system move in a raster scan, bound back and forth 
across the roof, spiral around outward from the center, or clear sub-areas sequentially?  These 
questions remain to be answered, as does the question: is real-time optimization worth the 
extra effort?  While near real-time optimization is superior to a playbook or optimal grid 
shortest path method in terms of total information gained, how much better is it when 
compared to the other techniques?  Are there threat sources that would not be detected with a 
simple method that would have been had real-time optimization taken place?   
The use of multiple platforms and multiple target buildings complicates the matter further.  
Ascribing to the “two is one, one is none” philosophy, multiple platforms are likely to be 
deployed to the same building.  Allocating search space and communicating data between 
systems is a topic with broad interest across multiple research communities and sectors, such 
as the military.  Additional platforms will likely change the number of collection points and 
the paths taken in order to cover the threat space efficiently and avoid collisions between 
systems.  One can also envision a tiered approach whereby a system with enhanced 
capabilities conducts secondary screening at anomalous locations.  The requirements for 
communications and data sharing increase with a multiplatform approach and may force 
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7 Synopsis and Future Work 
hile this work may seem like the detector equivalent of an infamous Rickover-
esque “paper reactor,” [151] there are already projects being funded and more than 
a few prototype systems in development geared towards several of the mission 
areas discussed here.  Some examples include scene data fusion for point and distributed 
sources using LAMP, sUAS swarms for post-detonation forensics, and launched scout-sUAS 
for contamination avoidance. 
7.1 Summary of Contributions to the Field 
The primary focus of the research we conducted was exploring the feasibility of using 
unmanned systems to remotely and semi-autonomously detect radiological and nuclear threats 
in a directed search scenario by conducting rooftop measurements during a period of darkness.  
The two chief concerns were the optimization of the sensor package and the development of 
the search method.  The choice of detector materials, the quantity and arrangement of detector 
elements, and the choice of auxiliary sensors are paramount in developing a system that can 
detect a sufficient number of threat materials under a given set of conditions.  Beyond that, 
the most effective employment of a group of systems requires detailed analysis of individual 
search patterns, collective coverage schemes, and cooperative detection algorithms.   
This work provides five distinct contributions to the field of remote radiation detection:   
1) This study is the first to characterize the levels and variation of background 
radiation near light industrial buildings as measured from the rooftop.  This work 
confirmed the relatively high background rates and variance of potassium 
contributions encountered in the industrial areas published by the RadMAP group. 
2) The development of system requirements and the exploration of the trade space 
form the basis for a detailed project proposal and provide a roadmap for future 
system design. 
3) The exploration of search patterns offers a preliminary method to develop a near-
optimal solution for a prescribed or playbook search method.  The techniques used 
to boost the efficiency of the optimization routine should enable further 
development of algorithms for adaptive control and multi-system collaboration.   
4) The concepts presented in the appendix, DoD Radiological and Nuclear Remote 
Detection Mission Areas, provide additional areas for exploration and contribution 
from the broader community of researchers.   
5) This work gained the attention of DoD leadership, including division chiefs and 
program managers at DTRA, the Joint Project Manager for Radiological and 
Nuclear Defense, and scientific advisors to the DoD Combatant Commands.  
Before engaging with them, the level of funding for sUAS-based detection was 
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7.2 Future Work 
We divide future work for this mission area into three primary areas: threat space mapping, 
cooperative algorithm development and improvement, and testbed iterations.  As discussed in 
5.3.2, the placement of neutron detectors on an unmanned platform could help or hinder the 
performance of the detector.  The response of thermal neutron detectors placed near various 
UAV components, including lithium polymer batteries, is an ideal project for a group of 
undergraduates to investigate using both simulation and experimental testing.   
7.2.1 Threat Space Mapping 
Considerable effort has gone into developing a spanning set of threats by the Nuclear 
Detection Systems and Algorithms group at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [152].  
We suggest coordinating a modest effort to assess the performance of the recommended 
sensor suite against the spanning set. The goals of the study would be threefold: (1) ensure 
that a reasonable percentage of threats would be detected under realistic but idealized 
conditions, (2) inform the trade space as to how one might improve most for the next version 
(e.g., improved energy resolution, larger detector sizes, increased number of systems), and (3) 
compare the playbook algorithm performance to an adaptive algorithm in order to gauge the 
benefit and evaluate whether the additional computational burden and system complexity is 
worthwhile.    
With regards to a reasonable percentage of threats detected, one should pay particular 
attention to those material combinations that exhibit similarities to proliferated weapon 
designs to ensure that the most likely threats are addressed.  One should also set the benchmark 
using the most likely threats, not the performance of the current capability.  For example, if 
the current capability can detect 25% of the threats and the unmanned system is able to detect 
50% of the threats (a two-fold increase in threats detected), but neither is able to detect the 
most likely threats, both systems fail to provide real operational value to the commander.  In 
that case, one needs to rework the system design until it provides value.  However, should the 
most likely threats be detected by both systems, then a threshold value for the threats detected 
might be 70% while an objective value for the system would be on the order of 95%. 
Performance that is on par with current capability or only provides a modest increase in 
capability could be attractive if it came at a significantly lower cost, provided a lower risk to 
personnel and equipment, or afforded equivalent coverage of more target buildings in the 
same time.  Otherwise, a system that only performs just slightly better than current capability 
is generally not worth pursuing. 
7.2.2 Cooperative Algorithm Development 
Though the recommended number of systems per target is six with a total basis of issue 
of eighteen, there is a likelihood that in a resource-constrained environment, a smaller number 
of systems, maybe four, are developed to provide an initial operational capability.  This 
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potential limitation suggests focusing efforts on improving real-time algorithms to maximize 
the information gained at each measurement location to avoid having to resample locations.  
Determining when a location has sufficiently been sampled and time is better spent measuring 
elsewhere is harder to do when resources are constrained.  A system must be able to adapt to 
the scenario where perhaps only half of the UAVs make it to the target for one reason or 
another.  This issue lends itself well to cooperative algorithms developed for the division of 
labor that swarms of UAVs use to cover a given area.   
The goal of this research would be to adapt and further develop algorithms for 1 to n 
systems to divide up the search space to maximize the probability of detection or reach an 
acceptable level of confidence that a threat is not present.   The confounding scenarios that 
need exploration include when one or more systems fail while on the target, when systems 
become available after the initial deployment, and when an anomaly is detected and needs to 
be confirmed.  Also, topics such as the minimum time spent at a location, the minimum 
distance between measurement locations, the shared data requirements and update cycle 
between systems, and general routing guidelines should be explored further. 
7.2.3 Testbed Experimentation 
The eventual goal is to develop and transition a capability to the DoD for the directed 
search mission area.  In parallel, we are sowing the seeds for the exploration of the other 
mission areas initially discussed in Chapter 1 and further explored in the appendix.  Several 
testbeds exist within the USG that could be used to explore the efficacy of the system and test 
different concepts of operations and employment.  These range from a collection of high-
fidelity threat objects at the Device Assembly Facility to relevant operational environments 
located at the DTRA Technical Evaluation Assessment Monitor Site.  
Sub-components of the system need to be tested at increasing technology readiness levels 
before a complete system is built.  Though modeling suggests that the recommended suite of 
radiation detectors  can detect relevant threats, the burden of proof is operational testing.  It 
does not make sense to push forward with a platform design and auxiliary sensor selection 
until the foundational radiation sensors are solidified.  In the same regard, expending 
considerable resources on adapting the form, fit, and function of sensors to a particular 
platform does not make sense until the platform has demonstrated that it can meet the 
constraints and limitations outline for the system.  That is, if the platform cannot make it to 
the target or is too conspicuous, then designing a sensor package to mate to it is a waste of 
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Appendix—Department of Defense Radiological and 




Radiological and nuclear search is the main effort when it comes to nuclear detection 
research and development efforts for the DoD, and arguably across other government agencies 
as well.  Nevertheless, what “search” means and what that term implies to different user 
groups is exceedingly diverse.  Therefore, the term “directed search” is defined and used here.   
Directed search assumes that law enforcement, security forces, or intelligence functions 
have confirmed the loss, theft, or possession of radiological or nuclear material of concern by 
a state or non-state actor (e.g., individuals, extremist organizations, and non-governmental 
entities).  The type, quantity, total mass, chemical form, and geometric configuration of the 
material are likely known or can be approximated.  The suspected location of the material has 
been narrowed to a reasonable-sized search area through intelligence collection and 
assessment. For directed search, a reasonable-sized search area is defined here as less than ten 
square kilometers (e.g., a small town, a large neighborhood or section of a city, several small 
villages).  Furthermore, intelligence assets may have identified light industrial or commercial 
structures within the search area as possible device fabrication, assembly, or material storage 
sites. 
Efforts to neutralize attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons or radioactive materials into the 
country have been ongoing since the advent of the Atomic Age. Fortunately, there have not 
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been any publicly confirmed attempts to locate an improvised nuclear device (IND) or 
radioactive dispersal device (RDD).  That is not to say that search teams have not been 
employed to find lost or stolen material.  In 2003, DoD radiological search assets were used 
to locate two radioactive capsules stolen by looters from a nuclear testing site located at 
Saddam Hussein’s main battlefield testing center in the desert west of Baghdad [13]. 
The site, built in the early-1980s, was used to test equipment, and possibly human subjects, 
in a simulated battlefield radiation environment by raising large-activity radioactive sources 
on towers arranged in an arc around a test pad.  Small metal capsules, each initially containing 
approximately 370 giga-becquerels (GBq)—10 curies (Ci)—of the isotope 60Co, had been 
stored in concrete containers at the bases of each of the eight 23 m (75 ft.) testing poles.  By 
2003, the sources had decayed to approximately 10% of their original activity but remained a 
significant health hazard and possible RDD threat at ~37 GBq (1 Ci) each.   
Finding sources of that strength is “the slow pitch softball” [14] of search operations.  It 
was quickly accomplished by mounting a large detector system containing thallium-doped 
sodium iodide (NaI[Tl]) scintillation gamma-ray detectors and 3He-filled proportional tube 
neutron detectors into a military helicopter and scanning the nearby area at low altitude and 
airspeed.  The two sources were found along with remnants of the tower poles, which were 
the target of the looting, in two adjacent villages approximately 16 kilometers (10 mi.) north 
of the testing site.   
Though this search and recovery operation was swift and successful, changes in the 
conditions could have made the mission far more difficult.  For example, the source strength 
and primary gamma-ray energies associated with the decay of the 60Co isotope allowed search 
forces to locate the material from an altitude of more than 100 meters.  Suppose instead it was 
special nuclear material (SNM), secretly hidden from inspectors, that went missing from the 
Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility.  Depending on the material properties—including fissile 
isotope(s), enrichment levels, impurities, and other factors—the gamma and neutron flux 
produced by the material could range several orders of magnitude and be much more difficult 
or nearly impossible to detect from the air.    
For this exemplification, assume that the material consisted of 25 kg of weapons-grade 
(WG) highly enriched uranium (HEU).  That amount is classified as a significant quantity 
(SQ) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which denotes the approximate 
amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive 
device cannot be excluded [16].  Prior to its removal by the IAEA after the 1991 Gulf War, 
Iraq possessed more than 12 kg of slightly irradiated 93%-enriched uranium fuel purchased 
from France as part of the Tammuz-2 reactor.  They also possessed more than an SQ of both 
fresh and irradiated 80%-enriched uranium fuel from the Russian-supplied IRT-5000 research 
reactor [17].                    
Unlike the 60Co sources, which were found lying in the yard of a house and partially buried 
in a field near another, assume that the value and hazards associated with the stolen SNM 
were known to the thieves and kept in a secure location, such as a non-descript building in 
Fallujah.  The concept of operations calling for a helicopter to fly low and slow to locate the 
material fails quickly.  First, the expected radioactive signature from the material would be 
 
 
   
 
132 
undetectable above background, even at the lowest operating altitude and speed of a 
helicopter, except for perhaps hovering directly above or landing on the roof.  Second, the 
geographic area that the cobalt sources were recovered from was semi-permissive during the 
operation; that is, the villagers, while not completely forthcoming with details regarding the 
missing material, were not actively hostile towards U.S. forces at the time.  Had operations 
taken place later in the conflict, those villages at the southern end of the so-called Sunni 
triangle may have been much more hostile, thereby precluding the low and slow flight of a 
manned helicopter or necessitating a much larger security presence.  Third, the presence of a 
helicopter flying a search pattern over buildings would certainly trigger apprehension in the 
minds of those possessing the material, prompting them to flee the area or to shield the 
material if they were working with it at the time.  
Given these realities, the conditions for high-consequence directed search operations 
involving SNM require pushing detectors as close to the source location as possible while not 
tipping off the adversary to one’s actions and reducing the risk to personnel and equipment 
where possible.  To that end, a remote sensing platform that can be flown, dropped, or 
launched to a location is an attractive solution.  As such, a modest collection of small 
unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) outfitted with radiation detectors coupled to contextual 
sensors could meet those requirements for under $2 million. 
sUAS can fly much closer to buildings and could perhaps land on them undetected.  
Furthermore, reducing the distance between potential sources and the sensors allows one to 
use smaller and more sophisticated detectors to achieve equal or better sensitivity but with 
much higher specificity. Moreover, the reduction in risk across-the-board is unparalleled.  Not 
only are several warfighters and tens of millions of dollars of equipment removed from a 
potentially high-risk situation, but the risk to mission compromise via adversary tip-off is also 
significantly reduced.    
Of course, there are engineering challenges that we must overcome and trade-offs that we 
need to weigh when designing such a system of systems for this application.  Considerations 
for this mission area are the primary focus of the research conducted and presented in this 
work.  The two chief concerns are the optimization of the sensor package and the development 
of the search method.  The choice of detector materials, the quantity and arrangement of 
detector elements, and the choice of auxiliary sensors are paramount in developing a system 
that can detect a sufficient number of threat materials under a given set of conditions.  Beyond 
that, the effective employment of a group of systems requires detailed analysis of individual 
search patterns, collective coverage schemes, and cooperative detection algorithms.   
The other mission areas illustrate various conditions that might dictate a different approach 
than that of directed search.  However, there are likely to be overlaps and synergies that exist 
between several missions that would permit adaptable or modular multipurpose design 
approaches that employ the same or similar unmanned platforms, sensors, search schemes, or 
algorithms.    
 
 





Battle Damage Assessment 
Battle damage assessment (BDA) encompasses the estimate of the damage resulting from 
the application of lethal or nonlethal military force.  Traditionally, it is associated with 
assessing the damage inflicted on a target from a stand-off weapon, such as a bomb or guided 
missile. Assessment of the physical damage, functional damage, and effect on the targeted 
systems are made to inform further actions [1].  As an example, physical damage to an 
underground hangar complex or airfield that prevents an enemy from launching fighter jets 
for some number of hours might be the commander’s desired effect of a given strike.  
Verification of craters of a certain depth and placement informs the commander of a functional 
kill; the strike has not destroyed any of the fighter jets yet has delayed their employment long 
enough to make their threat moot.  Alternatively, if the strike did not achieve the desired effect 
on-target, it may drive a commander to authorize another sortie or to adjust plans to account 
for the possible employment of the enemy fighter jets. 
While BDA to some extent is unique to military operations, there are corollaries with civil 
applications that involve the spread of radiological or nuclear sources, especially in an urban 
area.  This spread might be a from a “dirty bomb” scenario or an improvised nuclear device 
that fails to achieve a significant nuclear yield, known as a fizzle. The radiation detection 
requirements for the offensive military BDA scenario are likely to be quite similar to that of 
a civil response to an incident where radiological or nuclear material is explosively spread 
over an urban or industrial area.   
The bombings of the Al-Kibar reactor site in the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria in 2007, as 
well as the bombings of the Osirak reactor at the Al Tuwaitha Research Nuclear Center in 
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Iraq in 1981, both conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), are prime examples of where 
BDA enhanced with radiation detection capabilities could have proved useful.   
Though Syria signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), they failed to declare Al-Kibar to the IAEA.  Intelligence collected by Israeli-
operatives over some time determined that they were building a clandestine reactor at Al-
Kibar in the remote desert of eastern Syria, near the Euphrates river.  The facility was built in 
cooperation with North Korea and modeled after the Yongbyon facility [153]. Shortly after 
conclusive intelligence was gathered that proved the existence and purpose of the facility, a 
decision was made to execute a strike on the suspected plutonium production reactor.  As 
such, they anticipated that the Syrians had not yet fueled the reactor, but that construction was 
complete, and the facility was nearing operational capability.  Recently released cockpit 
footage and photographs suggest that standard BDA means were sufficient for the 
circumstances encountered.  However, had the Syrian’s fueled the reactor or stored fissile 
material onsite, a method to confirm or deny such a condition would be highly desirable. 
The bombing of Osirak was conducted under similar auspices, though it is interesting to 
note that Iran attacked and initially damaged the site first in 1980, shortly after the outbreak 
of the Iran-Iraq war.  However, due to concerns about spreading radioactive material, they did 
not attack the actual reactor building dome.  Instead, they targeted the control room, research 
facilities, and adjacent centrifuge buildings.  While both sides disputed the efficacy of the 
attack, Iran dropped nearly a dozen 500-pound bombs on the site resulting in severe damage 
to several buildings along with the plant cooling mechanisms. However, based on the reactor 
building remaining intact, suspected rebuilding efforts of the ancillary infrastructure, and the 
desire to send a message to Arab nations regarding the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the IDF 
completed the mission and destroyed the reactor complex with an overwhelming strike in June 
of 1981.      
While other remote sensing modalities may have informed targeteers that the bombing 
achieved the desired effect, it is unlikely that they were able to sense whether nuclear material 
was present at the site or if such material had been dispersed or otherwise released in 
conjunction with the bombing. The advantages of a remote sensing radiation detection 
platform that conducts BDA following a strike on a suspected nuclear or radiological target 
are numerous.  First, the ability of a team of people to rapidly access the target area is likely 
to be far more limited.  Second, the synchronization required to deploy remote platforms on 
target is far more flexible than that required to put BDA teams on the ground.  Third, several 
remote platforms could easily be deployed to achieve redundant coverage, corroborate 
findings between systems, or investigate multiple targets.   
The employment of remote sensing radiation detection platforms allows the commander 
to preserve limited critical resources, such as a force designated to recover weapons-usable 
material, until measurement confirms the presence of the material at a specific target.  
Furthermore, timely and accurate information gathered by a remote platform may have 
strategic messaging implications concerning the spread of radioactive contamination or the 
presence of materials which violate international treaties or agreements.   
 
 






The term consequence management comprises those measures taken to protect public 
health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to 
governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, 
biological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive situation [1]. From a DoD perspective, there are 
several reasons to maintain the capability to conduct nuclear consequence management 
operations.  First and foremost, the DoD possesses, operates, and maintains nuclear reactors 
and weapons that could be the source of the situation.  Second, DoD forces could be part of 
those affected by the consequences of a nuclear situation.  Third, the DoD could be called to 
assist civil authorities with executing the measures taken to protect the public, restore services, 
and provide emergency relief.   
One only needs to look to the relatively recent past to find an example where autonomous, 
remote radiation detection could have proved invaluable to a consequence management 
situation; specifically, the significant release of radioactive cesium and iodine triggered by 
the massive earthquake and follow-on tsunami that occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011.  
While the reactors automatically shut down as designed immediately after the earthquake, the 
six external power sources to operate the cooling systems were lost and the tsunami that 
followed within an hour wiped out the emergency backup generators.  Insufficient cooling to 
three of the reactors caused partial melting of the fuel and led to hydrogen gas buildup from 
high-temperature reactions with the zirconium cladding, which eventually triggered 
explosions in the containment buildings and an above-grade fuel cooling storage pond.  
The release of an estimated 570 petabecquerel's (15.4 MCi) resulted in the government-
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directed evacuations of the area within 30 kilometers of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Plants.  In support of the Japanese government, the U.S. Department of Energy aided in 
producing a survey of the initial contamination.  Members of the combined team completed 
the survey with a combination of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft as well as various ground 
stations to provide calibration reference data.  The first measurements flown near the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant took place six days after the earthquake and tsunami.  
The delay was caused by the time it took to deploy assets and obtain the clearance to begin 
work.  While this was undoubtedly beneficial and the efforts of those who conducted the 
surveys should be commended, a small fleet of instrumented fixed-winged UAVs could have 
provided a more rapid response along with higher fidelity knowledge of the extent and 
deposition of contamination.  
There are several aspects of the response that would have benefited from the technology 
discussed herein, the main uses would have been (plume/fallout) drove evacuation 
recommendations, status of the reactor site (flew manned and unmanned helicopters on site  - 
could have been deployed much faster, flown closer to the source, and limited exposure of 
flight crews.  “A significant problem in tracking radioactive release was that 23 out of the 24 
radiation monitoring stations on the plant site were disabled by the tsunami” [154]. With 
regards to ground stations, a handful of multi-rotor detection platforms would have provided 
a better representation of the average contamination for a given monitoring site rather than 
relying on measurements from a single position, owing to the inhomogeneous spatial 
distribution of the deposited radioactive material. 
Remediation and recovery efforts represent an even broader application space.  The 
government is allowing people to move back into areas that they have “cleared,” often through 
hand-collected and recorded monitoring data.  The alternative drone-based detection system 
could cover the same area in a much short amount of time with sub-meter position resolution, 
and provide a detailed radiation “heat map” survey to residents to assure them that the area is 
safe as well as providing a baseline measurement record to monitor for change over time.     
 
 






The priorities for the DoD response to U.S. nuclear weapon accidents are the location, 
security, and recovery of the weapon; the protection of lives and property; and remediation of 
the site [2]. Even though accidents involving nuclear weapons are particularly low occurrence 
events—just thirty-two documented U.S. “broken arrow” events since 1950—they remain a 
low-probability high-consequence event, even when taking modern safety design features into 
account [3].  While the high-alert nature of Cold War–era strategies, particularly Operation 
Chrome Dome, increased the probability of such events, the estimated 1,750 U.S. weapons 
that remain operationally deployed is a sober fact that must be taken into consideration for 
when planning a response to mishaps involving special nuclear materials [4].  Some of the 
tasks where an unmanned capability could prove are assessing the extent of the accident site, 
confirming or denying the release of radioactive material, mapping the radioactive 
contamination, locating aircraft or missile parts, locating nuclear material or weapons 
components, and verifying site remediation.  
Two events that exemplify the need for a robust capability to remotely detect, locate, 
identify, characterize, and map radiological and nuclear material and contamination involve 
U.S. Air Force bombers that crashed with nuclear weapons onboard during Operation Chrome 
Dome.  The first was the crash of a B-52 during airborne refueling operations taking place 
near Palomares, a small fishing village on the Mediterranean coast of Spain.  The second 
involved the abandonment of a B-52 due to a fire in the cockpit.  The crew was attempting to 
make an emergency landing at Thule Airbase in Greenland but became overwhelmed by the 
smoke.   
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Each accident required significant recovery efforts and involved personnel looking for 
bomb material in austere environments.  In the Thule accident, four thermonuclear weapons 
were on-board, and radioactive material was released from the bombs upon impact and 
detonation of the high explosives, though a nuclear detonation did not occur.  The recovery 
effort took months; sub-zero conditions and lack of daylight made the effort that much more 
difficult.  The blacken snow from the burning of the aircraft fuel delineated the general search 
area.  Officials estimated recovery of 94% of the plutonium and 85% of the uranium, as well 
as 2,100 m3 of contaminated liquid which was shipped to Savannah River, SC for storage and 
processing. 
Nevertheless, if at the time they could remotely map the spread of the contamination as 
well as indicate potential hot spots, the recovery of the special nuclear material and 
contaminated snow and ice could have been more efficient and thorough.  Large-scale human 
involvement would still have been integral to the recovery and cleanup effort.  However, a 
remotely acquired map of the contaminated area with hot spots identified would have given 
those planning and supervising the operation valuable situational awareness and allow them 
to focus initial efforts in key locations.  It would also give them better fidelity on the 
effectiveness of their removal efforts.  Alas, these two events occurred before the advent and 
widespread use of global navigation satellite systems, though drones and remote sensing 
capabilities were on the rise at the time.   
Current response procedures entail the use of fixed-wing aircraft for aerial photography 
and imagery collection (e.g., multispectral, hyperspectral, thermal) and previously discussed 
rotary-wing assets for aerial search and radiological mapping.  There is also mention of a four-
wheel-drive vehicle with detectors capable of high-spatial-resolution mapping of 
contamination  [155].  While we should not discount these capabilities and agree they still 
have relevance to the mission, they all require putting human operators into the debris field 
and do not provide the speed, fidelity, specificity, and coverage that a swarm of sUAS-based 
detectors flying close to the ground could.  The essential take away is that the risk of accidents 
involving nuclear weapons still exists, yet the organizations responsible for the assessment, 
consolidation, recovery, disposition, and site remediation phases currently possess little or no 









Nuclear Contamination Avoidance 
Limited nuclear warfare requires forces, on both sides of the conflict, to be prepared to 
operate in and cross through a nuclear-contaminated area. A required supporting task is to 
conduct a terrain-oriented zone or route reconnaissance to plan a route that minimizes the 
radiation exposure to forces, subject to the constraints of other competing military factors [5]. 
Current doctrine employs either Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Radiological (CBRN) 
reconnaissance platoons or rotary-wing aircraft outfitted with dosimeters and survey meters.  
Current generation M1135 Stryker Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Reconnaissance Vehicles 
(NBCRV) are medium armored vehicles which use readings from a vehicle-mounted beta and 
gamma probe—the Army-Navy Vehicle or Dismounted Radiac-meter (AN/VDR-2)—that 
measures dose rate and records accumulated dose [6].  There are efforts to integrate the data 
from the AN/VDR-2 with automated collection and mapping software, known as nuclear, 
biological, and chemical sensor processing group (NBCSPG), however, it is not currently 
fielded to CBRN units. 
Although the threat of limited nuclear warfare may not be at the top of the list of the most 
likely conflict scenarios, it remains possible and is a driver of validated materiel requirements 
within the DoD.  The potential benefits of developing an unmanned reconnaissance system 
for contamination avoidance are numerous: (1) reduce dose to personnel, (2) increase 
coverage area, (3) avoid terrain limitations, (4) allow CBRN personnel to conduct other 
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While accurate meteorological data and dose rate level of specificity may be enough to 
plan a route, the requirement to use manned armored vehicles or aircraft to probe the contours 
of a high radiation area is nonsensical.  One could easily outfit NBCRV with one or more 
small, tube-launched, fixed-wing unmanned aerial systems with onboard sensors optimized 
for aerial monitoring of radioactive plumes and fallout.  Moreover, the sensor for chemical, 
biological, and meteorological information requirements could potentially be integrated into 
the same platform, thereby streamlining and modernizing the reconnaissance and collection 
capabilities of CBRN units.    
The potential benefits of such a system are numerous.  First, the idea of sending a $5M-
vehicle with a crew of four highly trained, low-density personnel to gather dose rate 
information to help protect the rest of the force is archaic.  The DoD can, and certainly should 
have a capability beyond this 1930’s chemical warfare-based approach. In fact, during the 
nuclear weapons testing conducted as part of Operation Crossroads in 1946, drone aircraft 
and boats were used to assess the radiation intensities before anyone was permitted to enter 
the area following a detonation.  
Second, aerial collection, while not immune to becoming contaminated, offers a far better 
option in terms of reducing contamination to the vehicle and sensing instruments and is much 
easier to decontaminate.  That is, the 21-ton vehicle kicking up dust and debris while traveling 
through the contaminated area is far more likely to become inundated with contamination and 
therefore systematically over-estimate dose rates because of the near field effects of 
radioactive particles stuck to the vehicle.  It is also much easier to decontaminate or abandon 
equipment costing ~$100k with a surface area < 0.5 m2 than it is to do the same with a $5M 
vehicle with a surface area greater than 75 m2.   
Third, a small, unmanned aerial system is a much lower priority target for enemy 
engagement than an armored reconnaissance vehicle.  While an unmanned aerial system is 
still susceptible to enemy fire and countermeasures, a peculiar-looking group of armored 
vehicles traveling in and around the vicinity where a nuclear weapon was employed is much 
more likely to attract a lethal enemy response.  The loss of one M1135 Stryker NBCRV, not 
including the personnel, specialized equipment, armament, and ammunition, represents at 
least fifty sUAS.  
Even so, this integration effort is not quite as simple as mounting a dosimeter on a UAV 
and calling it a capability.  Some excellent work along in pursuing an initial capability, 
including autonomous search, was carried out by investigators at the Johns Hopkins Applied 
Physics Laboratory (APL). Unfortunately, the work was not pursued further by the sponsor 
and a true capability never made it through the research and development “valley of death” 
into the hands of a user.   
Some of the further tasks in designing such a system would include (1) developing the 
radiation detection element so that it provided an adequate response across the entire range of 
possible radiation environments while optimizing it for the most likely, (2) engineering the 
system from radiation hardened electronic components, and (3) ensuring the range, duration, 
and recovery of the system meets or exceeds threshold user requirements, and (4) integrate 
the data from the multiple radiation sensors into a situational awareness tool.  
 
 






Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear and other radioactive materials, either pre- 
or post-detonation, using various collection methods and analytical techniques to determine 
the composition, origin, age, and history of a material [8] [7]. Arguably the most advanced 
capabilities in remote sensing of radiation reside within the field of nuclear forensics.  
Endeavors sponsored by government agencies to develop pre-detonation capabilities focus 
primarily on nonproliferation and monitoring efforts.  In monitoring for nuclear testing, the 
source term is generally located deep underground and very little of the fission products make 
it out into the atmosphere unless there is a major malfunction during the test; or a nation could 
decide that it is necessary and prudent to conduct atmospheric testing of their nuclear 
weapons, which makes forensic collection easier.  Such a capability has been demonstrated 
as a bolt-on pod with the collection and measuring systems integrated onto a UAV [9]. 
However, we do not possess an advanced capability to collect materials for post-
detonation nuclear forensics.  Should a nation-state or violent extremist organization detonate 
a nuclear device in the U.S. or one of our partner-nations, our response policies dictate the 
collection and measurement of forensic materials from the nearby fallout area to attribute the 
device or fissile material to a source, especially when it is not readily evident or needs to be 
confirmed.  An unmanned system has many benefits but would likely have the most stringent 
constraints of all the mission areas.  Not only would it need to operate in a complex and high 
radiation setting, like that of a contamination avoidance mission, it would also need to be 
capable of excellent specificity and localization in a highly inhomogeneous environment.  
Current efforts are focused on using swarms of UAVs to characterize a debris field to direct 
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follow-on forces to auspicious collection areas with lower dose rates [10]. 
These requirements point to a very sophisticated radiation sensor package, likely using 
cutting edge detection materials such as GaGG, which has excellent timing characteristics for 
high count rate environments, medium energy resolution for isotope identification and 
characterization, and it can be finely pixelated for imaging applications.  Other potential 
detection materials include LaBr3.  Current semiconductor materials would likely incur 









Nuclear Disablement  
This mission area is a bit nebulous but is somewhat aligns with consequence management 
and environmental monitoring.  Nuclear disablement includes those operations associated 
with the assessment and handling of supporting nuclear infrastructure that might be 
encountered or targeted as part of military actions in a given area of operations.  Most likely 
this involves the safe shutdown of enrichment or reactor facilities, securing materials not yet 
assembled as a weapon, and any other tasks that fall into the category of nuclear-related, 
excluding weaponized or deployed systems [11]. 
Current capabilities reside in small teams of military personnel (~15 personnel) with 
specialized training in the operation of such facilities, and a limited amount of hand-operated 
or vehicle-mounted detection equipment.  Due to the uncertain nature of the mission, location, 
and conditions, most tasks are completed by hand.  However, teams usually conduct an initial 
survey of a facility using either a small, all-terrain vehicle, a vehicle-towed trailer system, or 
a helicopter, outfitted with a set of large directional gamma and thermal neutron detectors.    
The scale of facilities like a centrifuge plant is on the order of a square kilometer or more.  
This vast area presents a challenge to small nuclear disablement teams that are quickly triaging 
a vast site to identify and classify threats in order to take actions to exploit, degrade, or destroy 
critical and at-risk components.  While these operations are likely to take place in a semi-
permissive environment (e.g., the area is protected by a sizable security force, or the enemy 
threat is negligible in that area), nuclear disablement forces could also be high-value targets 
for snipers or insurgents in the area.  
A small number of autonomous radiation sensors could prove invaluable for deliberately 
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conducting exterior and interior reconnaissance of the facility.  These would relieve a good 
portion of the NDT members from swinging a meter and free them to use their human 
sensors—primarily their eyes and ears coupled with their intellect and training.  Anyone who 
has operated a radiation detector in the field recognizes the tunnel vision that goes along with 
it and how difficult it is to conduct other tasks simultaneously.  Moreover, an autonomous 
capability does not rule out the need to maintain a certain level of human-operated equipment 
or other specialized detectors.  It merely acts as a combat multiplier by alleviating a 
monotonous task that drained personnel resources for a good portion of the initial phase of an 










Active interrogation involves directing neutrons or high-energy photons toward a target 
and measuring the secondary radiation to gather information about the target.   Government 
agencies have expended tens of millions of dollars or more on active interrogation projects 
since 2001.  Whether the method includes a sizeable bremsstrahlung source, a pulsed neutron 
source, or some other novel source, such as cosmic muons or a photon beam driven by laser-
wake field electron acceleration, they all suffer from one common limitation: the signal they 
induce, while unique and identifiable, obeys the same inverse square law as the passive signal 
and is therefore difficult to detect at any operationally significant range [7].   
While several schemes also have issues with delivering potentially harmful dose to 
humans, both to the operator as well as persons within the screening area, the biggest hurdle 
is the need for large detectors often located away from the interrogation source (known as a 
bi-static or bicentric arrangement).  So, not only is a trailer-sized source required, but one or 
more trailer-sized detectors must be arranged around the target but away from the source as 
to not be washed out by the source signal.  This sine qua non is insupportable for most military 
applications, aside from using the source as a directed energy weapon.   
However, there is continuing research that could provide more compact sources that 
deliver an acceptably-low dose to operators and potential bystanders within the target area.  
Couple that to a detection platform that is small, autonomous, remote, and has a sensor with 
high energy resolution and imaging capabilities, and a tractable concept of operations begins 
to emerge.  That is, a suite of remote detectors could be flown, dropped, or launched to 
locations on or around the target of interest, thereby significantly decreasing the detector size 
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required to achieve the same sensitivity.  With this reduction in detector size, employment of 
high-resolution detection materials becomes feasible, thereby improving specificity and 
reducing the minimum detectable amount of material.  Moreover, the use of a position-
sensitive arrangement of detectors, from simple occlusion up to a pixelated Compton imaging 
array, is conceivable and could provide additional information regarding the quantity, 
location, and arrangement of material being interrogated.  
